Please find attached from the Burma Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (BCPR):

· BCPR Analysis Paper No 1 – The Dynamics of Sixty Years of Ethnic Armed Conflict in Burma

· BCPR Briefing Paper No 2 – The Conflict In Kachin State – Time To Revise The Costs Of War?

rNo1-TheDynamicsofSixtyYearsofEthnicArmedConflictinBurma

erNo2-TheConflictInKachinState-TimeToReviseTheCostsOfWar

If you would like to be removed from or added to this list, please email bxl@euro-burma.be.

Euro-Burma Office
Square Gutenberg 11/2
1000 Brussels, Belgium

Tel: (32 2) 280 0691 / 280 2452
Fax: (32 2) 280 0310
Email: bxl@euro-burma.be
Website: www.euro-burma.eu

The aim of the Euro-Burma Office is to promote the development of democracy in Burma by assisting the Burmese democracy movement to prepare for a transition to democracy.

What is Genocide? What is Rohingya genocide? When did it began? In which part of Burma is this taking place? Are there refugees taking shelter in the neighboring countries?  Who are the parties involved?, What should be done about it? Does it have anything to do with Rohingya’s race or religion? Are there democratic minded Rakhines to help stop the crisis?These are some of the questions people are curios to know. Human rights and international UN agencies are curiously waiting to know from the present “democratic” government what measures it is taking to stop genocide in Burma? .

First, what is genocide?
Genocide is “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves”"Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such:
a. killing members of the group
b. Committing bodily or mental harm to members of the group
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group.(1)

What is Rohingya Genocide?
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The so called amnesty announced by Burma’s Thein Sein government on January 2^nd, 2012 shattered the dreams of the political prisoners, their families and the Burmese democratic societies.  The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton clearly stated that if there is no visible improvement for change, including releasing of all political prisoners, the United States will not lifting the sanction.  Thein Sein government is still following the footsteps of its previous military regime by refusing political prisoners existed in Burma prisons, instead, he said there are only criminals existed in Burma’s notorious prisons.  He says those who are in prisons break the existing laws and there are no political prisoners. The amnesty is in fact to fool the international key players that they are releasing prisoners with good intention.  But the US and European Union also know the tricks that regime has been producing time after time.

The previous military regime gave long prison terms to legendary heroes of 88 Generation student leaders to 65 years prison term.  The current amnesty announcement on January 2^nd only reduced the jail terms by different categories.

It said persons who were sentenced to death will change to life without parole, and over 30 years should reduce to 30 years, those who had over 20 years and 30 years should be reduced to 20 years, 20 years and under should be reduced to ¼ of its term. For example a person who has 20 years term should reduce to 15 years.

The leader of Shan National League for Democracy Party, Khun Htun Oo, whose party won the land slide victory in Shan States in 1990, was sentenced to 90 years.  According to the amnesty order he still has 30 years.  88 generation student leaders got 65 years terms so their prison term should be the same as Khum Htun Oo reduced from 65 to 30.

The main motivation for this amnesty order is indirectly rejecting to release political prisoners.  From the start all the jail terms were systematically orchestrated to extremely given 10 to 50 times higher than the original prison terms.

Min Ko Naing and his group led the peaceful demonstration in 1997 demanding the lower gas and consumer prices and in return, they got 65 years prison term.   Under Thein Sein regime, demonstrations in the public places is allowed in the new constitution but in reality, people who tried to register for demonstration have been rejected. Those who break the law and demonstrate without permission will get 2 years prison term.  Min Ko Naing and his group got 65 years term is 32 times higher than the actual term.  When reduced to 30 years term, still it is 15 times higher. Thein Sein regime outright rejected to release political prisoners will lead Burma into a sleeping volcano.  It can erupt at any time, any moment, without any warning, unfortunately.

Thein Sein shed his true colors.  He is nothing more than a puppet of the military dictatorship.  If we want to see the release of 88 Generation student leaders and ethnic leaders, we need to fight, in order to, not falling back into the cunning tricks like in the olden days, which they use political prisoners as hostages for their own benefits and interests.  On the other hand, we have to push it for nation -wide demonstrations, we have to mobilize the people and signal them it is time to rise up without hesitation as we have no other choice.

Htun Aung Gyaw

The Regime War against Humanitarianism

Kanbawza Win

The international community was shock and aghast when the Burmese military regime turned down the humanitarian aid offered by the international community after  the Nargis Cyclone hit the country in May 2008 killing some 200,000 people and making millions homeless. The United Nations practically had to beg to deliver assistance to hundreds of thousands flood-stricken people and according to the UN figures 80,000 people needlessly died from their regime’s arrogance This episode alone proves that the Burmese Generals and the army (Tatamadaw) have no good will (cetena) to its own people. So it came to no surprise when the Burmese regime block the humanitarian aid to the Kachin refugees running away from an all out war waged by the Tatamadaw against its own people just like what President Bashar al-Assad is doing in Syria..What cruelty and inhuman gesture can be more vivid than this and yet it is hoping for the West to lift sanctions and enter into the community of civilized nations?

The current regime lacks the experience of independent struggles or Cold War politics. They are not able to stand on a nationalistic platform or non-alliance ideology and knaves in playing political theory games. The only lessons they have learnt is some effective ways to hold on to their power.  The training and lectures given to them is somewhat

-We work harder than others for the sake of the country.
-We sacrifice our lives to work for the sake of the country.
-Our comrades are injured or killed by our enemies.
-The enemies who injure or killed us are supported by a part of the population.
-We must follow orders, live under the discipline of the army at all the time.
-We are soldiers serving the country 24-hours a day.

Hence from the soldier’s view, ordinary people and civil servants live more easy-going lives. They are undisciplined and have many leisure hours. They do business just to enrich themselves. The end result is that soldiers believe they have the sole right to hold state power due to their hard work and sacrifices. These basic opinions not only hinder the relationship between the people and the Tatmadaw, but also between the opposition groups and the Tatmadaw.

When the army cracks down on peaceful demonstrators and monks, they viewed them as lazy opportunists who are asking for rights without working hard and sacrificing like them. The Tatmadaw, in a way, blames the people for failing to develop the country. Although the army as a whole works hard, the people and civil servants don’t work hard. Foreigners work and think smarter than lazy Burmese people, and these are the reasons developed countries are ahead of Burma seems to be the Tatmadaw’s logic and rationale. However, when ordinary people go abroad to seek job opportunity, they see them as betraying the country and opting for a foreign one The soldiers work industriously because they receive advantages from their work. They are disciplined because they are simply reaping the advantages from performing well. The regime especially the members of the ruling party who are old soldiers did not have the slightest idea that Burma could not move forward because of the army’s heavy handed control. So declaring war on humanitarian works and obstructing both the local and international NGOs is their humanitarian works is normal for them. Obviously they admire the dictum of Mao Ze Dong:

“Crack down on the extreme minority, leave the educated to live in illusion, and                             label the majority of ordinary people as supporters.”

The mentality of this Burmese quasi civilian government is such that it could not comprehend that humanitarian aid is an act of philanthropy and nothing more as helping the cyclone or a war victim. The ex brass are so evil and so engrossed in the fear of losing power that they are blocked from every reasoning power. Only brute force and punitive actions can make them understand. It becomes and international duty to make these brute to understand or otherwise it will continue to commit crime against humanity. With such kind of mentality it will be very difficult to make them comprehend that that every mortal being has the right to receive humanitarian assistance and to offer it is a fundamental humanitarian principle.

Tatmadaw propaganda encourages a blind racist nationalism, full of references to protecting the race meaning the Myanmar. This implies that if the Myanmar do not oppress other nationalities then they find themselves be oppressed. For them national reconciliation means assimilation and preventing disintegration of the Union of Burma  all the ethnic races must be assimilated into the Myanmar race including their language, culture and values. Hence if the Tatmadaw falls then everything will fall. The military construe that the international community, is constantly telling them to give up their hold on power and open up the way to become the real democracy and the Genuine Union of Burma. What right have they to tell us what to do?

Drugs money also makes a substantial contribution to army coffers. Official policy is to suppress opium growing. In reality, production has nearly tripled since as once can see in the UN report. Narco related companies in Rangoon pay off the army and money from this illicit trade permeates the military hierarchy. Cut off from their roots in the people and corrupted by a far more luxurious lifestyle than is available to ordinary Burmese, they became desperate. Amid the poverty, army officers maintain a privileged lifestyle, enjoying golf courses, seaside villas, Mercedes limousines and other luxuries. On retirement from the army, they are awarded lucrative jobs as directors of state-run enterprises

In recent years humanitarian agencies have been working in conflicts in Burma where the Tatmadaw have no interest in respecting international law, and where international political action to enforce this respect has been weak or ineffective. Humanitarian action was seen by the Burmese government at best as interference, or as an unfriendly act. Humanitarian personnel and assets were neither respected nor protected at all times. Payment was demanded at checkpoints, relief items stolen and aid workers threatened because of their control of resources and assets

.           Humanitarian assistance in Burma especially in Kachin state where the government is waging an all out war to annihilate the Kachin Race is both needed. People are suffering because of armed conflict and not because of natural disaster or disease. By definition, therefore, part of the territory in which the NGO attempts to deliver assistance is outside of any government’s control. The Geneva Conventions make clear that states and non-state actors involved in armed conflict have a responsibility to make sure that all “persons taking no active part in the hostilities” (and this includes humanitarian aid workers) are treated humanely. The UN Security Council has even passed a resolution urging “…States to ensure that crimes against such personnel [participating in humanitarian operations] do not remain unpunished. But the wild Tatmadaw would not respect the international law. The escalation in fighting in Kachin State, increased human-rights abuses against civilians, massive internal displacement and high levels of vulnerability all frustrated these attempts at participation. Increasing insecurity made it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to apply participatory approaches to relief programming.  It was difficult for humanitarian agencies to obtain adequate planning information, such as needs assessments and problem analyses.

Allowing government actors to decide where humanitarians can or cannot go and allowing governments to impose military escorts as a condition for protection might well protect humanitarian workers,  kills the very principles of humanitarian assistance and that is what the current Burmese regime is doing. The Tatmadaw and the generals are too naive to understand that respect and non-aggression toward humanitarian assistance is needed in the conflict areas. Humanitarian aid workers are not volunteering for martyrdom. Refusing the humanitarian aid or persecuting the aid workers and looting the aid for the solders as they often do made the Burmese Tatmadaw not a warring party but criminals.  When the civilized community requested the Tatmadaw protect the humanitarian assistance they are simply requesting them to live up to their commitment to create a space in which humanitarian assistance can operate. Is that such an impossible demand?

The UN Security Council doesn’t ask for that much effort on the part of states. What it does urge is that states do not allow crimes against humanitarian workers to go unpunished. Humanitarian aid organizations are not asking for so much. They are just requesting safety guarantees from Tatmadaw not to commit crimes against humanitarian assistance and workers, and if some captains do commit such crimes as they often do don’t let them go unpunished. It’s an essential condition to ensuring that the people needing humanitarian assistance receive it. Lynn Yoshikawa from Refugees International, an independent humanitarian advocacy organization based in Washington, DC, recently completed an assessment  after visiting Myitkyina, Pa An and Moulmein said ,

“Refugees International is really worried over the security of the workers and       internally displaced persons (IDPs), thousands of those are living in insufficient        camps in areas where the sanctuaries are sandwiched between the Kachin           freedom fighters and the Tatmadaw.”

It seems that when confronting horrible conditions and repressive Burmese governments, humanitarian organizations in Burma are faced with the decision of observing silence in order to have continued access to populations versus publically denouncing what is going on and risking expulsion. The Burmese regime is preventing aid organizations from having access to the Internally Displaced Persons camps. There is little respect for humanitarian organizations in the eyes of the Burmese and even the International Committee of the Red Cross is heavily restricted. Ultimately the best balance is for humanitarian organizations to carefully vocalize their opposition – mainly through encouraging the international community to continue pressuring the government – without a dramatic head-on confrontation that jeopardizes the humanitarian space in the country. Or otherwise the new quasi Civilian government just like the previous Junta will continue to wage war against humanitarianism.

The head of the Euro-Burma Office, Mr Harn Yawnghwe, on his role in last month’s negotiations on the Thai-Myanmar border, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s role in peacebuilding and the need to achieve a ‘political solution’ with ethnic groups

Harn Yawnghwe (centre) and Minister for Railways U Aung Min (right) at ceasefire negotiations conducted on November 19-20.
Pic: Supplied

What role have you played in the peace negotiations that have taken place to date?

I was asked by Railways Minister U Aung Min to help set up meetings for him with the Shan State Army-South, Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party, Chin National Front and Kachin Independence Organisation on the Thai-Myanmar border. I did and I participated in all the meetings on November 19 as a facilitator. That was the extent of my involvement. I am not involved in any of the subsequent meetings or negotiations taking place between the government and the KIO or the SSA-S.

We’ve heard that subsequent negotiations have started between the government and KIO in Shweli. What can we expect from the negotiations, which are led by high-ranking Union Solidarity and Development Party members?

I was not involved in the meeting between the KIO and the government in Shweli. But such a meeting should have taken place long ago. It is not right that the conflict should have been allowed to escalate to the extent it has, causing the population to suffer. Government troops are trying to secure a road in an area that both sides acknowledge is KIO territory.

What advantages are there to conducting the talks on Chinese territory?

If the talks take place in government-held territory, the KIO could technically be at a disadvantage. The same is true for the government if they take place in KIO territory. Taking place in China – a neutral venue – gives both sides the same advantage. It is a matter of building trust and confidence in the preliminary stages of negotiations.

If Daw Aung San Suu Kyi becomes a member of parliament or even a member of the government, what effect will this have on the peace process?

It will depend on how the government wants to handle the peace process. If, as some people suspect, it only wants ceasefires, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s presence in the parliament or government will make no difference. But if the government really wants permanent peace her presence could speed up the process.

She has already said that she is ready to assist in whatever role she can. How do you think she can help?

One of the reasons the government’s peace offer is not being welcomed by the various ethnic groups is the fact that they do not believe the government really wants to resolve the problem through political dialogue. For example, the KIO agreed to a ceasefire in 1994 because the military government said that they can have a political dialogue when there is a new elected government. Therefore, the KIO participated in the National Convention and supported the holding of elections in 2010. As a member of parliament or the government, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi might be able to question why this is happening. If she can ensure that the government handles the peace process properly, confidence in the process can be restored. The negotiations can then move ahead.

Are you optimistic that she can help build trust between the government and ethnic groups?

The ethnic nationalities trust her because she is the daughter of General Aung San. He related to the ethnic leaders as equals. He listened to what they wanted and sincerely tried to find a political solution that everybody could be happy with. The concept of the nation they agreed to was a Union of Burma where the Bamar, Shan, Kachin, Chin and other ethnic nationalities would, as co-founders, equally share the burden of nation-building. Unfortunately, General Aung San’s successors did not share his vision. The Bamar instead replaced the British and took on the role of big brother, diminishing the role of the ethnic nationalities. It later became worse with the military believing that they were the only ones who should be responsible for the welfare of the nation. She definitely can help rebuild trust but to have a permanent peace in the country, we need nationwide discussions on what we want the Union of Myanmar to look like in the future. Today, the ethnic states do not want to separate from the union. But if there is no justice and no way to resolve disagreements in peacefully through political discussions, then the conflicts will continue.

Critics say the government has made progress in political reform but little improvement in the way it deals with ethnic armed organisations. What’s your opinion?

The ethnic armed organisations exist because there was no way for ethnic nationalities to peacefully express their disagreement. Asking the armed groups to just stop fighting and engage in making money will not solve the problem. They are not fighting because they want to make money. They feel that the role of the ethnic nationalities in the history of Myanmar has not been recognised.

NEW DELHI – US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Myanmar (Burma), noted largely for a memorable photo opportunity with a wan but smiling Aung San Suu Kyi, signaled a significant change in the geopolitics surrounding a land that has faced decades of isolation, sanctions, and widespread condemnation for its human-rights violations.

Twenty-one years ago, after Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) swept a general election, the results were annulled, the party’s leaders and workers were incarcerated or exiled, and two decades of ruthless – and remarkably opaque – military rule followed. This year has witnessed political opening, the release of several prominent political prisoners, and evidence of self-assertion by the nominally civilian government (headed by a former general, Thien Sein). Suu Kyi’s announcement of her intention to contest a by-election to the new parliament offers a glimmer of hope that democrats could use the fledgling political process to create something resembling genuine representative government.

Burma’s military rulers are cynically hoping to use Suu Kyi’s participation in the parliamentary process to bolster the illusion of freedom while continuing to exercise real control. But such exercises in “managed democratization” – in places as different as Iran, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union – have often surprised their would-be manipulators. It is clearly in the interests of both India and the United States to seize this opportunity. While China has always been much more comfortable dealing with a military regime, India’s embrace of the junta has been more reluctant, based on reasons of geography rather than shared ideals.

When the generals in Rangoon (Yangon) suppressed a popular uprising in 1988, overturned the NLD’s overwhelming electoral victory, shot students, and arrested the new democratically elected leaders, India’s government initially reacted as most Indians would have wanted. For many years, India was unambiguously on the side of democracy, freedom, and human rights in Burma – not only rhetorically, like the regime’s Western critics, but also in more tangible ways. It offered asylum to fleeing students, allowed them to operate their resistance movement within India (with some financial help), and supported a pro-democratic newspaper and a radio station.

Then reality intruded. India’s strategic rivals, China and Pakistan, began to cultivate the Burmese generals. Major economic and geopolitical concessions were offered to both suitors. The Chinese even began developing a port on the Burmese coast, far closer to Calcutta than to Canton. And the junta’s generals began providing safe havens and arms to a motley assortment of anti-India rebels that would wreak havoc in the country’s Northeastern states and retreat to sanctuaries in newly renamed Myanmar.

Four of India’s politically sensitive Northeastern states have international borders with Myanmar. But the key development was the discovery of large natural-gas deposits in Burma, which would not be available to an India deemed hostile to the regime. India realized that its rivals were gaining ground in its backyard, while it was losing out on new economic opportunities. The price of pursuing a moral foreign policy became too high.

So India turned 180 degrees. The increasingly forlorn resistance operations based on Indian territory were shut down. And India sweetened the generals’ tea by providing both military assistance and intelligence support in their never-ending battles against their own rebels. India had gone from standing up for democracy to aiding and enabling the military regime. As I wrote at the time, “India’s policy may be governed by the head rather than the heart, but in the process we are losing a little bit of our soul.”

Yet, paradoxically, Myanmar’s gradual opening following the 2011 elections and the installation of Thien Sein as president may offer India some measure of vindication. As the new regime released political prisoners, permitted freedom of movement to the detained Suu Kyi, and even questioned the environmental and economic impact of a big Chinese dam project in the country’s north, Western critics began to acknowledge that genuine change might be on the way. Countries like India that had maintained links with the junta and gently prized open its clenched fist may well have achieved more than those whose threats, bluster, and sanctions had merely hardened the general’s stance.

In canceling a $3.6 billion Myitsone hydro-electric project (90% of whose electricity would have been exported to China), the Burmese government surprised most observers, even though Chinese analysts were quick to express understanding of the government’s desire not to be seen as wholly subservient to a much more powerful neighbor. But the signal is clear: Myanmar is not a Chinese vassal state, and is willing to diversify its foreign relations.

It is in Burma’s interests to have more than one suitor wooing it; offsetting one neighbor against another is a time-honored diplomatic practice. Though China’s engagement dwarfs India’s, Myanmar-India bilateral trade reached almost $1.1 billion in 2010-2011, and India is now Myanmar’s fourth-largest trading partner, after Thailand, Singapore, and China, accounting for 70% of the country’s agricultural exports.

Economics can always open political doors. “That Myanmar could defy the Chinese,” wrote Indian scholar Sreeram Chaulia, “is being seen as a sign that political space exists for the US to work as a facilitator of the democratization process in Myanmar.” Clinton’s visit brought confirmation that India has been playing a quiet but effective role in promoting greater engagement with the Burmese.

India cannot and should not seek to outdo China in appeasing the military junta. Its natural instincts lie with the Burmese democrats, Suu Kyi, and the former students for whom it has, over the years, shown its support. With the US signaling its willingness to take Thein Sein’s political openness at face value, the stage is set for the region’s democracies, especially India, to open Burma’s windows to the world. China will be watching closely.
Shashi Tharoor, a former Indian Minister of State for External Affairs and UN Under-Secretary General, is a member of India’s parliament and the author of a dozen books, including India from Midnight to the Millennium and Nehru: the Invention of India.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.
www.project-syndicate.org

ALTSEAN-Burma has released a briefer titled “Burma’s Parliament – A tool for institutionalized oppression.”
Burmas Parliament – A Tool for Institutionalized Oppression
From 22 August to 25 November, Burma’s Parliament held its second session. Despite the regime’s claim that an elected legislature was a crucial step towards the emergence of its “discipline-flourishing democracy,” the Parliament turned out to be the regime’s key tool for institutionalizing oppression.

The pro-regime Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)-dominated Parliament refused to repeal the draconian laws that provided the basis for the imprisonment of several thousand political prisoners in recent years. The refusal of Parliament to do away with the existing oppressive laws made the adoption of new and more progressive legislation irrelevant. The much-publicized “Peaceful Gathering and Demonstration Law” and “Labor Organizations Law” will not be sufficient to guarantee freedom of assembly and workers’ rights as long as the regime is still able to invoke the blanket “security” provisions of draconian laws.

The Parliament’s second session repeated the sham parliamentary debates witnessed during the January-March first session. Important issues, such as national reconciliation and the ongoing conflict in ethnic areas were only marginally discussed. During question time, regime ministers and officials went to great lengths to categorically deny human rights abuses and to justify repressive measures.

Debate and approval of the national budget remained off-limits to MPs because State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Chairman Sr Gen Than Shwe approved the budget for the 2011-2012 financial year before Parliament convened on 31 January.

The laws that govern parliamentary proceedings, enacted by Than Shwe in October 2010, continued to severely restrict parliamentary debate and participation. Censorship and lack of access continued to characterize the media environment during the Parliament’s second session.

The briefer is available at: http://bit.ly/w4pZKw

Yours, in solidarity,

ALTSEAN-Burma

Dear Mrs. Clinton,

On behalf of the Shan People I wish you success in your forthcoming visit to Burma, and at the same time may I present to you the voice of the Shan people: Like all other ethnic Nationalities the Shan do not want war and they do not want to fight the dictatorial armies. They want genuine peace.

But to them, genuine peace is achievable only if and when the dictatorial armed forces are withdrawn from all the ethnic states. As long as the dictatorial armed forces occupy their homelands the people will continue to suffer. There is no sign of the situation ever improving. The ethnic citizens have been living in fear and terror for more than half a century. No human beings should have the right to treat other human beings this way; in fact the regimes have no legal right to forcibly occupy the Shan State as the Shan State is a separate country in its own right. The regimes have abrogated the Panglong Agreement, so the legal tie between the Shan State and the Union of Burma has been broken. Even if the Panglong Agreement still exists between the two, the Shan State had the right to secede after ten years, that was in 1958.

All that the Shan and other ethnic nationalities ever wanted was their birthright:their ancestral and their homelands, the right to freedom, equality and self determination. Since the the Military regimes forcibly occupied the Shan State the people have not been able to move forward , they have retrogressed. The children have had no proper education, and many have become orphans because their parents had been killed by the soldiers.
Being in occupation of a state the dictatorial regimes have many advantages. Legally, or illegally it is recognised as a de facto government by the rest of the world and by regional and big powers. Its words whether true or false has more weight than the opposition and ethnic nationalities.

I hope you will consider supporting us in calling for the the regime to withdraw the dictatorial armed forces from all ethnic states. This is the only obstacle that is preventing peace in Burma. Please make your judgement and decision based on ethical, moral and legal grounds.

Sao Noan Oo
(Shan Elder)

ANTI-ROHINGYA CAMPAIGNS, VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS By Nurul Islam (U.K.)

Sunday, November 20, 2011 ROHINGYA BLOGGER

In a war that is becoming increasing vengeful, there is concrete evidence for the first time that a belligerent Burmese Army is using an unidentified chemical weapon in the unabated offensive against Kachin rebels in Northern Burma, lamented victims.
For over a week, the unidentified chemical weapon has been in use in three war zones against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) on Myitkyina-Manmaw (Bhamo) Road in Waingmaw township— Christian Prayer Hill and Lung Zep Kawng in Ga Ra Yang village, and Shwe Nyaung Pyin village, said KIA soldiers, who were attacked by this poison gas.

On Saturday, October 29, Burmese Army troops operating under orders from the Burmese government fired two mortar rounds of chemical weapons on the People’s Army fighters under the KIA in Prayer Hill, said civilian fighters.

La Gun, a civilian fighter and a victim of the chemical weapons attack told Kachin News Group today that, “Two rounds of chemical weapons were fired at us in Prayer Hill. There were seven of us present. Dark smoke billowed from the areas where the mortar shells landed.”

“When I breathed in the dark smoke I felt extremely dizzy, found it hard to breath, thirsty and felt like vomiting for hours,” he added.

The same chemical weapon was used during the week-long fighting in Lung Zep Kawng last week, La Gun said.

The same day, the chemical weapon was launched by the Burmese Army in Ntap Bum battle zone, near the KIA headquarters Laiza and four KIA soldiers felt dizzy, lay on the ground and began vomiting for a long time, said eyewitnesses.

The former General, President Thein Sein is responsible for the orders by a civilian government flouting the Geneva Protocol which forbids use of chemical and biological weapons in both civil and foreign conflict————

Burmese Army and Chemical Weapons
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FdAONUXgHlc

Chinalnd Guardian

22 October 2011 [CG Note: Ms Cheery Zahau has been a voice not only for women in Chin State but also for democracy, human rights and peace in Burma. Based in India and Thailand working with different organisations, the Chin human rights activist made several trips across the globe to raise ethnic and Burmese issues.

Recently, she went to the US and met with former US President Bush at his invitation. In this interview with Chinland Guardian, Cheery Zahau talked about her experiences, ethnic issues and views on current changes in Burma.]

Chinland Guardian: How long have you got involved as an activist working for Burma?

Cheery Zahau: I left Burma in 1999 after finishing my high school in Burma and joined the Chin women’s group operating in Mizoram along the India-Burma border. Since then, I have got involved in women’s groups, human rights groups and political groups.

Chinland Guardian: In which capacity did you start getting involved first?

Cheery Zahau: I started volunteering with the Chin Women Organisation, on the India-Burma border since 1999, teaching Chin and Burmese languages to Chin children who were born or growing up in Mizoram. Then, I continued volunteering with the organisation with small fund-raising activities by selling kitchen utilities, and we went from house to house where the Chin people are living. People thought what these punches of girls are doing.

In 2003, I was interning with the Central Chin Women Organization and I was helping to publish a quarterly bulletin “Rih Lasi” which featured articles and stories written by women in different Chin dialects, and to organize monthly Women’s Exchange as well as other office works.

Then, the mass deportation of Chin people erupted from 20 July till the end of October 2003. On the night of 20 July, many women and children came to our office. It was raining hard, cold, dark and the announcement of eviction via loud-speakers was everywhere. Our president, my supervisor and I went out and approached a prominent Mizo politician and asked for help. He let us use his empty house located outside of the city and the people who had no place to go home in Chin State or Burma took a temporary shelter.

During this time, my supervisor and I tried to spread the news as much as we could, but no one really knew the Chin refugees were there. It was so unknown. Since that day, I have become a human rights activist abandoning my education and future that I have dreamt of. I particularly mention this because I heard that some people assume activists outside of the country just got knowledge, travelled abroad and attended conferences. That’s not the case with many activists, young and old; they all have paid the price to be able to do what they are doing today.

Chinland Guardian: You have made many trips to several countries speaking for freedom, human rights and democracy in Burma. When was your first trip and who did you meet?

Cheery Zahau: In 2004, I was an intern with Alternative Asean Network on Burma (Altean-Burma) that gave me a chance to explore about the Chin situation in Mizoram and Chin State. I met with political leaders from Burma and other countries. In 2007, I went to speak at the British Parliament along with other Chin delegates, and that was the first time the Chin political activists were speaking at the parliament. It was organised by Christian Solidarity Worldwide and Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART). During this trip, we met about 20 British parliamentary members, European Union, high level officials at State Department, Congress and White House in the United States of America. Since then, the list goes on.

Chinland Guardian: Recently, you made a trip to the US at the invitation of former President George Bush. What can you tell us about it?

Cheery Zahau: I was emphasizing that Burma democracy movement needs a stronger political support including establishment of UN mandated Commission of Inquiry.

Chinland Guardian: As an activist, how do you see the current situation of changes in Burma and what could be the effect on women?

Cheery Zahau: We are seeing release of political prisoners, halting Myitsone dam project, more and more civil society groups in Burma emerge and become active, less censorship on media etc. I don’t want to be so cynical about some changes occurring in the country. Unfortunately, the fighting continues in ethnic areas, mass-displacement of people still happen, the Chin villagers contact me and tell me the Tatmadaw troops are still present, their villagers have not got proper schools, no roads, no electricity. Nothing has changed in their lives in that part of Burma.

In regards to women, we have only 22 women at the parliament who cannot raise their voices against the army-backed 600 men. So, women’s political participation is almost non-existent. Recently, 35 cases of rape were documented in Kachin State although we have been documenting hundreds of cases over the past years by different women’s groups in Burma. Can these women, parliamentary members, raise this issue at the parliament? Absolutely no. The new parliament budget allocation for education was 3 % of the national revenue; it is too small to help girls and boys in all parts of Burma, particularly girls in rural areas. So, if I conclude my remark, nothing has changed in Chin State and no tangible change for women yet.

Chinland Guardian: Many believe that ethnic issues cannot be ignored in Burma’s political arena. But some people think it is so complicated that it should be addressed at a later state. What’s your view on that?

Cheery Zahau: Ethnic issues are not a complicated matter; it depends on who says and who views it. It is the most crucial part to solve the problems in Burma. If we ignore more than 40 percent of the population and more than 50 percent of the land, the problems will not be solved. It’s been decades the dictatorship in Burma is trying to build a homogenous nation state. So, in order to have a centralized political power, what is the result? Civil war, refugees, mass-displacement of people, and poverty?

The simple fact is that General Aung San said, “If a Burman gets one kyat, you will get one kyat.” The ethnic people are upholding this principle the dictators, even the new military dominant government, are ignoring for decades. In my opinion, only if we resolve ethnic issues, then we can find solutions to tackle other problems. The public (majority) in Burma also need to have deeper and comprehensive understanding of ethnic issues with a broad mind.

Particularly, we, the young people, should not be fooled by the old propaganda that ethnic issues are problematic. We can change this attitude; we can challenge the military institution or military government that brainwashes us for so long. It is time for us, young people, to work toward unity, and to shape our country’s political destiny with mutual respect for each other.

Monday, 17 October 2011

If President Thein Sein government is angling or aiming at full fledged legitimacy and lifting of sanctions, imposed by the West, by releasing barely some 220 political prisoners from a total of 6,359 set free last week, it has failed its intended targets quite miserably.

Sai Wansai

True, while the shelving of Myitsone Dam, at least during his legislature period, is seen by many as a courageous move, the fervent hope that the much publicized release of political prisoners would also be as bold and all-inclusive. But to the disappointment of the people, democratic and ethnic oppositions, it turned out to be a flop.

Of over 2000 or so political prisoners, only 220 were among the released. The regime also failed to set free the high profile individuals like Hkun Htun Oo, leader of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) that won the most seat in Shan State in the 1990 nation-wide elections, Min Ko Niang and Ko Ko Gyi, student leaders of 88 generation, and U Gambira, the monk leader, closely identified with the “Saffron Revolution” that rocked Burma in 2007.

So far, the lone Shan figure released from prison was Major General Hso Ten; the former leader of the now divided Shan State Army (SSA) North. Hso Ten had faced an original 106 year prison term.

It is not clear if this has something to do with the war going on between the SSA and Burma Army, which have cost the latter some 500 or so killed in action, according to the SSA field report.

No wonder, Sao Yawdserk, leader of the Shan State Army (SSA) South said: “It shows the regime attaches more importance to those with arms than those without.”

If Thein Sein’s intention is to achieve reconciliation, this stingy, partial release, which amount to just about three percent of the political prisoners from the total amount of some 6000 released prisoners, is simply not enough.

Undoubtedly, while the recent release of political prisoners has brought joy and reunion for friends and family members, it has been a big disappointment for those still languishing in various prisons across the country. As a whole, Thein Sein’s ad hoc move has caught international headlines, but it is more of a shattered dream than a dream come true for those still in jails and the majority of the people, hoping that this might be an all-inclusive amnesty and pave way for a more comprehensive reconciliation and democratisation process.

The question arise here, why on earth can’t  he be generous, when it cost him nothing but could instead reap praise and more credential to his publicised piece meal reform process, leading to his intended goals of increased legitimacy and possible lifting of sanctions.

Zaganar, one of the prominent political prisoners, who is also a famous and  known comedian, likened the Thein Sein’s recent amnesty to “letting a stroke stricken grandma, with make-up, walking down the street”, indicating that he was at a loss on what to make out of this meagre and insufficient release of political prisoners.

According to Alternative Asean Network on Burma (ALTSEAN) dated 14 October, during the period of November 2004 to May 2011, the enacted ten amnesties have released over 66,437 prisoners, of which 827 or merely 1.2 % was political prisoners.

Of course, one could still argue that the recent release, on 12 October, is 3.4% and thus is an improvement, compare to the past amnesties.

On 13 October, The Wall Street Journal reported that Ye Htut, director general of the Information and Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Information in Myanmar, suggested in an emailed response to the complaints that critics shouldn’t jump to conclusions, and that more changes could follow. He wrote that the international stakeholders should appreciate, encourage and support all government actions which move to the right direction.
Many might wonder why Thein Sein chooses to act the way he does.

The answer might lie on the mental inclination or mind-set of the successive military leaders, of which Thein Sein is also a party. The successive military regimes, from Revolutionary Council (RC), Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to the recent military-backed Thein Sein government have ruled the country from 1962 onwards.

The hallmark of Burma’s military leadership is group survival mentality, paranoia and ethnocentrism.

Looking at the duration of almost five decades of continuous rule, under different names or banners, the Burmese military leaders have been successful to live up to their group survival mentality.

The present Thein Sein government with a civilian face is still manned by ex-military generals and officers, not to mention the constitutional right, or should we say licence, to stage military coup if the President and the military find it necessary for whatever reason, allotment of 25% seats to the military in the parliament without having to go through the election, and making it difficult to amend the constitution by imposing the 75% vote ceiling.

As on can see, a built-in, “fail-safe device” to secure the hold of the military is clearly there for all to see. Apart from that, the military, rightly or wrongly, is convinced of its righteousness in its self-appointed governing role of the country.

The military leader’s paranoia or siege mentality is also ingrained in their mindset. And as such, they had always strived for total control. The tiny percent of recently released political prisoners is a case in point. It might be that they want to move at their own pace, which is controllable. Also phobia of uprising, which could be spearheaded by the released political prisoners, could be the reason. But the more likely factor is using the prisoners as a bargaining chip against international stakeholders, to garner legitimacy and lifting of sanctions.

The most crucial one though is the deeply rooted ethnocentrism or racial supremacy tendency against all non-Burman ethnic groups like Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, Mon, Arakan and Chin.  The ongoing armed conflict, which has started decades ago, between the various ethnic groups and the Burmese military is a stark reminder that ethnocentrism mindset is entrenched in the military leadership mindset.

To sum up, if Thein Sein wants to achieve the lifting of sanctions and gain increased legitimacy, he would need to be more generous in meeting the demands of international community. But first and foremost, he must get rid of the military mindset which he has acquired during his life time, to truly become a reformer like Frederik Willem de Klerk of South Africa or Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie of Indonesia. Otherwise, his piecemeal, baby steps or half-hearted reform process would be seen as failing the mark or simply insufficient and that would be a pity for those willing to see real progress and harmony in Burma.

The contributor is General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union – Editor

Through the years, Harn Yawnghwe has faithfully served Burma’s pro-democracy movement in a variety of capacities. He was editor of Burma Alert, a monthly news digest; advisor to Dr. Sein Win, prime minister of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which claims to be Burma’s government in exile; and managing director of the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), which makes daily news broadcasts to Burma in Burmese and seven ethnic languages.

In February 1997, Harn Yawnghwe became director of the Euro-Burma Office in Brussels, Belgium. This joint project between the European Union and the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation was created to help the Burmese democracy movement prepare for a transition to a democratic government.

The Irrawaddy recently spoke with Harn Yawnghwe in an on-line interview about the current political environment in Burma, the status of reforms, the appropriate response of the international community to changes taking place in the country and ongoing challenges faced by the stakeholders.

Harn Yawnghwe. (Photo: Shan Herald Agency for News)

Question: There have been reports suggesting that within Burma’s government and military there are reform-minded and hard-line factions who are at loggerheads, what is your assessment of the situation? Do you think that reformists are gaining ground? Or are the two groups just playing a game of good cop/bad cop with the opposition and international community?Answer: It is not a clear cut case of reformed-minded liberals against hard-liners. The situation may appear that way when analyzed through a theoretical framework. That is why in 2004, Gen Khin Nyunt was seen as a liberal by some analysts. It is also not a case of good cop/bad cop. We should not fool ourselves, the Tatmadaw (Burmese armed forces) does not really care about either the opposition or the international community. Gen Ne Win seized power in 1962 because the Tatmadaw believed that U Nu was losing control. When Ne Win lost control in 1988, the Tatmadaw seized power again.

The key concept is that someone (the Tatmadaw) must always be in control to protect Burma’s independence, sovereignty and national unity. The Seven-step Roadmap was supposed to bring in a strong government with a strong Tatmadaw on standby. To protect himself, Snr-Gen Than Shwe deviated from the script and handed over power to a weak party, a weak president, a weak vice-president, a weak Parliament and a weak Tatmadaw. As a retired senior general, President Thein Sein could not let this situation persist. He had to exert control and he chose to do so through the framework of the 2008 Constitution. The disagreements we are seeing are not ideological. They are personal, because some of the others do not like the idea of U Thein Sein being the supremo. They want to be the supremo themselves.

Having a strong government that can exert control is not a bad thing in itself. All governments, even democratic ones like the US, have to be in control. Otherwise, there would be anarchy. The question is how does one decide who will be in control and how is that control exercised? If it is through the popular will, the rule of law and persuasion, it is perfectly acceptable. But if it is through the force of arms, it is not acceptable. Therefore, while some people may question President U Thein Sein’s legitimacy, the methods he is using are quite acceptable.

The other difference is that unlike Snr-Gen Than Shwe, U Thein Sein seems to be aware that for Burma to survive as a nation in the modern world, urgent reforms are needed. He is not a liberal, but he wants to make sure that his government is in control and able to protect Burma’s interests (against other nations and big business).

Will his reforms succeed? That is still an open question. If his rivals can unseat him, if he is unable to convince the population that his reforms will alleviate their suffering, if he is unable to build peace with the ethnic nationalities, if his government does not have the capacity to deliver on his promises, if the international community rejects his efforts and continues to exert more pressure, etc., he will fail.

The question we need to ask ourselves is this: What is the alternative? Will democracy be better served if he fails? Who or what will replace him? It will definitely not be a more liberal democratic civilian government. The most likely scenario is that the Tatmadaw will seize power. Given the failure of U Thein Sein’s experiment, the next regime is likely to be more conservative and repressive, not more liberal.

Q: What reforms would you like to see? What specific actions should Burma’s government take now?

A: A lot of reforms have already been promised. The ones related to the economy are very complicated and extremely hard to implement because they are interconnected. We also have problems that have been ignored and have festered for more than five decades. I think it is now more important for the government to implement promised reforms than to embark on new ones. The difficulty in implementing any reform is that the government may not have the capacity to deliver. If expectations exceed the government’s capacity to deliver, more reforms could be counter-productive. Repealing some security laws, declaring an amnesty, releasing political prisoners, putting in place procedures to allow exiles to return, lifting censorship laws, allowing journalists more freedom and allowing foreign journalists to visit are some of the easier reforms that will not overtax the already overloaded bureaucracy.

Q: President Thein Sein’s decision to suspend the China-backed Myitsone Dam project is partly viewed as a strategic move to foster better relations with Western powers, including the US, and thereby to balance Burma’s international relationships. Do you agree with that assessment? Was this really an effort by Burma to counter Chinese influence? Some critics say that by playing the China card, Burma can evade real political reform and still make friends with the West, do you agree?

A: I do not believe it is related to a grand international strategy. It is wishful thinking on the part of some people in the West. The suspension has to do with sending a domestic message that the president is the one in charge, that there is now a new strong man in place. The controversial dam had been negotiated in secret between a Chinese company and some past and present members of the government. U Thein Sein was apparently unaware of some aspects of the deals. The fact that it became a national cause célèbre gave U Thein Sein the ammunition that he was looking for. The issue of the Myitsone Dam was of concern not only to the Kachin people but all the people of Burma. Issues like that can really be used to build national unity. I welcome the president’s decision. I do not think China will intervene. It is not happy that one of its private companies is losing money, but it has too much to lose to use strong arm tactics with Burma.

As for reforms, the facts are that if the President wants to survive and protect Burma’s sovereignty, he cannot avoid reforms. There is no other way forward. Most people are still skeptical about the reforms but U Thein Sein is taking a lot of risks and going far beyond what anyone had expected. The danger now is of a backlash from those—inside and outside the country—who prefer the status quo and who do not want change.

Q: Some activists and dissidents believe the EU’s Burma policy has been soft, non-comprehensive and one-sided—almost an appeasement of the regime and its apologists. What kind of policy changes are you expecting in the EU bloc towards Burma? Meanwhile, the US is reportedly considering relaxing restrictions on financial assistance to Burma. If many political prisoners are released, as is widely anticipated, is it time for the West to lift their economic sanctions against Burma? Also, without lifting sanctions, what actions can the EU and the US take to show Napyidaw that they are positively responding to Burma’s reform initiatives? Do you expect the IMF and World Bank to provide greater technical and financial assistance to Burma in the near future?

A: If someone is weak, he may try to appease a bully in the hope that the bully will leave him alone. This hardly applies to the case of the EU and Burma. The EU does not need Burma to survive. It is also much stronger than Burma in very many ways. Why would the EU need to appease Burma? Like most Western governments, the EU in the early 1990s and 2000s was very open to policy advice from the opposition. But after 15 years (which is three or four life times for most elected governments), the EU started to question the soundness of the opposition’s strategy, which was based mainly on confronting and isolating the Burmese regime.

We have to remember that during the period that Burma has been in conflict with itself, Europe was rediscovering itself by reconciling differences, opening borders and trying to resolve most conflicts through negotiations. The EU began to develop its own Burma policy based on democratic principles, but also exploring ways to help resolve the problems so that democracy can prosper in Burma.

No one can accuse the EU of not being comprehensive. It takes years to develop a policy and it requires the elected governments of twenty-seven nations to unanimously agree. But since the EU was no longer 100 percent in agreement with the Burmese opposition, especially those in exile, some people started claiming that the EU is soft on democracy and human rights and that it is lop-sided in its approach to the regime. The EU could never abandon democratic principles even if all the 27 governments agreed, because the people of Europe would never accept it. Therefore, we can rest assured on that point. We need to instead examine ourselves first to see if we are being democratic before blaming others.

I believe the EU will continue to engage the government of Myanmar [Burma]. It will help build up the capacity of both civil society and the civil service (health, education, livelihood, poverty eradication, economy, environment, etc.). The concept is that without an empowered civil society, people’s rights will not be fully protected. Similarly, without a functioning non-corrupt professional civil service, no government can deliver essential services to the people.

The EU may lift sanctions if they are satisfied that the reforms are genuine. Releasing political prisoners would be one of the factors it would consider. But sanctions are not the cornerstone in EU policy. The key is genuine policy dialogue and cooperation to bring about a democratic, just and open society. The IMF and the World Bank may want to provide greater technical and financial assistance. But given that US presidential elections are next year, I very much doubt much can be expected from the US until that is over. Burma is just not a priority.

Q: You once backed the sanctions policy on Burma and now you are seen as a proponent of engagement. What made you change your mind?

A: People get emotional when sanctions are discussed. It becomes a debate about whether wrong-doers should be allowed to prosper or be punished. While sanctions may have that moral aspect to them, sanctions were seen mainly as a political tool when we (the NCGUB, National Council for the Union of Burma, National League for Democracy-Liberated Areas, etc.) first discussed them in the early 1990s. The various governments also enacted sanctions to achieve political goals. The question is, were the goals achieved? If not, we should discontinue them. We had proposed sanctions because we wanted the regime to talk to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. We had hoped that a compromise could be reached, and that democracy and human rights would be restored. The facts are that short of a military intervention (which will not happen), there will never be enough pressure on the military to make them compromise. Applying more sanctions is like trying to fill a leaky balloon with air. It will never get filled. It is not a question of rewarding the generals by lifting sanctions.

Sanctions also paralyzed the international community. Nobody wanted to take the initiative for fear of being labeled as undemocratic and supporting the regime. We needed the international community to be more active in other ways to help bring about change. The paralysis was not useful to us or helpful to the people of Burma. That was why I no longer supported sanctions. When we cannot get what we want in exactly the way that we want it, we need to find a way to get what we want given the circumstances. For example, U Thein Sein is talking with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. They seem to have reached some kind of understanding. They seem prepared to compromise. Is that not what we initially wanted? Yet some of us are still asking for more sanctions. What do we want? We have become so reactive and negative that we counter everything without evaluating whether or not it has any merit. I once said in 2005, that if we want real change in Burma, the Tatmadaw will have to spearhead it because it holds the power. The government of U Thein Sein is now spearheading reforms. It is possible that real change will come and eventually, democracy in Burma.

Q: Recent decisions by the Burmese government clearly suggest that it has made a break with the past military rule. But why haven’t we seen much of an improvement in its handling of ethnic minorities, with continued armed clashes in northeastern Burma with these groups? Would it be proper for the West to proactively respond to Naypyidaw’s initiatives until this issue is properly resolved? What is your reaction to ongoing human rights violations in ethnic regions as well as the calls for a Commission of Inquiry?

A: The fact that there has not been much improvement shows that the problems are deep-seated and will require much more effort and time than people expect. Trust and confidence have to be built up to overcome the decades of ill treatment and suffering. The government will need to show its good faith by acknowledging that its soldiers do act with impunity when dealing with the ethnic nationalities. Releasing ethnic leaders from prison so that they can help in the healing process will also go a long way in resolving the problems. Naypyidaw can do a lot and it will be much more effective if they do it on their own like U Thein Sein did with the Myitsone Dam, than to have the West or other foreign governments getting involved. But the international community can help by encouraging both sides to negotiate and providing technical assistance and support in the whole de-militarization process. The Commission of Inquiry is a non-starter and at this point, I think we should concentrate on practical steps, not on theoretical possibilities.

Q: If Burma is opened up one day, what role would you and your organization like to play in the country?

A: The Euro-Burma Office is engaged in building the capacity of the younger generation and civil society organizations in Burma. We have also been engaged in building understanding between various ethnic groups and encouraging people to work together to resolve problems through dialogue and negotiations instead of the force of arms. In general, we have also been able to bridge the gap between the people of Burma and the international community. If Burma opened up, we could do our job more effectively.

http://irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=22237&page=1Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org

By: Sai Wansai
Monday, 3 October 2011

The latest move of President Thein Sein shelving the construction of the $3.6 billion Myitsone dam project in Kachin state is the right decision and hopefully would expand to other problem areas, leading to reconciliation and conflict resolution.

Sai Wansai

President Thein Sein’s note was read out in parliament by lower house speaker Thura Shwe Mann, on Friday, for a halt to the construction.

According to Reuters, “The president sent a message comprising 10 points to the parliament this morning. One of them said that the construction of the dam on the Irrawaddy will be shelved during the term of his government.”

“He said that his government, being born out of people’s desire, has to act according to the desire of the people,” said the official, who declined to be named because he was not authorised to speak to the media.

The suspension will satisfy the people of Kachin state and downstream populace and not to mention the environmentalists and opposition parties. But Thein Sein still needs to work out the details with China on how to terminate the contract with state-run Chinese companies that are funding and building the dam.

Meanwhile, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei, in reply to question of shelving  Myitsone Dam by Thein Sein spelled out China’s position, on Saturday, as follows:-

“The Chinese Government always supports Chinese enterprises cooperating with enterprises of other countries based on the principle of mutual respect, mutual benefit and equality, requires them to perform duties and fulfill obligations in strict accordance with laws and regulations of the host country and urges relevant government to protect the legal and legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises. The Myitsone Dam is a jointly invested project between China and Myanmar that has gone through scientific verification and strict examination of both sides. Relevant matters arising from the implementation of the project should be handled appropriately through bilateral friendly consultation.”(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China)

Prior to this, on 27 September, Burma’s foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, told the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that an amnesty for prisoners is being considered, but gave no date for a possible release. He said that the President Thein Sein would grant the amnesty “at an appropriate time in the near future”.

Again, on Friday, Aung San Suu Kyi and Minister U Aung Kyi met for the third time, since Thein Sein came to power, and spelled out three issue areas – presidential amnesty for political prisoners, preservation and protection of Irrawaddy River, and restoration of eternal peace with the armed ethnic groups – that were discussed.
Indeed, Thein Sein has moved with relative swiftness in trying to deflate the political tension, built over years by confrontation between the ethnic-democratic opposition and the successive military governments. His poverty reduction workshop, a close-door, four eyes meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, invitation of exiles to return home, peace overtures directed at armed ethnic groups, and easing off the restrictions on the media were conducive to some improvement in political atmosphere.

Thein Sein’s moves, while quite effective in thawing the rigid and polarized political stance of the military and democratic opposition headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, in contrast, his peace initiative directed at the ethnic armed forces is producing more negative than positive results.

True, the regime could book in some success, when signing initial ceasefire agreement with the Untied Wa State Army (UWSA) and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) on the 6th and 7th September respectively, which includes, no hostilities, reopening of liaison offices, advanced notification when entering each side’s territory carrying arms, and a joint coordination team for regional development. But it should be noted that the regime, although on the war footing with both groups, have not entered into open armed conflict like the Shan State Army (SSA) or the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The SSA likened the regime moves of applying remedy to the wrong location and accused it of driving a wedge between the UNFC members and non-members like UWSA and NDAA.

The UNFC formed in February 2011, is composed of six armed groups as permanent members: the Karen National Union (KNU), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Chin National Front (CNF), the Kachin Independence Organization, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).

A few weeks after the ceasefire agreement with the UWSA and NDAA, SHAN reported on Friday,  that a thousand bags of rice which have been blocked by the Burmese military for 2 years were reportedly returned to the UWSA, in addition to releasing its imprisoned members serving sentences on opium trafficking charges in  Buthidaung Prison on the western Burmese border, and allowing domestic airline Yangon Airways, to fly again on 16 October, which is owned by Aik Hauk, son of prominent UWSA leader Bao Youxiang. The airline was refused a new license in November and ceased operations in December last year.

Similarly, on 13 September, SHAN filed a report that pickups and vans have been allowed to ply between Mongla and Kengtung, 80 km, since Sunday (11 September), 4 days after a new ceasefire agreement was signed between Naypyitaw and Mongla-based NDAA.

The immediate economic incentive given back to the two ethnic armed groups is a stark reminder that the regime is ready to apply its old strategy of “divide and rule”, which have worked so well in the past.

Meanwhile, the offensives against the KIA and SSA by the Burma Army are in full swing, making it hard to believe if Thein Sein’s peace initiative is for real or just a public relation stunt to curry international sympathy, in its charm offensive to win legitimacy.

According to BBC, the recent Burma Army’s offensive with 10 battalions on KIA 4 brigade, in northern Shan state, starting last Friday, have suffered at least 60 Burmese soldiers killed, while KIA casualties were said to be 8 killed and 8 wounded.

The Burma Army casualties, in its offensive in central Shan state, which have begun a few months ago, were equally devastating for the Burma Army, estimated to be in hundreds, due to the guerrilla warfare conducted by the SSA.

Likewise, the same situation exists, where Burma Army’s human cost numbered in hundreds, in its war against the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), led by Brig-Gen Saw Lah Pwe, who refused to become Border Guard Force (BGF) under the Burma Army, and Karen National Union (KNU).

On 26 September, VOA reported that Lanyaw Zawng Hra, the chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization, spelled out his terms Monday in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Mr. Ban has been seeking negotiations to end fighting between the Burmese government and ethnic rebels, including the KIO’s armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army.

He pointed out that the military-backed regime is still using the usual “divide and conquer” tactics, even though it could take another path to reconcile with the ethnic groups, and instead choose to ignore the basic rights of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities.

He also stressed that all recommendations from ethnic groups in drafting Burma’s new constitution were not taken into account, and banned the country’s 2 million ethnic minority members from voting.

According to the report of The Irrawaddy, on 27 September, the most crucial point spelled out in the letter is that “Despite the fact that Burma achieved independence in 1948 as the Union of Burma, it has been operating as a Unitary System, rather than practicing a true federal system as agreed to by independence leader Gen. Aung San and ethnic leaders.”

The leaders of Shan, Kachin and Chin decided at Panglong, on the 12th of February 1947, to join with U Aung San and the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) and leaders of other nationalities, to live together under one flag as co-independent and equal nations. This marks the birth of a nation-state now known as “Union of Burma”.

In this way the desire of the leaders of the Frontier Areas to co-operate with Burma to more speedily achieve freedom was initially put into effect. However, it was as yet, merely a temporary union for the transition period.

The establishment of a future Federation, consisting of Burma proper and the Frontier Areas, although prescribed in the decision of 6th February 1947, was not mentioned in the Panglong Agreement as it was understood that the matter should be considered in detail at the Constituent Assembly which was yet to be convened.

The Sub-Committee of the Supreme Executive Council of the United Hill Peoples, headed by the Saohpalong of Mong Pawn and U Kya Bu, negotiated with the Burmese Delegation headed by General Aung San, on the 10th February 1947, at Panglong and the demands tabled by the representatives of the Frontier Areas: – for full internal autonomy, for the establishment of a separate Kachin State, and for the federal organ to deal with only common subjects such as Defence, Foreign Affairs, Railways and Customs etc. – was accepted in principle by General Aung San.

General Aung San, however, requested that the demand for the Right of Secession from Burma at any time after attaining freedom, should be decided at the Constituent Assembly. ( Source: Document containing proposals For the REVISION of the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA – submitted by THE SHAN STATE – Translated by Sao Singha. This document was ratified by the Convention, attended by delegates from the entire Shan State, which was held in Taunggyi, on Saturday, 25th of February1961.)

It is not an exaggeration to state that without Panglong Agreement or Accord, signifying the intent and willingness of the free peoples and nations of what could be termed British Indochina, there would have not been born the Union of Burma in 1948.

Accordingly, the right of secession was included in 1947 Union of Burma Constitution, where the Shan and Karenni states were accorded with the right to exercise it after ten years.

A careful reading of the Constitution and the documents relating to the formation of the Union, suggests that the framers intended the – secession – right to be a measure of protection for those hill peoples who were dubious about allying themselves with the dominant and politically more advanced state of Burma proper. (Source: Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the Union of Burma – Josef Silverstein)

As we would witness later, this measure of protection was not even in a position to protect the human rights of the non-Burman ethnic peoples, much less their rights to internal autonomy and rights of self-determination. They were helplessly delivered to the racial supremacy ambition and military occupation onslaught of the Burmese military and its political class, which sought to monopolised the political decision-making power.

Following General Aung San’s assassination in July 1947, the Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. The ethnic homelands were recognized as constituent states but all power was concentrated in the central government. In other words, it was federal in name only but unitary in practice.

According to Mr. Tinker, a former Professor of History at the University of Rangoon, the Constitutional Advisor, Chan Htoon, observed much later that “our Constitution, though in theory federal, is in practice unitary.”

In 1958, the right of the Shan and Karenni people to disassociate from the Union after 10 years, guaranteed in the 1947 Union Constitution, was denied them. As a precaution, U Nu invited the Commander-in-Chief, General Ne Win, to form a ‘Caretaker’ government to restore law and order for a period of 2 years as young people took to the jungles to claim their rights.

In 1961, the ethnic nationalities leaders tried to return to the spirit of Panglong by proposing to amend the 1947 Constitution as a means of preventing the nation from disintegrating. This was probably the last legal attempt to ward off the growing political tension, which was about to blow out of proportion, leading to armed conflict between the Burman-dominated government and the non-Burman ethnic peoples.

But General Ne Win launched a coup d’etat in 1962 ‘to save the nation from disintegration’ and suspended the 1947 Constitution. From the ethnic nationalities’ point of view, this act abolished the legal instrument that bound their homelands to the Union. As such, they consider themselves to be independent entities held by force in subjugation by an invading army.

This breaching of contract, from the part of the successive Burman-dominated governments – starting from U Nu, General Ne Win, General Than Shwe to the present ex-general, President Thein Sein – is the main reason for the ongoing armed conflict continuing to these days.

The 1974 Constitution, adopted by General Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party  and the 2008 Constitution drawn and adopted by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), headed by General Than Shwe were both unitary in nature, which do not in anyway address the self-determination and autonomy aspirations of the non-Burman ethnic peoples.

From the perspective of the non-Burman ethnic peoples, the breaching of the Panglong Agreement, which explicitly spelled out the voluntarily participation in forming a new union, with complete autonomy and rights of self-determination in tact, is a non-negotiable position. And the altering of the federal structure to a unitary one amount to blatant dishonouring of the agreement or pure cheating, from the part of the successive Burman-dominated regimes.

The situation is like making a contract on a co-owned acquired piece of land to build a condominium, where involved parties would be allotted one unit each, while sharing the lobby, swimming pool and other facilities among the inhabitants. But a dominant party hijacked the agreed plan, declared its sole ownership and instead, built a house to its liking to suit its own purpose and desire, effectively sidelining all the other originally involved parties, who were also the rightful owners of the land and as well, the previously agreed building plan. This kind of scenario is certainly programmed to produce a heated, open conflict, if the previously agreed plan is not utilised or taken into account.

And as such, the military-backed Thein Sein regime’s unitary presidential system, based on its 2008 Constitution would not be able to accommodate the rights and aspirations of the non-Burman ethnic peoples. Only if the regime is ready to go back to the original federal set up agreement, as promised by the late General Aung San, would the ethnic armed resistance subside and eventual conflict resolution be worked out. But if the regime refuses to undo its breaching of original, federalism agreement contract and in contrary, insists to hold on to its unitary system at all cost, the ethnic armed conflict will continue to rage on unabated.

The contributor is General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union – Editor

A closer look at the ongoing development would indicate that this is not the case.

http://www.shanland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4040:burmas-reconciliation-piecemeal-reform-process-or-holistic-approach&catid=115:opinions&Itemid=308

CHIANG MAI – The isolated light-brown spots can be seen even on Google Earth. They are indicative of big, new buildings that have been carved out of densely forested jungle areas across the Myanmar heartland, with some dots seen in the hills east of the central city of Mandalay.

Most of them are for security reasons located in sparsely populated areas, but in the modern digital world not even Myanmar can keep the location of its new military installations secret.

Myanmar has embarked on a massive expansion of its military and military capabilities since the country was shaken by a nationwide pro-democracy uprising that almost toppled the regime in 1988. But this expansion appears to have been haphazard, with an emphasis on creating a loyal officer corps that the regime can depend on for its survival rather than building a professional fighting force.

Recent defectors from the Myanmar military say that the number of infantry battalions and other military units have been increased dramatically since 1988, but most of these are understaffed and the foot soldiers are often forcibly recruited, poorly paid and badly motivated.

Several sources with access to information from inside the Myanmar military say that the stated strength of the country’s armed forces, often given by Western analysts as between 300,000-400,000 men, is grossly exaggerated. Some sources put the actual figure at less than half that number and because the central authorities have had ceasefire agreements with almost all of the country’s ethnic rebel armies for two decades or more, the troops, and even most of the officers, lack combat experience.

Prior to the 1988 uprising and the ceasefire agreements with the rebels, the Myanmar military was known as a poorly equipped but ruthlessly efficient light-infantry force. Soldiers fought in yearly operations against insurgents in extremely difficult terrain, making it a tough, battle-hardened army with few equivalents in modern Asia.

“Now, the soldiers are doing nothing. They have new uniforms and better guns, the officers have more money to spend than anyone could dream of in the old days. They have new cars, new golf clubs, mistresses, everything – except professionalism,” says a disgruntled former Myanmar army officer who requested anonymity. Meanwhile, the morale among the rank-and-file is reported to be low while desertion rates are high.

Consequently, recent military campaigns against ethnic Kachin and Shan rebels in the country’s north and northeast have been disasters. Even after months of fighting, the government’s troops have failed to occupy a single major camp run by the Shan State Army (SSA) in the heart of Shan State, while in the north the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) recently gave the military a bloody nose when it tried to dislodge the rebels from their strongholds near the Chinese border.

To make up for the lack of combat experience – and to keep the officers happy with new equipment – the Myanmar government first embarked on a massive procurement campaign in 1989. Throughout the 1990s, an estimated US$1.4 billion of military and military-related equipment was bought from China, including anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles, aircraft, naval vessels, armored personnel carriers, trucks and other military vehicles, artillery pieces and rocket launchers. Additional weaponry and military hardware were procured from other military partners such as Russia, Singapore, Ukraine, North Korea, and, at one stage, Pakistan, Portugal, Poland and the former Yugoslavia.

Homegrown defense
Recent years, however, have seen a rapid expansion of the number of homegrown defense industries, witnessed in the new clearings in the jungles throughout the country. Before the 1988 uprising, the country had no more than half a dozen such factories.

Today, there are more than 20 military factories apart from the research facilities where new weaponry, including missiles, are being developed. The Myanmar military is also known to be carrying out nuclear research, although even former Myanmar army major Sai Thein Win, the whistleblower who fled the country last year, says that the project is unlikely to produce a usable atomic weapon.

“When the German-made machinery arrived from Singapore, I asked my commander who was going to operate it. ‘You are,’ he said. He had never before worked in a defense factory, and I – and I was trained in Russia – could see that this equipment was not suitable for the purpose for which it had been obtained. The nuclear program is nothing but a pipedream,” Sai Thein Win told Asia Times Online in a recent interview.

Known by the acronym ka pa sa after the initials of the Myanmar name for “the Directorate of Defense Industries”, the early factories were located exclusively around the old capital Yangon, on the western bank of the Irrawaddy River near the town of Pyay, or Prome, and near Magwe further to the north. According to analyst Andrew Selth, an Australian expert on the Myanmar military: “Before 1988 these factories could produce automatic rifles and light machine-guns, light mortars, grenades, anti-personnel mines and ammunition.”

Myanmar’s attempts to develop its own defense industries began in the early 1950s when a small factory was set up to produce bullets and copies of an Italian 9mm TZ45 submachine gun, known as the “Ne Win Sten” after the army commander at that time and later the country’s first military ruler.

Selth states in a monograph about Myanmar’s arms industries, published in 1997 by the Australian National University: “The Burmese [Myanmar] arms industry was given a major boost in 1957, when the state-owned West German company Fritz Werner GmbH agreed to build a factory in Rangoon [Yangon] with Heckler and Koch to produce Gewehr 3 [G3] automatic rifles. Finance was provided on favorable terms by the West German government.”

All such West German assistance was supposed to be halted after the 1988 uprising was drenched in blood, resulting in international condemnation of Myanmar’s military regime. But an internal audit report for the West German company, dated March 31, 1990, reveals that “raw materials imported from abroad are recorded in the stock ledger, but delivered directly to Myanma Heavy Industries for custody and use by them in production of goods on the JVC’s [Joint Venture Company] behalf.” The report, compiled by Fritz Werner’s accountants from the U Hla Tun Group, goes on to mention Ministry of Heavy Industries production sites at Yangon, Sinde and Nyaungchitauk at Padaung near Pyay, and Malun near Minhla – or exactly the locations of Myanmar’s then most important defense industries.

Fritz Werner is still active in Myanmar, but, according to Sai Thein Win and other sources, it is doubtful whether it is still actively involved in producing military equipment, although in 1984 it became the first foreign company to enter into a joint-venture agreement with Myanmar’s Heavy Industries Corporation, which produces weapons for the country’s armed forces.

The old Gewehr series – G2, G3 and G4 – has been replaced by other, indigenously produced infantry weapons which are lighter and more suitable for Myanmar’s tropical climate. Called MA 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 – after “Myanmar Army” – they are based on Chinese designs and resemble modern versions of the Soviet-era Kalashnikov and the old Makarov pistol. The new MA series is produced at ka pa sa 1 near Yangon’s Inya Lake, while the more advanced ka pa sa 2 in Malun produces mortars and artillery pieces and also has a shooting range built by Singapore to test the effectiveness of the weapons.

Brothers in arms
Missile research and development is carried out at the newly built ka pa sa 10 at Konegyi village in Minhla, where experts from North Korea and possibly also China and Russia are reportedly active. Myanmar is said to be interested in producing a North Korean-designed, Scud-type Hwasong 6 missile. But it is still an open question how close Myanmar is to producing a functioning missile. North Korean ships, however, continue to arrive frequently in Myanmar’s ports, carrying what is described as “general goods” that are often destined for Myanmar’s defense industries.

The production capability of the old mortar and shell factory ka pa sa 3 at Sinde, Padaung, has been surpassed by the new ka pa sa 12, set up in 1996. It now produces 60mm, 81mm, 105mm and 120mm mortar shells in a complex that sprawls over more than 16,000 acres (6,500 hectares) south of Sakhangyi village in Thayetmyo township, Magway Region.

According to Myanmar military insiders, machinery for ka pa sa 12 was imported from the Czech Republic and installed with help of experts from that country. Ka pa sa 12 uses modern electronic control equipment and is now considered one of the most advanced in Myanmar.

The most reliable factory for the production of small arms is ka pa sa 11 in Taikkyi township, Bago Region. It manufactures parts for the new MA-series of light infantry weapons, and machinery for the facility was reportedly obtained from South Korea’s Daewoo company.

A more mysterious industrial complex is at Sidoktaya near Magway Region’s border with Rakhine State. Designated as ka pa sa 20, 100,000 acres have been cleared for the facility and Google Earth imagery shows a helicopter landing pad and unusually long buildings.

It is staffed by 400 soldiers, military engineers and officers, many of them Russian-trained in nuclear physics, leading to speculation that it could be one of several locations in Myanmar where nuclear-related research is being carried out. Close to ka pa sa 20 is a new hydroelectric power station to provide a steady source of electricity to the top-secret facility.

Ka pa sa 8 in Sinbaungweh township, Magway Region, produces parts for tanks, ka pa sa 9 in Padaung, Bago Region, makes bullets for the MA-series of weapons, and ka pa sa 7 in Pyay makes sea mines and produces and repairs armored vehicles. Ka pa sa 6, also near Padaung, produces various kinds of ammunition and was reportedly built by Chinese experts. Ka pa sa 13 near Letpan village in Magway Region makes mines and parts for artillery.

Defectors such as Sai Thein Win, the only one willing to be interviewed by name by Asia Times Online, question the efficacy of these new arms factories. According to him, the fact that they are scattered all over the country and are, as he puts it, situated “in the middle of nowhere” (they can be seen with a even cursory look at Google Earth), makes it extremely difficult to coordinate production.

“Raw materials and parts have to be sent across the country, from one facility to another, and one factory doesn’t know what another is doing. The outcome is that many of these new weapons are basically useless,” claims Sai Thein Win.

Myanmar’s newly recruited infantry may lack combat experience, and the quality of the weapons produced in its defense industries may be of poor quality due to bad coordination between the various ka pa sas. But it is clear that the Myanmar regime is in no hurry to change its priorities, as defense spending still accounts for as much as 50% of the central government’s budget.

Regime survival has always been the main prerogative of Myanmar’s generals and thus a loyal and well-supplied officer corps is still of utmost importance, regardless of their weakness on the battlefield.

Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and author of several books on Burma/Myanmar. He is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media Services.

Among the many races and different ethnic nationalities residing in Burma, Myanmar is the only ethnic race that harbours the African mentality This phrase may be galling to the Myanmar, but as an academic, we have to call “a spade a spade.” for we cannot lie. Burma still maintains the title of the longest civil war in the world yet we have not heard of any ethnic resistance army or a resistance pro democracy group committing rape, Why? This is because the ethnic nationalities army and pro democratic groups are born out of the people, whereas the Burmese army or rather Myanmar Tatmadaw (jrefrmhwyfrawmf ) in Burmese is raping the ethnic women with impunity because it was simply a pocket army of the Generals. Instead the Tatmadaw did not feel any remorse or regret but instead they are even proud to do that as it is their bounden duty to clean the country of the undesirable ethnic nationalities. This is the psyche and rationale of the Myanmar Tatmadaw that compels them to rape and pillage the country. Hence it is predictable that it will continue to do that in the future also because rape by a Burmese soldier is considered as a reward of his hard work..

Rape as a weapon of war has been in existence for quite sometimes particularly in Africa and later in Bosnia. The Tatmadaw just copy from these examples as is practicing it on its ethnic nationalities as a means of ethnic cleansing to create a policy of a great nation.

Harking back to World History one can discover of how William the Conqueror, Duke of Normandy vanquished the Britons in 1066 (just 22 years before the first Burmese Kingdom, Pagan Dynasty was established), rape the existing Saxons women, intermarried them and later became one race, the English which is a great nation. So also when Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492, the Europeans followed, kill the aboriginals (Red Indians, which is neither red or Indians) and eventually created the United States of America and Canada which are great nations of modern time. So also the Myanmar ethnic race wants to create the fourth Myanmar Empire and is following the steps of the three warrior kings whose huge statues can be seen in Naypyidaw. Hence raping the women and girls of the ethnic nationalities is a natural phenomenon.

They construe that ethnic nationalities are all rebels bent on balkanization. Their philosophy is that the present day Burma is developed in a linear fashion straight from the founding of the first Burmese kingdom in 1044 AD under king Anawrahta. Only the British colonization of the Myanmar Kingdom for 120 years was disrupted this historical development. They believe in the accounts of their mighty, expansionistic imperialist empires with subordinate alliances made up of multi-ethnic and multi-language communities, including the Shan, the Arakanese, the Mons, and so on, encompassing the present day Burma and its political boundaries and, at times, stretching into neighbouring India and Thailand, others are their subordinates and hence should not be treated as equal but above the ethnic nationalities. Hence an average Myanmar view the ethnic nationality as somewhat the necessary evil of the country where he is destined to live forever and that it is his unbounded duty to lead him to civilization He/she must be showed the real civilization of the Myanmar people and finally lead him to Theravada Buddhism on to Nirvana. It is a historical duty to bring these ethnic nationalities into Myanmar race and this is the sole reason of why the current administration did not accept the Panglong Concordat where everyone will share as the founding father of Modern Burma said “Shan Ta Kyat Bama Ta Kyat” (&Srf;wusyfArmwusyf)   meaning we will share equally in weal and woe with justice and equality among the ethnic national races. This is the underlying cause of why the Tatmadaw is a rapist army.

Before 1988 a secret order was issued that any Myanmar soldier who is able to marry an ethnic women is rewarded a handsome amount of money but this happens to be difficult and slow and so when the Tatmadaw takes over the administration, it encourages raping the ethnic nationalities. This unwritten message can be read by the lieutenants, and captains and hence it was these ranks who committed most of the rape cases. Research by ethnic women organizations proves that an average soldier seldom committed this crime. In the long run if only there one race Myanmar, one religion Theravada Buddhism and one country Burma will be able to govern and stand tall in the international community is their basic philosophy.

A hard-hitting report released in 2002 by the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) – ‘A Licence to Rape’ – outlined in great detail the use of such a despicable ploy. International organisations and foreign governments looked into the allegations and confirmed the practice really was occurring. Today, with a number of former ceasefire groups facing the guns of the Burmese military, the use of rape has extended to women from these ethnic communities as well.

As usual the Junta denied it – as they do with virtually every accusation – but things have not change.  The latest report about rapes in Shan State comes only weeks after the Kachin Women’s Association denounced the rape of 18 women and girls during renewed fighting in Kachin State
Rape brings stigma, shame, and reluctance on the part of victims to speak out about what happened to them. But an increasing number of women and girls from Burma – the ones that survived – have begun to tell of their experiences of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the country’s war-torn areas. Burmese Army deserters confirm that rapes occur regularly and usually go unpunished. The UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women has published material that corroborates details in ‘A Licence to Rape’ and adds many new cases.
“Lying the very concept of Truth” being the motto of the Tatmadaw obviously refuses to grant the UN access to the country to enquire about the rape. As incidents of rape continue to be reported, and the Burmese military must surely know what is happening. However the Junta engages in Orwellian double-speak has rejected the reports, instead launching its own investigations, and formed Myanmar National Human Rights Commission where one can hardly have confidence in their credibility and became a laughing stock of the world.
In 2000, the UN Security Council recognised that gender-based violence thwarts security and adopted Resolution 1325, which calls on parties in conflict to respect the rights of women and children, and particularly to prevent gender-based violence. In 2004, ASEAN governments vowed to end the impunity states like Burma have enjoyed and signed the Declaration to Eliminate Violence Against Women in this region. But these resolutions won’t mean much unless action is taken. While the United Nations and a number of Western countries have spoken out against the use of rape in Burma’s military campaigns, members of the ASEAN community have been conspicuously quiet. This Constructive Engagement Policy of the ASEAN enables the Tatmadaw to carry on its horrific military tactics.

Rape in the real world, however, is receiving media attention, and public consciousness is being raised about it. What is new is not the practice of mass rape but the extent of its relatively recent publicity and some of rape’s consequences for public health in an era of HIV. The most common post-traumatic disorders are found in women and children subject to rape: Rape victims, battered women, and sexually abused children are its casualties in this longest civil war. Hysteria is the combat neurosis of the sex war. The role of women who are raped and then murdered is like that of people who are murdered in a bombing.

By raping women Tatmadaw send a clear message that they will do like this again if the resistance ethnic group continue to resist and did not obey their command. This also sends another message to the second targets i.e. the populace under their control that everybody must obey the Tatmadaw command or else face the consequence of rape. So the ubiquitous threat of rape is a form of terrorism. Rape served as a double edge dagger  not only to the women survivors who were its immediate victims but also the men socially connected to them

Rape is a cross-cultural language of Tatmadaw domination as forcible impregnation and is a tool of genetic imperialism. Where the so-conceived child’s social identity is determined by that of the biological father, impregnation by rape can undermine family solidarity. Even if no pregnancy results, knowledge of the rape has been sufficient for many men in patriarchal societies to reject wives, mothers, and daughters. Tatmadaw aims to destroy an ethnic nationality’s identity by decimating cultural and social bonds. Many women and girls are killed when rapists are finished with them. If survivors become pregnant or are known to be rape survivors, cultural, political, and national unity may be thrown into chaos. These have been among the apparently intended purposes of the mass rapes of women in Burma

Tatmadaw treat the situation of women who are enslaved as war captives and war booty. Captured and impregnated females might be “persuaded” to alter their loyalties where nothing comparable could have been done to change the loyalties of their fathers or spouses. Enslavement rather than slaughter as war captives has two apparent advantages. First, if any woman might become a war captive, it could be to his advantage to survive (rather than be killed) even as a sex slave and hope for a reversal of fortune. Second, sex slavery instituted a class system, providing exploitable productive labour for conquerors. But to what advantages could a woman look forward who was enslaved rather than slaughtered? Would a captured woman who was impregnated, gave birth, and then survived to be freed when political fortunes changed are better off after the change of political fortune? What would have become of her identity or her children and her ties to them? Or, as a wife of Tatmadaw soldier, what would it do for her were her husband to take female concubines from defeated peoples? Are the many questions that cannot be answered.

Unwittingly, rape has become a political institution in Burma . That soldiers who rape “enemy women” are not to be reported.  A soldier may rape because he was ordered, or because he felt like it. Superior officers, on the other hand, may look the other way because of the martial purposes such rapes serve. Burmese soldiers may not always be given direct orders. They may be induced in other ways, for example, they may be given reason to believe that if they do not participate, they will be beaten or raped themselves. Hence the attitude of a Tadmadaw soldier to ethnic women is “We will do everything to ensure that your children become Myanmar”

Tatmadaw use rape to demoralize and disrupt bonds among the ethnic nationalities and to create bonds among perpetrators. Of many forms of, rape has a special potential to drive a wedge between family members and to carry the expression of the perpetrator’s dominance into future generations. A major long-range aim of rape would be to eliminate patriarchal and protectionist values. Organized rape has been an integral aspect of Tatmadaw warfare for a long time The primary target here is to inflict trauma and through this to destroy family ties and group solidarity within the ethnic nationalities. It is a fundamental way of abandoning subjects: rape is the mark of sovereignty stamped directly on the body, that is, it is essentially a bio-political strategy using the distinction between the self and the body. Through an analysis of the way rape was carried out by the predominantly Myanmar soldiers is introduced within the woman’s body (sperm or forced pregnancy), transforming her into an abject-self rejected by the family, excluded by the community and quite often also the object of a self-hate, sometimes to the point of suicide. A Myanmar soldier is made to believes that the penetration of the woman’s body works as a metaphor for the penetration of enemy lines. In addition it is argued that this bio-political strategy, like other forms of sovereignty, operates through the creation of an ‘inclusive exclusion’. The woman and the community in question are inscribed within the enemy realm of power as those excluded. The impact of rape goes far beyond the immediate effects of the physical attack and has long-lasting consequences.

Rape by the Tatmadaw soldiers is not a simple by-product of war, but is a well planned and targeted policy. This recognition of rape as a weapon of war has taken on legal significance at the Rwandan and Yugoslav Tribunals where rape has been prosecuted as a crime against humanity and genocide. The apparent primary aim of the rapes by the Burmese army is the expulsion and dispersion of entire ethnic groups. The idea is to destroy family and community bonds, humiliate and terrorize, ultimately to drive out and disperse entire peoples in “ethnic cleansing,” the current euphemism for genocide in Burma

Hence the international bodies and UN should consider taking the Burmese General to the International Court for Justice. Burma has refuses to live up to the standards of decency that ASEAN has set for itself. Surely more can be done. Sadly, there seems to be little political will to do anything about ongoing atrocities in Burma. ASEAN needs to act, because its credibility erodes every day that nothing is done. What hypocrisy will be more apparent than giving the chairperson of ASEAN to Burma in 2014. Obviously it will reflect the ASEAN values to see. Marty Natalegawa, the Indonesia’s Foreign Minister and the current ASEAN Chairperson to visit Naypyidaw. instead of pushing Co1 as others civilized nations have done.

The author can be reached at bathannwin@gmail.com
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