The Battle of the Ulterior Motives
Nov 23rd, 2009
Kanbawza Win
“The Washington Post” of the 7th instant decries, “Results of US-Burma Meeting is Unclear.” How can it be clear when the two sides, the Burmese Junta and the American representatives Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, together with Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary witted against each other with mammoth ulterior motives? Perhaps Campbell`s team missed Bertil Lintner’s writings in the Wall Street Journal, “Westerners who believe they can engage the generals to make them change their ways are naïve. Burma’s ruling generals don’t receive Western visitors because they are interested in learning anything from them. They talk to outsiders because they think they can use them to get critics off their backs and remain in power. Foreigners, whether they advocate “engagement” or sanctions, have always overestimated their own importance. Burmese’s generals listen only to themselves and any change would have to come from within—and not from sweet-talking.”
Sen. Jim Webb’s visit to Burma in August, with “the business overruling the conscious” like attitude, was hailed by some foreign diplomats as a “breakthrough, ” and now we have Campbell and Marciel came looking rather tough but ended up going back only with the picture of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for their photo album.
One cannot forget that Razali Ismail, a Malaysian diplomat, United Nations’ special envoy, who desperately tried for five successive years starting in 2002 to initiate the talks with the Junta and the leader of the pro democracy forces. In 2006 in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, he admitted he had failed in his job “to help broker an agreement between the government and opposition that would lead the country towards democracy.” His successor Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari, was equally unsuccessful. So is Ban Ki-Moon the UN Secretary General.
Leave the UN aside, because the Junta did not respect them, as perhaps they consider UN to be part of NATO (No Action Talk Only) and let us look at the initiative of US. In February 1994, Congressman Bill Richardson—now the governor of New Mexico —paid a highly publicized visit to Burma. They met prodemocracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi—who also then was under house arrest—and intelligence Chief Gen. Khin Nyunt. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, then as well as now, expressed her willingness to talk to the Junta. It was hailed as a breakthrough but a second visit to Burma in May 1995, Mr. Richardson stated at a press conference in Bangkok that his trip had been “unsuccessful, frustrating and disappointing. Here’s my conclusion after my trip. There is serious repression, regression and retrenchment by the [junta] in the area of human rights and democratization.” What more proof is wanted than Campbell, and Marciel is following the same road.
There is no heart and soul on both sides as each one to get the better of the other and leave Burma’s impoverished millions to endure decades of life under the iron grip of a secretive and paranoid regime that has fattened itself off the country’s immense natural resources, from natural gas to rubies. Overall, Obama’s Asia policy has been largely driven by events and domestic priorities rather than by an overarching strategic vision, as in the case of Burma to rescue democracy. The Obama team is being forced to coordinate closely with China on financial matters in response to the financial crisis. Passing a cap and trade bill at home means that America need China to sign up to a global climate change pact; Americans will chafe at a costly bill if the world’s largest carbon emitters do not agree to carbon reductions. Hence the Obama team attempted a new policy on Burma. The idea is to find a way to engage the Burmese Junta which would strengthen relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Burma is a member. But the policy change has been overtaken by events. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was unfairly punished when an American swam across a lake to her residence. And the Junta began a new round of repression, as its leader’s jail and harasses political opponents in the run up to their 2010 “elections.”
Surely President Obama could not radically shift Burma policy. Rather, adjust to US relations with ASEAN and Burma has been only marginal. And as part of the broader attempt to build stronger relations with Southeast Asia, the administration signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and will make his presence felt in Singapore. Visits to Southeast Asia by Secretary Hillary Clinton and her deputy, Jim Steinberg, demonstrate a desire to deepen American engagement with that region. But it is unlikely that engaging Burma or signing the TAC will increase America’s regional influence, not with Burma.
The Burmese regime’s distrust of Western powers can be seen as moving the capital to the jungle hideout of Naypyidaw, the raison d’ etre being where it could not be neither harassed by domestic opposition fighters nor attacked by Western powers — consolidation and isolation in their most pure forms. The U.S. must understand that the regime with which it hopes to engage is comprised of an elite group of military leaders deeply suspicious of any U.S. action.
In the wake of Cyclone Nargis, as thousands and thousands of Burmese succumbed to disease and starvation, the Junta got the heart to block nearly all Western humanitarian assistance and would not allow U.S. ships carrying aid to enter Burmese waters, out of fear of attack. Breaking through such distrust will be a difficult task.
However, assuming the Junta is amenable to direct talks with the U.S., the question remains of what the United States might hope to accomplish. Even if senior level talks do take place, and the junta — putting aside its strategy of the past 50 years — actually grants concessions, such as releasing political prisoners or conducting free elections, how can the U.S. be sure that it will then comply? After years of sanctions and lack of trade with Burma, the U.S. is devoid of economic leverage over the regime and lacks a political enforcement mechanism
China which has supported Burma in every respect is starting to feel the negative consequences of sharing its border with a failed state and expressed its displeasure over the Burmese Junta’s ongoing fight with eastern ethnic nationalities that send thousands of refugees streaming into China. If China decides to pressure the Junta on key issues in order to mitigate cross-border violence, it certainly wields more leverage than the U.S. However, China’s commitment to a policy of non-interference and the new pipe line makes such pressure unlikely. Will the US cooperate with China?
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be the real linchpin for change in Burma pressuring them to enforce the democratic principles inscribed in the organization’s charter, of which Burma is a signatory. ASEAN is just beginning to see that an unstable and repressive Burmese regime can have a negative impact on Southeast Asian countries, whether it is through refugee flows, spill-over armed conflicts or a bustling drug trade. However, a summit statement by members of the US-ASEAN Summit takes a soft line on Burma, failing to call for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, despite efforts by the US clearly climaxed the American hypocrisy and proof that that America has no say in ASEAN affairs.
It seems that, internal US political realities prevented because of other, more important foreign and domestic crises require expenditure of greater administration political capital. Another fact is it must be prompted by some significant amelioration of harsh Junta rule in Burma. The US president can justify a policy shift, but only in response to significant Burmese reforms which we see no sign up to this day. The policy change requires the support of significant bipartisan support in the Congress and on the Burmese side it must be construe that a change occurred because of US pressure. Even if the change occur the vested interest of the US companies together with the Generals’ cronies will complain but it will be better for the region and the people of Burma and enhanced the Obama’s administration.