Gas pipeline linked to abuses across Myanmar – report/activists
06 Sep 2011 17:32

BANGKOK (AlertNet) – Two controversial gas pipeline projects being built in western Myanmar to feed China’s growing energy demand are fuelling further conflicts, human rights abuses and environmental degradation, a report released on Tuesday said.

Shwe Gas Movement, a group of Myanmar exiles in Bangladesh, India and Thailand, said the two pipeline projects must be suspended and all financing frozen or divested until there is transparency and accountability, protection of the environment and community rights, and until affected people can share the benefits.

The pipelines, expected to be operational by 2013, will supply China with oil shipped from the Middle East and natural gas from Myanmar’s vast offshore reserves in the Bay of Bengal.

Chinese state energy group CNPC is building the pipelines with companies from Korea and Myanmar, which will run from Kyaukphyu Township in Rakhine State on Myanmar’s west coast to southern China’s Yunnan province.

The Shwe offshore fields will produce trillions of cubic feet of natural gas which the report – “Sold Out: Launch of China pipeline project unleashes abuse across Burma” – said could be used to spur economic and social development in one of the world’s least developed nations.

It also said the Shwe Gas project will provide revenues of around US$29 billion over the next 30 years to Myanmar, one of the poorest countries in the world and suffers from serious energy shortages of its own.

Rights groups have said the people of Myanmar will see little of the money from the pipelines, saying profits will likely be filtered away by the military government for their own purposes, like buying arms.

JOBLESS & HOPELESS

According to the report, some 8,000 residents living near the onshore gas terminal and deep sea port in Rakhine are losing their main livelihoods – fishing and farming – as fishing grounds are now restricted and farm lands confiscated to make way for the project infrastructure, leaving them jobless and without income.

The oil and gas projects, meanwhile, only provide low-paying, unsafe and temporary construction jobs and workers are unable to complain about the working conditions or wages without retribution, the report added.

Women are especially vulnerable. They get paid less for the same jobs, are harassed and intimidated and face problems due to an increase in the sex industry to cater for an influx of male workers, the report said.

The report also said the expanding construction has damaged coral reefs, destroyed mangroves and led to forest-clearance, dredging and strip mining, all of which could increase the area’s vulnerability to natural disasters.

Still, local communities are standing up and making their voices heard despite threats, it said. It pointed to a strike in April by more than 100 workers over working conditions and a complaint in June by residents from Wat San village in Rakhine state over companies dumping waste into a local creek used for irrigating crop lands and watering livestock.

FUELLING CONFLICT

The report also said increased militarisation in the pipeline areas – some of which cross areas of clashes between ethnic armed groups and the government – is set to inflame conflict.

In June, government troops clashed with ethnic Kachin rebels near Chinese-built hydroelectric dams in what some analysts claim was due to business interests where local communities were cut off from the lucrative deals.

Chinese-built energy projects are a highly contentious issue for ethnic minorities in Myanmar, who see their construction as an incursion by an aggressive military that is reaping financial benefits from their resources.

The deployment of more troops to protect such foreign investment leads directly to increased abuses towards the local population, ranging from forced labour and forced relocations to torture, activists said.

US Special Representative On Myanmar Tour Seeking Reforms, Reconciliation
9/7/2011 4:31 AM ET

(RTTNews) – The U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Myanmar, Ambassador Derek Mitchell will depart on his first trip to the South-East Asian country in his position on Wednesday. During his trip, he looks forward to meeting with a full spectrum of Myanmar society, including government officials, members of political parties, local civil society organizations, and others.

His trip is intended to build upon U.S. dialogue and engagement toward shared goals of genuine reform, reconciliation, and development for the Burmese people, US State Department said in a statement.

Ambassador Mitchell will attend meetings in Nay Pyi Taw on September 9 and10. He will continue consultations in Rangoon during September 10-14.

From Myanmar, he will leave for Thailand and Indonesia. He will consult with officials in Bangkok on September 14-15, and in Jakarta on September 16-17.

Sep 8, 2011
Asia Times Online – Toys for the boys in Myanmar
By Bertil Lintner

CHIANG MAI – The isolated light-brown spots can be seen even on Google Earth. They are indicative of big, new buildings that have been carved out of densely forested jungle areas across the Myanmar heartland, with some dots seen in the hills east of the central city of Mandalay.

Most of them are for security reasons located in sparsely populated areas, but in the modern digital world not even Myanmar can keep the location of its new military installations secret.

Myanmar has embarked on a massive expansion of its military and military capabilities since the country was shaken by a nationwide pro-democracy uprising that almost toppled the regime in 1988. But this expansion appears to have been haphazard, with an emphasis on creating a loyal officer corps that the regime can depend on for its survival rather than building a professional fighting force.

Recent defectors from the Myanmar military say that the number of infantry battalions and other military units have been increased dramatically since 1988, but most of these are understaffed and the foot soldiers are often forcibly recruited, poorly paid and badly motivated.

Several sources with access to information from inside the Myanmar military say that the stated strength of the country’s armed forces, often given by Western analysts as between 300,000-400,000 men, is grossly exaggerated. Some sources put the actual figure at less than half that number and because the central authorities have had ceasefire agreements with almost all of the country’s ethnic rebel armies for two decades or more, the troops, and even most of the officers, lack combat experience.

Prior to the 1988 uprising and the ceasefire agreements with the rebels, the Myanmar military was known as a poorly equipped but ruthlessly efficient light-infantry force. Soldiers fought in yearly operations against insurgents in extremely difficult terrain, making it a tough, battle-hardened army with few equivalents in modern Asia.

“Now, the soldiers are doing nothing. They have new uniforms and better guns, the officers have more money to spend than anyone could dream of in the old days. They have new cars, new golf clubs, mistresses, everything – except professionalism,” says a disgruntled former Myanmar army officer who requested anonymity. Meanwhile, the morale among the rank-and-file is reported to be low while desertion rates are high.

Consequently, recent military campaigns against ethnic Kachin and Shan rebels in the country’s north and northeast have been disasters. Even after months of fighting, the government’s troops have failed to occupy a single major camp run by the Shan State Army (SSA) in the heart of Shan State, while in the north the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) recently gave the military a bloody nose when it tried to dislodge the rebels from their strongholds near the Chinese border.

To make up for the lack of combat experience – and to keep the officers happy with new equipment – the Myanmar government first embarked on a massive procurement campaign in 1989. Throughout the 1990s, an estimated US$1.4 billion of military and military-related equipment was bought from China, including anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles, aircraft, naval vessels, armored personnel carriers, trucks and other military vehicles, artillery pieces and rocket launchers. Additional weaponry and military hardware were procured from other military partners such as Russia, Singapore, Ukraine, North Korea, and, at one stage, Pakistan, Portugal, Poland and the former Yugoslavia.

Homegrown defense

Recent years, however, have seen a rapid expansion of the number of homegrown defense industries, witnessed in the new clearings in the jungles throughout the country. Before the 1988 uprising, the country had no more than half a dozen such factories.

Today, there are more than 20 military factories apart from the research facilities where new weaponry, including missiles, are being developed. The Myanmar military is also known to be carrying out nuclear research, although even former Myanmar army major Sai Thein Win, the whistleblower who fled the country last year, says that the project is unlikely to produce a usable atomic weapon.

“When the German-made machinery arrived from Singapore, I asked my commander who was going to operate it. ‘You are,’ he said. He had never before worked in a defense factory, and I – and I was trained in Russia – could see that this equipment was not suitable for the purpose for which it had been obtained. The nuclear program is nothing but a pipedream,” Sai Thein Win told Asia Times Online in a recent interview.

Known by the acronym ka pa sa after the initials of the Myanmar name for “the Directorate of Defense Industries”, the early factories were located exclusively around the old capital Yangon, on the western bank of the Irrawaddy River near the town of Pyay, or Prome, and near Magwe further to the north. According to analyst Andrew Selth, an Australian expert on the Myanmar military: “Before 1988 these factories could produce automatic rifles and light machine-guns, light mortars, grenades, anti-personnel mines and ammunition.”

Myanmar’s attempts to develop its own defense industries began in the early 1950s when a small factory was set up to produce bullets and copies of an Italian 9mm TZ45 submachine gun, known as the “Ne Win Sten” after the army commander at that time and later the country’s first military ruler.

Selth states in a monograph about Myanmar’s arms industries, published in 1997 by the Australian National University: “The Burmese [Myanmar] arms industry was given a major boost in 1957, when the state-owned West German company Fritz Werner GmbH agreed to build a factory in Rangoon [Yangon] with Heckler and Koch to produce Gewehr 3 [G3] automatic rifles. Finance was provided on favorable terms by the West German government.”

All such West German assistance was supposed to be halted after the 1988 uprising was drenched in blood, resulting in international condemnation of Myanmar’s military regime. But an internal audit report for the West German company, dated March 31, 1990, reveals that “raw materials imported from abroad are recorded in the stock ledger, but delivered directly to Myanma Heavy Industries for custody and use by them in production of goods on the JVC’s [Joint Venture Company] behalf.” The report, compiled by Fritz Werner’s accountants from the U Hla Tun Group, goes on to mention Ministry of Heavy Industries production sites at Yangon, Sinde and Nyaungchitauk at Padaung near Pyay, and Malun near Minhla – or exactly the locations of Myanmar’s then most important defense industries.

Fritz Werner is still active in Myanmar, but, according to Sai Thein Win and other sources, it is doubtful whether it is still actively involved in producing military equipment, although in 1984 it became the first foreign company to enter into a joint-venture agreement with Myanmar’s Heavy Industries Corporation, which produces weapons for the country’s armed forces.

The old Gewehr series – G2, G3 and G4 – has been replaced by other, indigenously produced infantry weapons which are lighter and more suitable for Myanmar’s tropical climate. Called MA 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 – after “Myanmar Army” – they are based on Chinese designs and resemble modern versions of the Soviet-era Kalashnikov and the old Makarov pistol. The new MA series is produced at ka pa sa 1 near Yangon’s Inya Lake, while the more advanced ka pa sa 2 in Malun produces mortars and artillery pieces and also has a shooting range built by Singapore to test the effectiveness of the weapons.

Brothers in arms

Missile research and development is carried out at the newly built ka pa sa 10 at Konegyi village in Minhla, where experts from North Korea and possibly also China and Russia are reportedly active. Myanmar is said to be interested in producing a North Korean-designed, Scud-type Hwasong 6 missile. But it is still an open question how close Myanmar is to producing a functioning missile. North Korean ships, however, continue to arrive frequently in Myanmar’s ports, carrying what is described as “general goods” that are often destined for Myanmar’s defense industries.

The production capability of the old mortar and shell factory ka pa sa 3 at Sinde, Padaung, has been surpassed by the new ka pa sa 12, set up in 1996. It now produces 60mm, 81mm, 105mm and 120mm mortar shells in a complex that sprawls over more than 16,000 acres (6,500 hectares) south of Sakhangyi village in Thayetmyo township, Magway Region.

According to Myanmar military insiders, machinery for ka pa sa 12 was imported from the Czech Republic and installed with help of experts from that country. Ka pa sa 12 uses modern electronic control equipment and is now considered one of the most advanced in Myanmar.

The most reliable factory for the production of small arms is ka pa sa 11 in Taikkyi township, Bago Region. It manufactures parts for the new MA-series of light infantry weapons, and machinery for the facility was reportedly obtained from South Korea’s Daewoo company.

A more mysterious industrial complex is at Sidoktaya near Magway Region’s border with Rakhine State. Designated as ka pa sa 20, 100,000 acres have been cleared for the facility and Google Earth imagery shows a helicopter landing pad and unusually long buildings.

It is staffed by 400 soldiers, military engineers and officers, many of them Russian-trained in nuclear physics, leading to speculation that it could be one of several locations in Myanmar where nuclear-related research is being carried out. Close to ka pa sa 20 is a new hydroelectric power station to provide a steady source of electricity to the top-secret facility.

Ka pa sa 8 in Sinbaungweh township, Magway Region, produces parts for tanks, ka pa sa 9 in Padaung, Bago Region, makes bullets for the MA-series of weapons, and ka pa sa 7 in Pyay makes sea mines and produces and repairs armored vehicles. Ka pa sa 6, also near Padaung, produces various kinds of ammunition and was reportedly built by Chinese experts. Ka pa sa 13 near Letpan village in Magway Region makes mines and parts for artillery.

Defectors such as Sai Thein Win, the only one willing to be interviewed by name by Asia Times Online, question the efficacy of these new arms factories. According to him, the fact that they are scattered all over the country and are, as he puts it, situated “in the middle of nowhere” (they can be seen with a even cursory look at Google Earth), makes it extremely difficult to coordinate production.

“Raw materials and parts have to be sent across the country, from one facility to another, and one factory doesn’t know what another is doing. The outcome is that many of these new weapons are basically useless,” claims Sai Thein Win.

Myanmar’s newly recruited infantry may lack combat experience, and the quality of the weapons produced in its defense industries may be of poor quality due to bad coordination between the various ka pa sas. But it is clear that the Myanmar regime is in no hurry to change its priorities, as defense spending still accounts for as much as 50% of the central government’s budget.

Regime survival has always been the main prerogative of Myanmar’s generals and thus a loyal and well-supplied officer corps is still of utmost importance, regardless of their weakness on the battlefield.

Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and author of several books on Burma/Myanmar. He is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media Services.

Asian Correspondent – Is Burma’s HR Commission just another empty promise?
By Zin Linn Sep 07, 2011 3:55PM UTC

The Burmese government media announced Tuesday it has established a National Human Rights Commission to look into human rights violations

The New Light of Burma reported on September 5 that the 15-member commission is made up of diplomats, academics and former government officials, all of them are retired.

The committee was formed following the United Nations Human Rights Envoy to Burma Tomas Ojea Quintana’s visit last month. However, the government said it had already set up the commission before Quintana arrived. Quintana was allowed for the first time to visit prisoners at the notorious Insein Prison and meet with Burma’s Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.

In an interview with VOA’s Burmese service, Quintana said he welcomes the decision to establish the commission, but he also said that the commission must have independence and neutrality.

After a four-day tour of the country, Quintana said in a statement dated August 25 that he welcomed a number of initiatives by the nominally civilian government to improve a human rights record that Western leaders have strongly criticized and the United States has called abysmal.

He also mentioned ongoing charges of torture and other human rights abuses during his official interviews, as well as the use of prisoners as porters for the armed-forces, and the transfer of prisoners to far-flung prisons where their families cannot visit due to difficult communication.

Human rights groups have repeatedly condemned the situation in Burma, which still holds more than 2,000 political prisoners. They say they will wait and see if the commission is effective.

The State-media said the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission was formed with the following persons with a view to promoting and safeguarding fundamental rights of citizens described in the constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. The commission members are as follow:

(1) U Win Mra, Ambassador (Retd),Chairman; (2) U Kyaw Tint Swe, Ambassador (Retd), Vice-Chairman; (3) U Tun Aung Chein, Professor (Retd), Department of History, Member; (4) U Hla Myint, Ambassador (Retd), Member; (5) U Than Swe, Director-General (Retd), Forest Department, Member; (6) Dr Nyan Zaw,State Medical Officer (Retd), Member; (7) Dr Daw Than New, Professor (Retd), Department of Law, Member; (8) Daw Saw Khin Kyi, Professor (Retd), Department of International Relations, Member; (9) U Tin Nyo, Director-General (Retd), Basic Education Department, Member; (10) U Kwa Htiyo, State Law Officer (Retd), Member; (11) U Khin Maung Lay, Director (Retd), Labour Department, Member; (12) U Lapai Zawgun, Minister Counsellor (Retd), Member; (13) U Nyunt Swe, Deputy Director-General (Retd), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Member; (14) Daw San San, Director (Retd), Labour Department,Member; (15) U Sit Myaing, Director-General (Retd), Social Welfare Department, Secretary.

Burma government representatives continue to deny any human rights violations, in direct contradiction to the facts on the ground. So, there remains serious doubt whether the newly formed government commission will deal with the facts and take action against human rights abuses in line with the laws.

Philippine Star – Myanmar to export rice to Philippines
(philstar.com) Updated September 07, 2011 12:00 AM

YANGON (Xinhua) – Myanmar will export about 3,000 tons of rice to the Philippines produced from southwestern Ayeyawaddy region under FOB (Free-on-board) system in a bid to expand its rice market to the international, trading circle said today.

The export to the Southeast Asian nation comes after parboiled rice were exported to Russia from three rice mills in the region.

The export of 125 tons of parboiled rice to Russia was made in the first batch while 250 tons in the second batch.

The price of a ton of parboiled rice in the Russian market is about $490.

Parboiled rice mills were scattered in Bogale, Kyaiklat and Einme townships in Ayeyawaddy region.

The rice buyers from Russia remarked that the standard of Myanmar parboiled rice is on par with international with more orders obtained from Bangladesh.

Although Myanmar people are not accustomed to consume parboiled rice, the Indians devour parboiled rice for 90 percent.

Parboiled rice is a healthier choice for consumers because it is richer in vitamin B1 and B2 and Niacin compared with normal rice and it is more suitable for those who are suffering diabetes and high blood pressure.

Parboiled rice is produced by soaking paddy in water heated to 70 degrees Celsius for eight hours. It is then steamed for eight minutes.

At present, there are 16 rice exporting companies in the country.

Meanwhile, Myanmar fetched $76.73 million for exporting a total of 221,600 tons of rice in the first three quarters of the fiscal year 2010-11.

Myanmar exported over 40,000 tons of rice in the single month of April, the start of the fiscal year 2011-12.

New Kerala – Myanmar organisation NNLD lauds FNR

Kohima, Sep 7 : The Naga National League for Democracy (Burma) has appreciated the untiring efforts of Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) for bringing together the Naga national workers under one roof.

A press note issued by executive committee members of the NNLD noted that the meetings have progressed significantly.

NNLD (Burma) also extended support to the reconciliation and further appealed to FNR to reach out to all the Naga National Workers (underground) groups.

The league also appealed to all NNW groups to remove the reservations and the past to attain permanent reconciliation and unity amongst the Nagas.

”We are pained to see the manners of expelling one another.

Nagas must tolerate each others’ shortcomings for we are brothers and we cannot be separated permanently.

”We shall continue to live under one name and shall be known by others as one family. Our organisation firmly stands for unity of all the Nagas, peace and understanding,” the NNLD stated.

The Irrawaddy – Cables Describe Than Shwe Culture of Fear
By SIMON ROUGHNEEN Wednesday, September 7, 2011

BANGKOK — Amid speculation about a power struggle in Naypyidaw between “reformists” such as Burma’s President Thein Sein and “hardliners” such as Vice-President Tin Aung Myint Oo, recently released US diplomatic cables provide a portrait of the man believed to still wield the balance of power in the military-dominated country: Snr-Gen Than Shwe.

The apparent onset of a factional contest is seen, some say, in developments such as the rebranding of the old Myanmar Human Rights Body (MHRB) into a human rights commission and the recent offer of amnesty to Burma’s political exiles. In contrast, recent appointments, such as that of Maj-Gen Soe Shein as head of the country’s military intelligence, suggest that Than Shwe maintains a decisive influence behind the new institutions.

According to accounts drafted by US officials based in Burma, last year’s election was less about reform than about ensuring that Than Shwe’s successor did not subject him and his family to the fate he imposed on Ne Win, the former military dictator who was put under house arrest by Than Shwe in 2002.

A Burmese businessman told the US embassy that “many of the top generals believe Than Shwe knows he has only a few years to live, and has dictated the timing of the referendum and elections to make sure a parliamentary government, overseen by the military, is in place before he dies.”

US diplomatic cables from the country’s embassy in Rangoon depicted Than Shwe as a paranoid recluse, secluded from reality by sycophants and yes-men, yet simultaneously able to maintain absolute authority. According to then US Chargé d’Affairs Shari Villarosa, writing in a Jan 11, 2008 cable recounting her meeting with Yin Yin Oo, a Burmese Foreign Ministry official described as close to current House Speaker Shwe Mann, “No one speaks truth to power for fear of losing their privileged positions.”

Despite his “increasingly erratic behavior,” coming around the time he traveled to Singapore to receive medical treatment, Than Shwe remained “firmly in power and in control” and was “single-handedly calling the shots regarding the upcoming constitutional referendum and the next steps of the roadmap, including the parliamentary election,” according to another cable dated April 25, 2008.

In the days following the May 2008 Cyclone Nargis disaster, Than Shwe is described as “worried about a US invasion” and “isolated and unaware of the scale of the catastrophe that has befallen his country.” At the time, the Burmese rulers were castigated internationally for refusing for weeks to allow international humanitarian assistance to enter Burma, despite the destruction and death toll wrought by the cyclone.

Indicative of how centralized power—and fear, it seems—had become in Burma, the cable outlined that “no-one will approve visas for international humanitarian assistance workers without his direct approval,” suggesting that Than Shwe was prone to micro-management when it came to issues he was sensitive about, such as the presence of foreigners in Burma.

Seemingly exasperated with the official reaction to the Nargis disaster, which killed over 140,000 according to official figures, the business and media contacts referred to in the cable “pleaded with the US to request the Chinese to send a high-level emissary to speak to Than Shwe regarding the gravity of the situation, and to urge him to let in international humanitarian experts.”

Speculating on the extent of Than Shwe’s self-imposed isolation and the fear-ridden inertia his rule generated, the contacts even “doubted that [UN Secretary-General] Ban Ki-moon’s message to Than Shwe had even been delivered to him, as no one dared push up any bad news to the Senior General.”

Other cables point to Than Shwe lambasting visiting United Nations envoy Ibrahim Gambari, disputing that Burma had any humanitarian problems and restating the claim that there are no political prisoners inside the country.

Than Shwe apparently cited what the cable says were “bogus humanitarian statistics” while meeting Gambari—possibly similar data and interpretations to those given by Burmese officials at rare press conferences and seminars attended by diplomatic representatives. Along similar lines, at a Dec 3, 2007, news conference, Minister of Information Brigadier-General Kyaw Hsan, Director General of Police Khin Yi and Minister of Labor Aung Kyi “presented the regime’s conspiracy theory of how external agitators, not popular discontent,” were the cause of the nationwide monk-led protests in August and September 2007.

However, despite his apparent omnipotence, Than Shwe revealed some apparent vulnerabilities.

According to one view given to the American embassy, he shunned extended stays away from Burma for medical treatment, as he was paranoid that rivals could move against him in his absence.

The cable recounting Than Shwe’s verbal assault on UN envoy Gambari jumped on old rumors that the regime’s No 2, Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, was plotting against his boss, citing a Machiavellian plot to stir Than Shwe into “a harder line” against the UN, which in turn could justify a move against him. However, it is unclear if such an attempt to oust Than Shwe was ever likely, given that his hardline reaction to the 2007 protests and negligence after Cyclone Nargis went unimpeded by would-be plotters. According to the post-Nargis US embassy account, “the military and bureaucracy remain paralyzed with fear.”

Despite his alpha male exterior, Burma’s military dictator was simultaneously capable of maudlin self-pity and peevish envy, it seems. In a meeting with American embassy officials, a departing Chinese diplomat recounted that Than Shwe once held his hand and asked, “Why do they sanction me—I have no villas and no foreign bank accounts, and yet they idolize a female [Suu Kyi] who has done nothing for the country?”

It seems that Than Shwe was not always so detached from reality, or, that in the past, he at least made the effort to spin a softer line to foreigners, without recourse to blatant denials of patently obvious truths.

A much older cable, from September 1992—the year he seized power—has the newly enthroned dictator telling the departing Indian ambassador that “the military cannot stay in power too long without risking unpopularity” and that “Burma’s economy won’t recover without foreign expertise.” The newly installed strongman even conceded to the Thai
government that Burma held political prisoners—much to the chagrin of Khin Nyunt, the Prime Minister and intelligence svengali later ousted by Than Shwe in 2004.

The Irrawaddy – Journal Punished after Publishing Suu Kyi Interview
By BA KAUNG Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Burma’s press censorship board has punished a Rangoon-based journal for violating the country’s draconian media laws—apparently for publishing an interview with Aung San Suu Kyi and putting a large photograph of the pro-democracy leader on its front page.

Earlier this week, the weekly journal Messenger became the first local publication to receive permission to run an interview with Suu Kyi. The journal’s latest issue quickly sold out because of the interview, according to local journalists.

However, on Wednesday, the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division (PSRD), Burma’s state censorship board, informed the journal’s editors that they would not be permitted to publish a regular supplement in the next issue of the journal because they had violated censorship rules.

The PSRD did not specify which rules had been broken, but local journalists said it appeared to be related to the large photograph of Suu Kyi on the front cover.

The supplement, which usually contains more up-to-date information than the journal itself, is important for generating sales.

The move comes amid a recent relaxation of control over media coverage of Suu Kyi, seen as part of the new, nominally civilian government’s effort to reach out to the democratic opposition in a bid to win greater international recognition.

This week, the PSRD permitted another weekly, The People’s Era, to publish an article written by Suu Kyi about her trip to the ancient Burmese capital of Pagan in July.

Journalists have also been allowed to attend recent parliamentary sessions in Napyidaw, albeit on the condition that they avoid reporting in a manner damaging to the “dignity of the Parliament and the State.”

Despite such signs that the government is opening up to greater public scrutiny, however, it continues to detain a number of reporters accused of working for exiled media outlets.

The Irrawaddy – Cement Firms Seizing Land in Mon State
By LAWI WENG Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Villagers in Mon State have reported to The Irrawaddy that their rice paddies and rubber plantations were seized by a powerful cement company, which compensated them with a small fraction of the land value.

The land confiscations took place in January and February in and around the villages of Kaw-Pa-Naw and Kaw-Don in Kyaikmayaw Township in eastern Mon State. About 600 acres of paddy and 140 acres of rubber plantation were appropriated by John Cement Company, the villagers said.

Burma’s state-run media reported on Sept. 4, that John Cement Company and another private firm, BAC Phili Trading Company, had been granted concessions by the government to open two cement-making plants, each with a 1,000-ton daily capacity, in the Kyaikmayaw region.

According to Nai Aue Mon, a coordinator at the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), John Cement is a subsidiary of Zaykabar, the country’s leading property developer, which is owned by powerful Burmese tycoon and military crony Khin Shwe.

The villagers said that representatives of John Cement offered payments of only 15,000 kyat (US $20) per acre for fallow land, and 150,000 kyat ($200) per acre for rice paddies.

Speaking toThe Irrawaddy by telephone from Kaw-Don village, one of the victims of the scheme, Nai Sein, said, “We can grow two harvests on our land—one season for rice and one for beans. I can sell the arable land for 700,000 kyat ($965) per acre, but they will only give me 150,000 kyat.”

A woman in Kaw-Don who did not want to be named said that about 10 percent of people in the village refused to accept financial compensation for their land.

She said the company representatives responded to those villagers by saying, “If you do not want the money—it’s up to you.”

The villagers complained that there existed no mechanism for complaining about the land seizures, but several said that even those who accepted the compensation still wanted to contest the land appropriation.

According to HURFOM, which is based in Thailand, the two cement companies earlier this year measured out and demarcated hundreds of acres of land in Kaw-Don, Kaw-Pa-Naw and Ni Don villages for cement production.

It said the firms had conducted surveys and taken soil samples from the area.

At the end of 2010, the Zaykabar Company confiscated 800 acres of land in Ni Don, which is also in Kyaikmayaw Township, to build a cement plant. The company invariably paid low rates of compensation to the victims of land appropriation in Ni Don, according to HURFOM.

With regard to rubber plantations, the companies have set rates at: owners of plantations which have been in production for up to three years receive 800,000 kyat ($1,100) per acre; those that have produced rubber for up to seven years get two million kyat ($2,750) per acre.

“We can sell one acre of rubber plantation with seven years’ growth for as much as 10 million kyat ($13,800),” said Nai Shwe, a villager in Kaw-Pa-Naw.

About 460 rubber plantation owners in Kaw-Pa-Naw and Kaw-Don signed a petition which was sent earlier this year to the government in Naypyidaw and to the Southeast Military Regional Command in Moulmein.

According to the villagers, there are 2,700 acres of rubber plantation in Kaw-Pa-Naw and Kaw-Don villages. However, 140 acres have been seized since they sent the petition.
An ethnic Mon Buddhist monk in Kaw-Pa-Naw said, “The companies will take more and more land to meet their plans. But they will not take all the land at once, because the authorities are worried about an uprising.”

Meanwhile, rumors are rife that BAC Phili Trading Company plans to open another cement-making plant in nearby Kwan Ngarm village.

“They come and measure the land every day,” said villager Nai Win. “We heard that they are going to take about 1,000 acres of land.

“I will probably find out within the next two days if my rubber plantation will be confiscated,” he said.

“We have nothing left for our livelihoods,” he said. “We don’t know what to do or where to go.

“Our lives will likely end with us working here as slaves for these companies,” he said.

Former child soldier sentenced to death released from prison
Wednesday, 07 September 2011 21:31 Te Te

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – A former child soldier who spent seven years on death row has been freed with the help of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Phyo Sithu, now 21 years old, was sentenced to death in a case involving the shooting death of three soldiers including a junior officer.

The ILO contacted the Directorate of Prison Administration and the Burmese army and urged them to review the case in accordance with the childrens’ rights law.

Phyo Sithu was released from Kalay Prison in Sagaing Region on August 3, his lawyer, San Aung, told Mizzima. “The ILO contacted the relevant departments, and he was released eight months after the appeal,” he said.

Phyo Sithu, who lives in Aungchantha Quarter in Thanlyin, Rangoon, attended military training in Ayadaw in Sagaing Region and became a soldier with identification number (k/279449).

In 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross sent a letter to Phyo Sithu’s parents, Win Bo and Than Than Yi, saying Phyo Sithu had been imprisoned in Kalay Prison, according to his parents. They made appeals for help to the Directorate of Prison Administration, the ILO and the United Nations Children’s Fund asking that his sentence be commuted from death to imprisonment.

“When I heard that he received a death sentence, I was choked. My son went out from home with his friends and then he was recruited in the army. When my son was released from prison, I felt like I had won the lottery,” Than Than Yi told Mizzima.

In May 2003, Phyo Sithu was forcibly recruited into the army at the age of 14 and sent to Infantry Unit No. 50 (under the Northwest Command) in Gangaw in Magwe (Magway) Region.

Later, at a military base in the Reh area in Chin State, gun shots erupted in a dispute between soldiers; three soldiers including a second lieutenant died in the conflict. The Kalay Military Tribunal in Sagaing Region sentenced Phyo Sithu to death in May 2004.

“They were shot when they were sleeping. My friends shot them because they were furious. They [Phyo Sithu’s friends] were angry because the superior officer beat them up because they were not following orders. When we slept during sentry duty, he kicked us in the face, gave us blows and beat us with sticks. We were tortured,” Phyo Sithu told Mizzima when he arrived back home.

Second Lieutenant Yan Lin Tun, a corporal and a medical clerk died; three soldiers who were involved in the conflict fled to India, according to Phyo Sithu.

During the trial by the military tribunal, in addition to the conflict, incidents regarding misappropriation and corruption by military officers were revealed. As a consequence, three military officers including the commanding officer of Infantry Unit No. 50 were sentenced to three years in prison.

Phyo Sithu said: “A person riding a horse was carrying opium in a coconut and when Unit No. 1 caught the person, they accepted bribes and then released the person. They shared the bribes with the commanding officer. The case was revealed in our trial.”

When he was forcibly recruited into the army, Phyo Sithu said he was forced to say that he had been 18 years old. In May 2011 when President Thein Sein signed a commutation order, all death sentences were commuted to a 20-year prison term.

In May 2011, the appeal to authorities that Phyo Sithu should be released was made in accordance with the Children’s Act. Section 46 of the 1993 Children’s Act states that children who committed crimes can be sentenced to a maximum of seven years.

Agence France-Presse reported in June that with the help of the ILO, there have been 174 cases of underage children who were recruited by the Burmese military who have been released to their families since 2007.

According to a report released in May by the Thailand-based Network for Human Rights Documentation–Burma, there were 21 child soldier cases from January 2011 to March 2011.

USDP MP, a former colonel, says Suu Kyi not right for peace committee
Wednesday, 07 September 2011 12:16 Myo Thant

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – A person who says “Burma” instead of “Myanmar” should not be appointed to the country’s peace committee, a former colonel who is a Union Solidarity and Development Party MP told Burmese lawmakers in the Lower House of Parliament on Tuesday.

Hla Swe said he doubted that such person should be a member of the country’s peace committee who would be negotiating with ethnic armed groups, according to MPs.

Hla Swe, who represents Magway Region Constituency 12, did not mention Aung San Suu Kyi by name, but MPs said they believed he was referring to the opposition leader.

In 1989, the former junta changed the country’s name from Burma to “Myanmar.” In May, Suu Kyi told Radio Free Asia (Burmese service) that she would continue to call the country “Burma” because the former junta changed the country’s name without consulting its citizens.

Regarding the government’s on-going armed conflicts with ethnic armed groups, MP Hla Swe said that a cease-fire agreement had not been reached because the government could not give the armed groups “special privileges.”

Hla Swe also alleged that there were supporters of the ethnic armed groups in the Parliament, an MP told Mizzima.

Last week, Rakhine Nationalities Development Party MP Dr. Aye Maung of Arakan State Constituency No. 1 said the government should invite opposition leader Suu Kyi to be on the peace committee when its formation was being discussed in Parliament.

Germany’s controversial machinations in Burma
Wednesday, 07 September 2011 12:34 Nicholas Ganz

(Commentary): (Mizzima) -  When it comes to Burma, Germany is under the spotlight for the wrong reasons. August 8 is normally marked by exiled Burmese with demonstrations to commemorate the democratic uprising of 1988. But this year instead of protesting in front of Burmese embassies, they gathered in front of German embassies in seven international locations.

The German government’s quiet engagement with the power-holders in Naypyitaw is now being criticized loudly by Burmese protestors.

For a long time, the Federal Republic of Germany has faced criticism that she undermines or even prevents sanctions imposed by the EU on Burma. In March this year, Burmese monks of the All Burma Monks Alliance (ABMA) staged a protest in front of the German foreign ministry to demand stronger sanctions by Germany. Even Aung San Suu Kyi indicated the need for further action by Germany on the Burma question. She criticized the EU countries for not speaking with one voice and said they were not focused on concrete issues.

Germany has been politically and economically engaged in Burma since the beginning of the military dictatorship in 1962. The company Fritz Werner was fully owned by the German government until 1990 and it built weapons and ammunition factories in Burma beginning in 1957. The company had close ties to the late dictator General Ne Win and it is claimed that German-made or German-delivered weapons were used in government actions against the people in 1962, in the mid-1970s, and in 1988, and in the war against ethnic people.

A few weeks ago, the director of Fritz Werner, Joerg Gabelmann travelled to Burma and held meetings with finance minister Hla Tun and minister of transport Nyan Tun Aung, who are blacklisted by the EU. The company gave no further explanation about the talks. According to a statement by the Fritz Werner office in Essen, the meetings were about a container shipment of X-ray apparatus to be used against the drug-trade. All economic projects inside Burma were purely civilian trade, and they were approved by the federal department of export.

But even if this statement is true, it is unclear what the end use of the machines will be and whether they would fall into the hands of military personnel, who can use them for military purposes in their war against the ethnic people.

Beside all this, it recently became clear that the German companies Deckel Maho Gildemeister (DMG) and Trumpf delivered machines for Burma’s dubious nuclear programme and the production of Scud missiles. The deserter Sai Thein Win clearly showed how the German machines were used to construct parts that could be utilized for Scud missiles as well as for the enrichment of uranium.

But the Burmese military cheated the German companies and even delegations of the German embassy in Rangoon did not notice the fraud. Though an American military attaché noticed after his inspection of Fritz Werner facilities, “that the supply of dual-use machine tools or casing often hid a trail, as plausible deniability may exist for the items’ use. This allegedly included the import of ‘lip stick’ casing that never held lipstick.”  A speaker of the German foreign ministry says that Germany is strictly following the weapons embargo, including post-shipment controls and they apparently did not notice the misuse.

The companies claim that they delivered machines for civilian-use only and their investment had been acknowledged by the federal department of exports. Trumpf and DMG claim to have abandoned all investments and maintenance service, according to their offices.

Germany has undermined and concretely blocked several sanctions against the Burmese regime. Mark Farmaner from the Burma Campaign UK stated: “For more than a decade Germany has quietly worked within the EU to block steps to increase pressure on the dictatorship, directly opposing the wishes of Burma’s democracy movement and Aung San Suu Kyi. They have also encouraged other European countries to follow them, splitting the EU. Germany is now the main country blocking the EU from supporting a UN Commission of Inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma. It is shocking that the German government would oppose even something like this, especially at a time when serious abuses, like the rape and murder of ethnic minority women, are on the increase. The EU works by consensus, all have to agree. This gives Germany an effective veto, and as a powerful EU member, officials use their influence to push other EU members to agree with them. Without doubt this is one of the main reasons that the EU has mostly toothless sanctions.”

Markus Loening, the human-rights commissioner of Germany explained the reasons for relaxing the sanctions: “Our main goal is that the human-rights situation in Myanmar is changing after 50 years of military dictatorship. I have explicitly told our dialogue partners that we expect a clear and sustainable advancement of the situation by the new government. When we will see substantial improvement––which is not the case so far––we will engage in a gradual relaxation of sanctions in return. But we also must question ourselves, which of the hitherto existing sanctions have supported to improve the human-rights situation and which not.”

Loening justified his idea in an article in The Financial Times that an uncomfortable side-effect of the EU sanctions is a loss of jobs for thousands of women in the clothing industry. Yet there is an embargo by the EU on the textile industry, hence the EU sanctions cannot be blamed for this. Loening did not respond to an e-mail query on this issue.

“Germany is in constant, close exchange with Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders in Burma and outside the country,” Loening said in an e-mail reply to queries on Germany’s position. “The appraisal of the situation in Myanmar is without much difference. Since the (exiled) opposition is not united about their own true path towards democracy and freedom in Burma, the German government can obviously not agree with all groups. We rely on the policy of change with a mixture of pressure and appeals.”

The appeals in Loening‘s statement become clearer with the publication of US cables by Wikileaks in 2009. According to the cables, Germany agreed to export high-tech machines to Burma, a country where 70 percent of its population are working in the agricultural sector. But the pressure, that Germany allegedly wants to increase, can be seen in the prevention of direct sanctions and the veto against the proposal for a UN Commission of Inquiry. As the world’s third largest producer of weapons, maybe Germany is afraid of being accused in court of its own involvement in the Burmese massacres with German made and delivered weapons.

Even the work of some German organizations is now being criticized. Often the name of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) foundation crops up. According to several international and Burmese observers, activists and intellectuals, the work of the FES foundation is questionable. Mark Farmaner said: “Friedrich Ebert Stiftung are effectively an extension of the federal foreign ministry in Germany. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has played a key role in implementing one of the most unpleasant aspects of German foreign policy. Burma’s democracy movement, including the democratically elected NLD (National League for Democracy), wanted targeted sanctions and increased pressure, the exact opposite of what the German foreign ministry wanted. It was very difficult for them to make their case against sanctions in the face of what Aung San Suu Kyi and the democracy movement wanted. So instead they set out to find and promote other Burmese voices who would oppose sanctions and increased pressure. These people were then lavished with funding and training, invited to international conferences, and presented as a so-called third force and a true voice of people inside Burma. But most of these people had no constituency or support in the country, and some had links to the dictatorship. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the German government then argued that these people showed that Burmese people didn’t support sanctions, or that the democracy movement was divided. In this way the German government actively worked to undermine Burma’s democracy movement.”

When contacted to explain their reaction to this criticism, the company said: “The FES is working inside Burma/Myanmar and outside the country with a variety of different organisations. The collection and co-operation with several Burmese and non-Burmese partner-organisations is conditioned according to the themes and aims of the specific working-line.”

As a justification, the FES cited the example of their event before the elections in Burma in September 2010 with “representatives from different Burmese exile groups, as well as representatives from Myanmar’s civil-society organisations. The project work of the FES is generally trying to reflect different visions and arguments for the development in Burma/Myanmar.”

What these attempts look like is clearer when we look the list of invited speakers for this event. It mainly consisted of people who already supported the line of the FES. The panel discussion caused a lot of dismay amongst exiled Burmese and Burma groups. Moreover, a demonstration took place in front of the conference. Other discussion panels by the FES were criticized for the same reasons and were alleged to have been organized in an elitist way.

So far, the German government is keeping silent about these highly sensitive questions, contradictions and criticism. The protestors in front of the German embassy last month in London accused Germany of putting economic interests before human rights. But this is nothing new when one hears of other dubious projects including the recent German shipment of tanks to Saudi Arabia or allegations of passive cooperation with Tripoli during the Libyan crisis.

DVB News – Political laws could equal lifetime ban
By AHUNT PHONE MYAT
Published: 7 September 2011

On Tuesday the People’s Parliament discussed amending the election law for the house, with a National Democratic Force (NDF) MP objecting to the inclusion of stipulations that MPs convicted of laws such as the Unlawful Association and other acts viewed as political, could face the punishment of being permanently banned.

In the discussion yesterday, the NDF’s Sanchaung township representative Soe Win objected against the addition of a paragraph in the bill that specifies parliamentary representatives convicted of certain infringements would be slapped with the stricter punishment of a life time ban. At present punishments are not specified.

Amongst the laws that could be in the contentious paragraph were national treason, defying the constitution, bankruptcy and the unlawful associations act.

The military dominated parliament rejected the suggestion in open voting;

“[Soe Win] said there are parliament representatives who in the past were imprisoned under such [political charges] and that they should not be restricted from future elections under these amendments. The parliament decided to go for a vote whether to accept his objection or not and it turned out there were 31 votes in favour [of Soe Win’s objection], eight abstained and 382 against votes,” Pe Than an MP for the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) told DVB.

Laws such as the Unlawful Association act are regularly used against activists and journalists, including at leasttwo DVB journalists who are now behind bars. It effectively means that the mere act of an MP talking to what the law defines as an unlawful association would bar them from politics for life, or indeed those already convicted of such crimes;
“It is a common thing for a political activist in Burma to have been in prison under political charges. And given that they have already served their punishments so they should not be restricted from participating in future elections,” Pe Than said.

The issue of defying the constitution and national treason are loosely defined and therefore open to interpretation but all such additions are likely to prevent large swathes of dissidents past or present from ever taking part in electoral politics in the country. Another exclusion was those suffering from mental problems, needless to say highly open to interpretation.

The discussion however was approved for parliament last week by speaker of the house former general Shwe Mann. The open voting system has acted to prevent the majority USDP and military candidates from diverging from the party line.

DVB News – Burma’s new leader could emulate B J Habibie
By KHIN MAUNG WIN
Published: 6 September 2011

Comparisons are often made between Indonesia and Burma; two Southeast Asian nations where the militarisation of politics, democracy struggles, their achievements and transitional phases, have defined their people’s recent histories.

Burma’s former military regime; the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), was renamed from State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1997 and is said to have copied Soeharto’s New Order regime that guaranteed the dual role of the army in politics and security affairs.

SLORC initiated the writing of a constitution in January 1993 that was completed by the SPDC in May 2008 with a sham referendum in the wake of cyclone Nargis. It has become known as the 2008 constitution and can be seen to reflect Soeharto and his New Order regime.

The Burmese version of the Soeharto-era Golkar Party, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), was first created a few months after the constitution drafting process started in 1993. The USDA was renamed the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in mid-2010, months before the general election in November of the same year, conducted with under the 2008 constitution and according to many; a healthy dose of cheating. General Thein Sein, Prime Minister of the SPDC was a candidate for the USDP and has now been elected to the presidency.

While many are very critical about the 2008 constitution, the 2010 election and its outcomes, including the government of President Thein Sein, some argue that these are inevitable steps in a gradual democratic transition.

Despite many critics lacking faith in President Thein Sein’s ability to initiate democratic transition the developments witnessed lately on his initiative have raised eye brows. These initiatives include formal talks between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and government ministers; changes in the attitude of government towards the media that include the first ever lively and fairly transparent government press conference in Naypyidaw; public announcement in the newspapers offering armed ethnic groups peace talks, even if it was met with skepticism.

Whilst the historic meeting between the president and the ever iconic Suu Kyi at which both parties express satisfaction could not help but cast a warm PR glow onto the news pages. Lastly but by no means least, the visit of Tomas Ojea Quintana, the UN special rapporteur on human rights on Burma and his meetings with high-ranking government officials and Suu Kyi; he had previously been barred for his frank call for the creation of a Commission of Inquiry for the serious human rights violations in Burma.

Furthermore, the president in his speech to the parliament on Aug. 22 vowed that his government will reach out to the opposition. After all even Suu Kyi’s political tour to Pegu, a town north of Rangoon, was escorted by

government security forces instead of being attacked by them, as was the case in 2003.

Whilst these developments are received cautiously by many observers, it seems unlikely that the president is doing all this just for PR. One hopes it is too much for any PR work.

Many people, including Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) view them as positive developments that could be the beginning of long-awaited transition.
These developments once again remind one that major transition took place in Indonesia under president Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. Once seen as Soeharto’s subordinate and merely an engineer rather than a decisive politician, Habibie surprised the world by introducing aggressive initiatives that made a dramatic transition to democracy possible.

The initiatives included, but were not limited too, Timor Leste’s referendum on independence; introduction of three new political laws — Law on Political Party (Law No.2/1999), Law on General Election (Law No.3/1999) and Law on the Structure and Position of MPR/DPR, or Parliament (Law No.4/1999) — which collectively pave the way for the 1999 democratic general election, the first since 1955.

The successful holding of a free and fair general election and the transfer of power to democratically elected leaders in 1999 was a clear indicator that the most important steps of democratic transition in Indonesia occurred during the presidency of Habibie in less than two years between 1998-1999.

U Thein Sein became president via a controversial election, while Habibie was sworn in by his mentor, Soeharto, in May 1998. But both are considered the nominees or heirs of outgoing strongmen.

It is natural then, that one of the major tasks of the successor is to safeguard the legacy and ill gotten gains of their mentor. Habibie, however, strikingly had the courage to diverge from his mentor. An investigation into alleged corruption by Soeharto was initiated in late 1998, and it later put Soeharto on trial. If Habibie was being controlled by Soeharto during the critical period of 1998-1999, then Indonesia’s transition would have been a very different story.

Despite such a record as a transitional leader, Habibie himself failed to stay in power. Some still saw him as being too close to their bitter memory of the western backed dictator Soeharto.

People perceived Habibie’s initiatives for transition emanating not from a sincere conviction, rather because of pressures from the activists and public. In addition, a majority of lawmakers lost confidence in him largely because of his policy on Timor Leste.

But Habibie, to his credit never tried to extend his grip on power beyond his mandate.

One of the most important factors contributing to the success of transition under the presidency of Habibie was the divergence of the Indonesian Military (TNI) from the Soeharto family and politics. The TNI itself went trough a reform program that greatly benefitted the orderly transition in Indonesia.

Lately, it has not escaped conjecture to wonder if President Thein Sein could be Burma’s Mikhail Gorbachev. The Soviet leader who introduced Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (restructuring) in the late 1980s. President Thein Sein’s initiatives mentioned above may be considered the beginning of Glasnost despite the fact that initiatives that could be considered Perestroika are yet to come.

President Thein Sein, is widely believed to be one of the more humble and clean from the previous regime and the current government. But despite that was still heavily influenced by his mentor, Senior General Than Shwe, the word yes man has been used to describe mentor and protege.

But President Thein Sein could also be compared to president Habibie as the two countries have been compared for sometime.

If President Thein Sein is to be Burma’s B.J. Habibie for introducing initiatives to pave the way for a democratic transition, two additional, but very important, conditions should be met to make a Burma transition successful.

First, President Thein Sein must have the courage to walk his own walk and diverge from his mentor Senior General Than Shwe. Second Burma’s army; the Tattmadaw, must learn lessons from the TNI on how to contribute and cope with democratic transition.

The writer is deputy executive director of the Democratic Voice of Burma, this article first appeared in the Jakarta Post