Might it be possible that the generals in Myanmar recognise that they are in a cul de sac? Could the regime be seeking ways out of its isolation in the run-up to the 2010 elections? Could it welcome dialogue and engagement?

The recent decision by Myanmar’s government to sentence pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi to a further 18 months’ house arrest shows how difficult it is to deal with that country’s ruling generals. Yet the first steps toward a new approach may already have been taken.

The clearest sign comes from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member. At first, most of ASEAN’s member governments responded mildly to the verdict, expressing their “disappointment” — a stance that reflects the group’s principle of non-interference in fellow members’ internal politics.

But Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya then consulted his counterparts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam. As current ASEAN chair, he floated the idea of concertedly requesting a pardon for Aung San Suu Kyi.

ASEAN government officials have since met to draft a text. Approval by the association’s foreign ministers may come in September, with ASEAN leaders tackling the issue in October.

Of course, amendments and objections to the draft should be expected. But the pardon request is already significant. It seeks to be finely balanced, respecting the regime’s sovereignty while subtly pressing home the point in unison, as neighbouring states. The request would be politely worded, but it would also be an official and public mode of communication, instead of the usual behind-the-scenes quiet diplomacy.

What ASEAN says or does not say will not change things immediately. Cynics might add that even if Aung San Suu Kyi is pardoned, she may yet still be detained on political grounds or face other barriers aimed at preventing her from competing in the elections promised in Myanmar for 2010.

But Western sanctions have not worked, either. Since the 1990s crackdown, human rights violations have continued, most recently with the suppression of the protests led by Buddhist monks in 2007. The average citizen has grown poorer, even as those close to the junta become ostentatiously rich.

Western sanctions instead paved the way for investments in Myanmar by those with less concern about human rights violations — first by ASEAN neighbours in hotels and other sectors, and more recently by China and India, which are vying for projects and influence in the strategic energy sector. As a result, Myanmar’s generals have been able to play one side off against another.

The game, however, may now be changing. ASEAN’s initiative is a new step forward for the group. While ASEAN rejected previous calls to impose sanctions, or even to expel Myanmar, this step shows that it will not remain inert regardless of what the generals do. Moreover, some ASEAN member countries, like Singapore, have explicitly called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be allowed to participate in the 2010 elections.

The ASEAN effort coincides with two other developments. One is the decision by the United States to reconsider its policy of sanctions, becoming more flexible while remaining true to its values and interests.

Some activists have criticized US Senator Jim Webb’s journey to Yangon to obtain the release of John Yettaw, the American whose actions triggered the charges against Aung San Suu Kyi. But this is consistent with the Obama administration’s policy of seeking a dialogue even with those who are not America’s friends. Such dialogue is vital if Myanmar is to be prevented from possibly pursuing nuclear weapons and rigging elections, à la Iran.

The other development is less obvious. After the court delivered its verdict, the regime halved the sentence and agreed to keep Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, rather than moving her to one of its worst jails. This may not seem like much of a concession. But the junta seems to be trying to cause less offence.

Consider, too, the junta’s gesture in handing over Yettaw to Senator Webb, and its interaction with the international community on humanitarian assistance after Cyclone Nargis. Might it be possible that the generals in Myanmar recognise that they are in a cul de sac? Could the regime be seeking ways out of its isolation in the run-up to the 2010 elections? Could it welcome dialogue and engagement?

How the generals respond to the ASEAN request will be an important signal of the regime’s intentions. Even if the regime does want to begin talking, sustaining a dialogue will be no easier than has been the case with North Korea.

ASEAN, as the organisation of neighbouring states, is important to achieving that goal, but US involvement is key, as is inclusion of China and India. They must be pressed to see more than the opportunity for strategic access to energy and other natural resources. Japan, too — still the largest Asian economy and a traditional donor to the region — must also play a role.

A moral but pragmatic community needs to be constructed, with all in agreement on how to deal with Myanmar. Even if, like an orchestra, different countries use different instruments and play different notes, the main theme must be consistent.

If this can be done, the chances of progress in the run-up to the 2010 elections will be strengthened. Success may still prove elusive, but a new game with a greater possibility for success will have begun. —DT-PS

Simon Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and a fellow of the Asia Society

YANGON, Sept. 2 (Xinhua) — South Korea will provide training on nuclear energy to officials and technicians from Myanmar along with other member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the local weekly Myanmar Times reported Wednesday.

It was offered by the South Korean government when ASEAN+3 energy ministers met recently in Myanmar’s second largest city of Mandalay, South Korean embassy here was quoted as disclosing.

The East Asian country agreed to the provision of technical know-how on nuclear power stations in order to reduce the burning of fossil fuels and to help protect the environment.

Under a three-year training program which lasts from 2009 to 2011, South Korea will train a total of 150 technicians and senior government officials from ASEAN countries including Myanmar, the report added.

The East Asian energy ministers, at a series of meetings with counterparts from ASEAN nations held in Mandalay, called for deeper and closer regional energy cooperation and integration, and regional actions to build a secure, stable and sustainable energy future.

Lawyers for Myanmar pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi said they would lodge an appeal Thursday against her conviction on charges relating to an incident in which an American man swam to her home.

The Nobel laureate was ordered to spend 18 more months under house arrest after a court on August 11 found her guilty of breaking security laws by giving shelter to US national John Yettaw at her lakeside residence.

“We will submit the appeal this afternoon. Aung San Suu Kyi’s conviction is not in accordance with the law but we will have to wait to see whether the court agrees to hear the appeal,” her main lawyer Kyi Win told AFP.
He said the appeal would focus on the fact that a 1974 constitution under which the ruling junta had detained Suu Kyi had been superseded by a new constitution that was approved in a controversial referendum last year.

“Altogether there are 11 reasons for the appeal, but the main thing we will point out is about the constitution,” Kyi Win said.

The 64-year-old Suu Kyi had insisted on her innocence during the trial held at Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison, saying that she allowed former military veteran Yettaw to stay for two nights at her home because he was ill.

Yettaw was sentenced to seven years’ hard labour for the stunt in early May but was freed after a visit by US senator Jim Webb in August, on what the regime said were compassionate grounds because of health problems.

The American said he was on a “mission from God” to save Suu Kyi from assassination.

“Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is not guilty. The main person is the intruder,” Nyan Win, another of her lawyers and also the spokesperson for her National League for Democracy (NLD), told reporters Thursday.

Suu Kyi’s conviction unleashed a wave of international outrage, with the United Nations Security Council expressing “serious concern” and the European Union extending sanctions against the junta.

US President Barack Obama described the case against her as a “show trial.”

The NLD won elections in 1990 but was never allowed to take power and she has been detained by the junta for 14 of the past 20 years.

Suu Kyi now plans to renovate her home to improve security and keep out other possible trespassers, Nyan Win said Monday. – Sapa-AFP

It has been a good few weeks for Burma’s dictator, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, even though Sen. Jim Webb secured the release of an imprisoned American during his recent visit and even though the sentencing of Burma’s democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, after this summer’s sham trial was roundly condemned. With all the media attention, Than Shwe got a dose of what he appears to crave most: international legitimacy. And he is assured that Suu Kyi, who won Burma’s last free elections in 1990, will remain under house arrest during the 2010 elections. Last month Burma’s state-run media even hailed the regime for its humanitarian nature and called for targeted economic sanctions to be lifted.

But is there, in fact, a more humanitarian regime in Burma?

Distinctly negative answers come from Ho Lom village in Burma’s Shan State, where junta soldiers burned 62 houses on July 29. Or from Tard Mawk, in the same district, where soldiers burned more than 100 homes. Or from the 38 other Shan villages from which villagers have been forcibly displaced in July and August, part of a systematic and brutal campaign documented by the Shan Human Rights Foundation and the Shan Women’s Action Network and reported by Human Rights Watch last month. Eric Schwartz, assistant secretary of the U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, noted on Aug. 19: “We’ve been deeply concerned by very recent reports of large-scale displacement, perhaps as many or more than 10,000 civilians . . . as a result of increased military activity in northeastern Burma.”

Schwartz said this even before the latest round of attacks — against the people of Kokang, an ethnic enclave of Chinese speakers in northeastern Shan State, close to the Chinese border. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the fighting has driven 10,000 to 30,000 Kokang into China — prompting a rare rebuke from the People’s Republic, a longtime trade and investment partner of the junta.

Other ethnic groups, including the Karen in eastern Burma, have faced intensified fighting and egregious rights violations this summer. Some 5,000 Karen have fled into Thailand, according to Human Rights Watch. In Karen State, large numbers of land-mine injuries are being reported as untrained new conscripts, including children, are forced to fight their own people in some of the world’s most heavily mined jungles.

These systematic campaigns in Burma’s eastern ethnic regions have been marked by allegations of torture, extrajudicial executions and rapes of ethnic minority women and girls. Such mass atrocities are not new. Our collaborative team of medics conducted population-based health and human rights assessments in 2006-07 among more than 2,900 ethnic households in eastern Burma. We found that more than a quarter of all Shan families had been forcibly relocated in the previous year, that in 24 percent at least one family member had been taken by soldiers for forced labor and that in 9 percent of households at least one family member had been injured by a land mine — one of the highest rates ever documented.

The current assaults appear to be part of the junta’s strategy for the 2010 elections. The generals are attempting to force their ethnic opponents to become border patrol forces and to participate in their showcase elections. Most of the larger ethnic groups and political parties have rejected these offers, as did the leaders of Kokang. Most, along with Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, have also rejected the junta’s constitution, which was drafted without their input and approved in the discredited referendum of May 2008.

Burma’s ethnic peoples know they are not living under a new, more humanitarian regime. Quite the opposite: The junta is creating humanitarian emergencies in its quest for control. Shan, Karen, Kokang and other civilians are losing their homes, livelihoods and lives. Their suffering is directly linked to the detention of Suu Kyi and to the crackdown against Burma’s democratic forces: student leaders, journalists, independent humanitarian relief workers and courageous clergy of all faiths. Indeed, essentially all the progressive forces opposing the generals are under attack.

Strikingly little international attention has been paid to this murderous turn of events. Yet these ethnic peoples must play a role if Burma is to have any sort of decent future. Suu Kyi knows this; in the only statement her people have had from her in years, given to U.N. Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari in late 2007, she highlighted the need for ethnic participation for true national reconciliation. The Obama administration, which is reviewing its Burma policy, would do well to heed Suu Kyi’s advice: Don’t forget Burma’s ethnic groups. Whatever the administration does about sanctions, it must do much more to press the junta, Burma’s neighbors and the junta’s supporters to stop the campaign of bloodshed against Burma’s ethnic peoples. China has a special role to play, first in providing humanitarian relief to those seeking refuge across its borders and in pressuring the junta to end its brutal campaign. Ethnic warfare and its resultant instability are in no one’s interest, except perhaps Than Shwe’s. He must not be allowed to continue killing with impunity.

Chris Beyrer is director of Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Public Health and Human Rights. Richard Sollom leads the Burma Project at Physicians for Human Rights.

The recent case against Aung San Suu Kyi by the Burmese junta is internationally well known. The case and the verdict were condemned all over the world as one more demonstration of a completely fake trial merely orchestrated to silence Burma’s opposition leader. She has already been under house arrest for two decades. Aung San Suu Kyi was charged with violating the rules relating to detention. The court sentenced her to five years of rigorous imprisonment. Within hours the Burmese junta, which was aware of the tremendous adverse impact of their decision throughout the world, reduced the sentence to 18 months of detention in her own home. The sole exercise of the trial was to give a semblance of legality and legitimacy for further imprisonment of this lady in a way so that she could not participate in any events relating to proposed elections in the country.

J.S. Tissainayagam’s case from Sri Lanka, though not as well known as Aung San Suu Kyi case, is also quite well known internationally. The arrest, detention and the trial against this man, a well known journalist and a human rights activist, received the attention of many governments. The American president, Barrack Obama himself mentioned this case as an example of the repression of journalists throughout the world. All leading media organizations worldwide condemned the arrest, detention and trial and repeatedly called on the government for Tissainayagam’s unconditional release.

Tissainayagam was charged with aiding and abetting terrorism and instigating racial violence by writing a few lines in an article which referred to the armed conflict then taking place in the north. Tissainayagam, who had been a veteran journalist and a human rights activist, had over a long period of time reported matters regarding internal conflicts in the south as well as the north and east. In the late eighties he helped the incumbent president of Sri Lanka, who was then an opposition Member of Parliament, by preparing and translating documents relating to disappearances and other atrocities in the south. There was nothing in the alleged document on which he was prosecuted, to indicate any attempt to instigate violence or promote racial hatred. There are thousands of pieces of writing of many persons who have written about the armed conflict from different perspectives and Tissainayagam’s writing was no different to any of these.

As a Tamil, for Tissainayagam it was quite natural for him to write about the problems of the Tamils in the same way that others have written about the problems of their groups. Tissainayagam was singled out for arrest, detention and prosecution solely for the purpose of intimidating other journalists and newspaper editors from publishing materials relating to the war. Several other journalists were exposed to serious dangers and some fled the country during this time.

Like the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, the case of Tissainayagam too, had no real grounds on which to base a criminal charge. In both cases the charges were fabricated. The charges were based on special regulations and not on the normal laws of the country. These regulations themselves were made in order to give enormous powers of harassment over dissidents and anyone who holds any form of opinion that is opposed to that of the regime in power.

Where the charges themselves are not valid there cannot be a fair trial. The issue before the court in both cases was to decide on the legality and the validity of the charges in the first instant. Both courts proceeded on the basis of these bloated charges and found the two persons guilty.

The transformation of independent courts into those that merely carry out the wishes of the executive has taken a long period of time in both countries. And now, in both countries there is the possibility of having show trials.

The Sri Lankan court sentenced Tissinaiyagam to 20 years. Previously the Sri Lankan Supreme Court has, over and over again asserted the right of citizens for freedom of expression and publication. The court has also held the rights of citizens to criticize the existing government. However, the High Court trying a case based on special regulations under anti-terrorism laws has completely altered the democratic tradition which previously existed.

Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has gone further and in a communiqué issued by it stated that criticism of the judgment in the Tissainayagam case is a slur on the independence of the judiciary in the country. However, this case, like that of Aung San Suu Kyi’s demonstrates that the independence of the judiciary in both countries has suffered serious setbacks.

It is therefore fitting that J.S. Tissainayagam has been named as the first winner of the Peter Mackler Award for Courageous and Ethical Journalism. This award should bring to global notice the manner in which courts can be manipulated for the purpose of suppressing freedom of expression and publication.

About AHRC: The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based group was founded in 1984.

Without addressing the root cause of the problems, the Burmese military junta is intensifying attacks against its own citizens. The latest tension erupted between the Burmese army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 10,000 to 30,000 people have fled to China since the tension flared up on August 8, when the Burmese army raided the home of Peng Jiashen, the Kokang armed leader, in northern Shan state.

The consequence of confrontation between the two groups spills over the international border. The affected country is none other than the military junta’s closest ally, China, a country that maintains robust economic ties with Burma.

China hopes Burma “properly deal with its domestic issue to safeguard the regional stability in the China-Myanmar border area,” said the Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, on August 28. The statement is unusual for China that usually defended Burma in the face of international criticisms.

There are two important concerns for the Beijing government. First, the victims who have fled to the Yunnan province are mostly ethnic Chinese origin or Chinese nationals; second, Beijing sees skirmishes along the border are threatening the harmony and stability of Yunnan province.

The statement, however, should not be taken as a change of China’s foreign policy toward Burma. Beijing will continue to maintain its bilateral relationship with Naypyidaw intact. The Burmese military junta is also unlikely to part ways with communist China because of such border skirmishes.

The MNDAA, which demands autonomy, rejected the military junta’s proposal to transform its armed cadres ?to Border Guard Force. The proposal has been rejected by many other ceasefire groups, and the issue becomes a political headache for the Burmese military junta.

The latest development is a consequence of the unresolved longstanding ethno-political conflicts in the Union of Burma. The nature of conflict is an evidence of the existence of two different sets of movement in Burma: democracy and democracy that guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities.

The Union of Burma had gained independence from the British in 1948, but its ethno-political problems have not been settled. Though more than a dozen armed groups have signed ceasefire agreements with the junta, the simmering tensions still linger.

Ethnic problems in Burma had started long before independence. The mistrust exacerbated when the spirit of Panglong agreement was not honoured. One fundamental principle of the agreement was to establish a federal government. With the assassination of Aung San, who headed negotiation for Burma’s independence from the British, the dream of establishing a federal society was shattered.

The latest tension is a consequence of the military’s attempt to silence the voice of opposition in the run up to ?the 2010 general election. Unless the military junta can persuade the different ceasefire groups to its own terms, ?it is likely that similar confrontations will occur.

Despite international criticisms, the Burmese military junta is determined to move forward with the 2010 general election. Under the guidelines of the 2008 constitution, it is by and large a forgone conclusion that the military will stay onto power after election.

Burma will see a transitional government with a military-dominated multi-party democracy. The military junta’s official name ‘State Peace and Development Council’ will either be abolished or renamed.

If the United States of America and the Peoples’ Republic of China can lead a coordinated international strategy, there still is a chance for the success of international community’s engagement. Otherwise, one thing is clear ?that the ethno-political conflicts in Burma will continue to remain in post 2010 election.

Nehginpao Kipgen is a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma (1947-2004) and general secretary of the US-based Kuki International Forum.

If Burma intends to acquire nuclear weapons, as reports suggest, this reflects a widely-held and terrible attraction that nuclear weapons maintain over military planners. This fascination stems from a misunderstanding about what nuclear weapons can do for a country’s national security.

The recent allegations that Burma has started to develop a nuclear weapons programme appear to have surprised no one; in a similar vein, no one was surprised when the first news of a nuclear weapons programme in North Korea emerged. If a country is led by a paranoid government eternally suspicious of just about every other state in the international system, then nuclear weapons must surely be the ultimate guarantor of that country’s national security.

Two arguments have traditionally been made in favour of nuclear weapons. First, the eminent nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie in 1946 called them the “ultimate weapon”. There is something viscerally certain, even iconic, about the nuclear mushroom cloud. More recently, there was the 21st century re-imagining of the classic 1970s television series “Battlestar Galactica”, which revolved around a simple premise: Two civilisations, both capable of faster-than-light travel (which Einsteinian physics maintains is impossible) seeking to destroy the other with nuclear weapons. This premise reflects the emotive power that nuclear weapons exercise over the human imagination.

Second, nuclear weapons offer an apparent cost-effective alternative to the otherwise expensive business of acquiring and maintaining armed forces. Defence budgets typically go mostly to manpower costs. A nuclear weapons programme offers the prospect of significant downsizing of the armed forces and, consequently, significant cuts in defence spending; it can also have civilian energy spin-offs. For states with nuclear ambitions – the so-called nuclear wannabes – these arguments appear to be very persuasive.

There are two key arguments that relate nuclear weapons to national security. The first posits a scenario in which a nuclear state faces potential aggression from a non-nuclear state. In this scenario, it is possible to argue that the mere possession of a nuclear weapon should be sufficient to act as a deterrent against external aggression. It would be tempting to ascribe this state of affairs to the case of Israel – long suspected of having an opaque nuclear weapons programme – in its relations with its Arab neighbours.

This scenario is, however, problematic. Any nuclear retaliation against a conventional military offensive crosses a threshold that has remained intact since 1945. This renders the nuclear state as a pariah, likely to then face a variety of very severe sanctions imposed by the international community.

The second argument involves threats to the nuclear wannabe’s existence from an existing nuclear state. The argument is that for the nuclear wannabe, the possession of nuclear weapons will deter any aggression from other nuclear states, and therefore provide the country with a measure of national security. After all, as one Indian general was alleged to have remarked, the signal lesson of Operation Iraqi Freedom is that if one wishes to go up against the United States, make sure you already have a nuclear weapon.

What deters aggression between two nuclear powers, what keeps the nuclear peace, in other words, is not the fact that both are nuclear powers. If that were the case, all nuclear powers should only need to maintain only one nuclear weapon in each arsenal. The fact that this is not the case suggests that nuclear deterrence and nuclear peace may be rather more complicated.

If a nuclear wannabe genuinely believes that nuclear weapons will enhance its security, it needs to keep in mind two considerations. One is retaliation. What maintains the peace between two adversarial nuclear states is the fear that one may attack first. But the victim will still have nuclear weapons that survive this first attack. The nuclear weapons that have survived will then be sufficient for the victim to launch a retaliatory attack against the aggressor, and inflict on the aggressor levels of damage that are politically unacceptable.

This means the nuclear wannabe will need either a very extensive nuclear arsenal, or it will need to ensure that its nuclear arsenal is survivable, either by hardening nuclear silos or by deploying their nuclear weapons on mobile, difficult-to-detect platforms such as missile submarines. Neither option is cheap; both subvert the myth of nuclear weapons as a low-cost solution to national security challenges.

The second critical element in nuclear deterrence is that of sufficient warning. This typically – but not exclusively – applies in the case of states with very small nuclear arsenals that are not likely to survive a nuclear first strike. In this instance, one state has the capacity to react quickly enough in the event of a nuclear attack, to launch its own nuclear weapons against the aggressor before its arsenal is destroyed. In this instance, because both adversaries know the other has sufficient early warning of impending nuclear attack, any nuclear aggression by one will almost certainly be counter-productive, inasmuch as it will lead to the state’s own nuclear demise.

The nuclear wannabe will have to undertake serious investments in geo-stationary satellites that can monitor the nuclear weapons facilities of its putative adversaries, and advanced command and control facilities that allow for quick launch of its nuclear weapons. Again, this is not a cheap option, and it demands of such states very high levels of technological expertise that most will in fact lack.

It therefore means that if any state, genuinely worried about its survival and security, seeks to acquire nuclear weapons, the mere possession of even a handful of nuclear weapons – assuming the country then has the systems that can deliver these weapons against its putative adversary – is not enough. Secondly, nuclear weapons will not constitute a cheap, cost-effective security for the country. The great irony is that if any state genuinely desires to acquire nuclear weapons, it has made itself more vulnerable to external attack than ever before.

Bernard F. W. Loo, educated at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, is associate professor of war and military strategy at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

Military operations by the Burmese junta along its border with China in the past few weeks have sent tensions soaring, after thousands of ethnic minorities from Burma fled for their lives.

The Burmese army’s recent offensive against the ethnic rebel group Kokang, who call themselves the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (or MNDAA), has also shocked Beijing and rocked their normally very close relations.

Fears that the fighting could spread and explode into renewed civil war has led to a flurry of urgent diplomatic actvity by Beijing, as the Chinese government tries to stabilise the situation before it gets out of hand.

Senior Chinese security officials, including Meng Jian, the powerful minister for public security, have just toured the border area to assess the situation and plot the Chinese reaction.

But the whole affair casts a long shadow over what has been taken by many to be a rock-hard relationsip. It is now increasingly evident that a significant rift exits between the two countries that could have crucial implications for other countries in the region, and for any approach which the international community may take to encourage the Burmese military regime to introduce real political change.

The implications of this growing divergence could have a significant effect on the border region, as the most powerful of the ethnic groups – especially the Kachin, Kokang and Wa – in this area have ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta, but also have traditionally close ties with the Chinese authorities.

Economically and culturally the area is closer to China than to the Burmese regime. Thousands of Chinese businessmen and workers have migrated into northern Shan State over the last decade, seeking employment and economic opportunities. Many of these ethnic leaders go to Chinese hospital across the border for medical treatent and send their children to school in China. The Chinese language and even the Chinese currency, the renminbi, are used throughout the Kokang and Wa areas in Burma’s northern Shan State.

Anything which forces Beijing to choose between their ethnic brothers inside Burma – the Kokang and Wa are ethnically Chinese – and the central government in Naypidaw will cause the superpower immense problems. And in the end will bring into sharp focus the real nature of the Burma-China axis.

Alarmed and surprised by the Burmese military offensive, Beijing has already sent hundreds of extra troops and armed policemen to the area to quell any potential violence. The Chinese central authorities are very upset by the effect of the Burmese military action along the border, and are furious that they were not informed before-hand, according to a senior Chinese government official who requested anonymity.

A senior diplomat flew last week to Naypidaw, the Burmese junta’s headquarters and the country’s new capital, to convey Beijing’s displeasure. Burma has apologised for the instability caused across the Chinese border region, according to Burmese foreign ministry officials. But the Chinese authorities remain anxious about further fallout from the offensive against the Kokang.

The operations were aimed at capturing a Kokang arms factory, the Burmese leaders told their Chinese envoys. But analysts remain sceptical and believe this was, at best, a pretext.

“The junta knows it must move to disarm these ethnic rebel groups, and the Kokang are the weakest militarily,” said Win Min, the Burmese academic and military specialist at Chiang Mai University in Thailand.

The Kokang are ethnically Chinese and speak a Mandarin dialect, but have lived for many decades inside Burma. They have their own armed militia and had been fighting the Burmese army for several decades demanding autonomy until they agreed to a truce with the Burmese military regime in 1989.

Tensions have been rising in Burma’s border areas for months, as the military junta pressurred the ethnic cease-fire groups – particularly the Kachin, Kokang and Wa – to surrender their arms before the planned elections next year. The Burmese government wants to integrate them into a Border Police guard but these key ethnic groups along the Chinese border have been resisting the move.

At the weekend, international NGOs reported more than 30,000 refugees had fled to China in the part week to escape the fighting. Since then the fighting seems to have subsided and refugees have begun to trickle back to the Kokang capital of Lougai which is on the border and which is firmly under the control of the Burmese army. Once a bustling border town full of bars, discos, karaoke clubs, massage parlours and gambling dens, the town centre is still virtually deserted and many buildings have been damaged.

“More confrontation and military encounters are expected in the following days and thousands of villagers are fleeing across the border [into China] to avoid the war, and subsequent human rights abuses,” said a statement from the Kokang group, sent to the Bangkok Post. The 23-year-old cease-fire agreement between the Burmese junta and the Kokang seems to be effectively ended, according to Burmese dissidents based in the Chinese town of Ruili not far from where the Kokang refugees crossed the border.

“This does not augur well for the other ceasefire groups like the Kachin and Wa,” said Mr Win Min. “This may be a preview of what is to come.”

If the Burmese try the same tactics against the Wa, they will inevitably fight back, Mr Win Min believes. There is a very strong risk of a return to armed conflict along the Chinese-Burmese border, according to a Chinese government official who closely follows events in Burma. “The problem is that the Wa are very close to the Chinese government, and it would be very hard for Beijing to desert them at this crucial point in time,” he added.

Beijing now has a major quandry to deal with. They want to stabilise the border area as soon as possible and restore peace to the region. They have advised the Burmese to stop the fighting, or risk a rift between the two governments. They have suggested that the only option is to negotiate a new peace settlement with the Kokang, and offered their support as intermediaries, according to Chinese government sources.

Beijing wants the refugees to return to Burma as soon as possible, but have no intention of pushing them back, said the government official. For the time being they are taking care of them, but are making sure they do not travel further inland.

The latest move by the Burmese only strengthens suggestions that there has been a growing disenchanment within the Burmese regime towards China. Over these past few months the Burmese junta has become disillusioned with Beijing, largely because of the latter’s failure to enthusiastically back the Burmese authorities’ attempts to disarm the rebel groups, especially those which enjoy a special relationship with China.

The enthusiastic reception for the US senator Jim Webb last week – usually only reserved for heads of state, and only the most important at that – was a clear sign of the winds of change in Naypidaw.

In another indication of the Burmese rift with Beijing, this week’s Myanmar Times ran a short agency news story on Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama visiting Taiwan, after it was approved by the censors, according to diplomats in Rangoon. This is the first time the media in Burma has mentioned the Dalai Lama’s name in more than 20 years: anything to do with the Tibetan leader makes Beijing bristle.

So China is currently wondering to what to do. Diplomats in both countries are running round like headless chickens, according to Western diplomats in both capitals. In the meantime the fear is that the situation on the border could explode into renewed civil war at any moment.

“The majority of the Kokang troops have surrendered to China,” said US-based Burmese activist Aung Din.

Once the situation calms, the Burmese junta is expected to turn its attention to other ethnic minorities along the border, Aung Din said.

“There will be more fighting, more tension and more conflict because the regime will continue to try to force these groups to surrender their arms ahead of the elections.”

Much now depends on how much infleuence Beijing still has with its ally and whether China will try to pressure the Kokang and Wa to come to some accommodation with the Burmese government.

Burma, the scene of much suffering from last year’s devastating Cyclone Nargis as well as long-running political repression and egregious human rights abuses, saw more turmoil last week when fighting broke out along the northeast border with China between an armed ethnic group and government troops deployed to secure the region.

United Nations officials estimate that as many as 30,000 civilians have been forced to flee the area, home to a large number of ethnic Chinese. The tensions add a new element to concerns over stability in the region, both among Burma’s neighbors and the greater international community.

The United States is conducting a broad review of its policies toward the government in Rangoon, in an effort to find the best way to bring democratic transition and respect for human rights for the Burmese people.

World attention has focused on the continued detention of pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi and 2,100 other political prisoners, but the review has multiple dimensions. Ethnic conflicts exploited by Burmese authorities pose challenges for the future of Burma, not only the recent fighting in the Kokang region but also as seen in the plight of Burma’s Muslim Rohingya minority and others.

The U.S. has a great interest in seeing Burma promote stability by heeding the UN calls for Burma to free its political prisoners and hold a genuine dialogue among the Burmese authorities, representatives of the opposition and ethnic nationality leaders on a shared vision for the way forward in Burma. Taking positive steps toward a true, representative democracy would do much to end the isolation and conflict that has caused so much suffering there.

NEW YORK — The recent decision by Myanmar’s government to sentence pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi to a further 18 months’ house arrest shows how difficult it is to deal with that country’s ruling generals.

Yet the first steps toward a new approach may already have been taken.

The clearest sign comes from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member. At first, most of ASEAN’s member governments responded mildly to the verdict, expressing their “disappointment” — a stance that reflects the group’s principle of noninterference in fellow members’ internal politics.

But Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya then consulted his counterparts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam. As current ASEAN chair, he floated the idea of concertedly requesting a pardon for Aung San Suu Kyi.

ASEAN government officials have since met to draft a text. Approval by the association’s foreign ministers may come in September, with ASEAN leaders tackling the issue in October.

Of course, amendments and objections to the draft should be expected. But the pardon request is already significant. It seeks to be finely balanced, respecting the regime’s sovereignty while subtly pressing home the point in unison, as neighboring states. The request would be politely worded, but it would also be an official and public mode of communication, instead of the usual behind-the-scenes quiet diplomacy.

What ASEAN says or does not say will not change things immediately. Cynics might add that even if Aung San Suu Kyi is pardoned, she may yet still be detained on political grounds or face other barriers aimed at preventing her from competing in the elections promised in Myanmar for 2010.

But Western sanctions have not worked, either. Since the 1990s crackdown, human rights violations have continued, most recently with the suppression of the protests led by Buddhist monks in 2007. The average citizen has grown poorer, even as those close to the junta become ostentatiously rich.

Western sanctions instead paved the way for investments in Myanmar by those with less concern about human rights violations — first by ASEAN neighbors in hotels and other sectors, and more recently by China and India, which are vying for projects and influence in the strategic energy sector. As a result, Myanmar’s generals have been able to play one side off against another.

The game, however, may now be changing. ASEAN’s initiative is a new step forward for the group. While ASEAN rejected previous calls to impose sanctions, or even to expel Myanmar, this step shows that it will not remain inert regardless of what the generals do. Moreover, some ASEAN member countries, like Singapore, have explicitly called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be allowed to participate in the 2010 elections.

The ASEAN effort coincides with two other developments. One is the decision by the United States to reconsider its policy of sanctions, becoming more flexible while remaining true to its values and interests.

Some activists have criticized US Senator Jim Webb’s journey to Yangon to obtain the release of John Yettaw, the American whose actions triggered the charges against Aung San Suu Kyi. But this is consistent with the Obama administration’s policy of seeking a dialogue even with those who are not America’s friends. Such dialogue is vital if Myanmar is to be prevented from possibly pursuing nuclear weapons and rigging elections, à la Iran.

The other development is less obvious. After the court delivered its verdict, the regime halved the sentence and agreed to keep Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, rather than moving her to one of its worst jails. This may not seem like much of a concession. But the junta seems to be trying to cause less offense.

Consider, too, the junta’s gesture in handing over Yettaw to Senator Webb, and its interaction with the international community on humanitarian assistance after Cyclone Nargis. Might it be possible that the generals in Myanmar recognize that they are in a cul de sac? Could the regime be seeking ways out of its isolation in the run-up to the 2010 elections? Could it welcome dialogue and engagement?

How the generals respond to the ASEAN request will be an important signal of the regime’s intentions. Even if the regime does want to begin talking, sustaining a dialogue will be no easier than has been the case with North Korea.

ASEAN, as the organization of neighboring states, is important to achieving that goal, but US involvement is key, as is inclusion of China and India. They must be pressed to see more than the opportunity for strategic access to energy and other natural resources. Japan, too — still the largest Asian economy and a traditional donor to the region — must also play a role.

A moral but pragmatic community needs to be constructed, with all in agreement on how to deal with Myanmar. Even if, like an orchestra, different countries use different instruments and play different notes, the main theme must be consistent.

If this can be done, the chances of progress in the run-up to the 2010 elections will be strengthened. Success may still prove elusive, but a new game with a greater possibility for success will have begun.

*Simon Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and a fellow of the Asia Society. © Project Syndicate, 2009.

In his Aug. 29 article, “U.S. should engage Burma,” Brahma Chellaney makes some good points concerning U.S. sanctions against the military regime in Burma: that these sanctions have failed in their stated purpose to promote democracy and human rights; that they have increased China’s already large influence inside the country; and that they reflect a double standard — why trade with China, but not with Burma?

But he is mistaken to assume that it is “U.S.-led sanctions” that have made Burma’s people among the poorest in Asia. Responsibility for that rests squarely with Than Shwe and his fellow generals, who have squandered funds on new weapons purchased abroad and on the costly new capital city at Naypyidaw, rather than investing in health, education and other improvements in the people’s standard of living. Their management of the economy has been grossly incompetent, including a complex and counterproductive system of multiple currency exchange rates and a complete lack of the rule of law in business as well as in other spheres of life.

By contrast, after it adopted liberalization policies in 1986, communist Vietnam did very well for itself despite a U.S. embargo that wasn’t lifted until 1994. Washington should take modest first steps in opening up to the regime: perhaps appointing an ambassador to its embassy, still in Rangoon — there hasn’t been one since the early 1990s — cutting back on often hypocritical rhetoric about human rights, and continuing to pursue dialogue with Burma’s leaders.

Humanitarian aid should be dramatically increased. Washington should adopt a “wait and see” attitude concerning the general election next year. But it is premature to drop all economic sanctions as long as the junta persecutes ethnic minorities like the Karens and Shans and holds more than 2,000 political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.
The opinions expressed in this letter to the editor are the writer’s own and do not necessarily reflect the policies of The Japan Times.

The Tatmadaw of Burma, one of the most nationalistic armies in the world, demonstrated its xenophobia during the past two weeks following its capture of Kokang-Chinese territory.

According to reports from the region on the northeastern frontier of Burma, following the seizure of Laogai, the Kokang capital, on Aug. 24, government soldiers questioned civilians about whether they were Burma-born Chinese or immigrants from China.

“After answering, Chinese from mainland China were beaten by soldiers,” said a source in Laogai.

Refugees who fled to China told reporters that shops, stores and other properties owned by Chinese had been looted in various towns in the Kokang region where an estimate 90 percent of businesses are owned by Chinese businessmen.

Anti-Chinese elements among government soldiers are not new. In 1967, an anti-Chinese riot in Rangoon and other cities caused led to dozens of deaths. Observers said late dictator Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party used the Chinese as a scapegoat to deflect public anger at the government over a rice shortage in the country.

Anti-Chinese sentiment among Burmese has increased after the Chinese and Burmese governments signed border trading agreements in 1988, and the military junta signed ceasefire agreements with ethnic militias on the Sino-Burmese border in 1989.

After the opening of border trade and the ceasefire agreements, Chinese business interests and immigrants moved into Burma in large numbers, observers said. From the northern Shan State capital of Lashio to Madalay, the second largest city, to Rangoon, Chinese migrants and businesses along with the ethnic ceasefire groups, such as the Kokang and Wa, have taken on a higher profile among Burmese.

“They say they are Wa or Kokang, but we know they are actually Chinese,” said a businessman in Mandalay, citing his experience.

During two decades, Chinese have taken over businesses owned by Burmese in northern Shan State and Mandalay. Signs on many department stores, restaurants and shops in Mandalay and Lashio are printed in the Chinese language.

Intentionally or unintentionally, the special favors granted ethnic groups by Gen Khin Nyunt, the former Burma spy chief, produced a backlash against Kokang-Chinese and other ceasefire groups among the Tatmadaw’s soldiers.

From 1989 to 2004— before Khin Nyunt’s downfall—the Kokang and Wa were allowed to take their weapons to Rangoon and Mandalay. Kokang and Wa soldiers were untouchable under Khin Nyunt’s instructions even though they committed crimes.

When vehicles from Wa and Kokang groups passed army and police checkpoints, they were not searched.

In one incident in 1999, a member of the Wa army killed a businessman in downtown Rangoon after a business conflict. The police arrested the man but he was not charged, and later Wa officials took the man from police custody.

According to Mandalay residents, members of ceasefire groups such as the Wa and Kokang were known to use pistols in personal conflicts with local people in the early 2000s.

Chan Tun, a former Burmese ambassador to China, said that after ceasefire agreements were signed, the Wa and Kokang caused many problems in cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay, and many officers and soldiers in the regime’s army have developed a negative image of the two groups as a result.

The recent military conflict between the government and ethnic groups has divided public opinion in Rangoon and Mandalay, according to journalists.

“Some people here say it is the government bullying the Kokang-Chinese. But most people support the government,” said an editor of a Rangoon-based private journal.