Just like Mrs. Bhutto, Padoh Mhan Sha has become a target of many KNU’s political and military opponents, living not so far from his domicile, Mae Sod, the wide west border town at Thai-Burma border. And this incident obviously demonstrated the reality of dangerous situation along this border region that those leaders and activists living in this area should not take it for granted of their safety and security, with questionable ability and motivation of local law reinforcements.

I met Padoh on eve of Karen New Year day in Mae Sot two years ago to pay my respect and courtesy call at the same house that he was assassinated. Before I met him, I had visited General Thamalar Baw, another KNU top leader living in Ma Sot as well. I was kindly accompanied by NCUB General Secretary U Mg MG and Joint Secretary U Myint Thein on both visits. I was quite surprised to see relax and normal environments at both leaders’ places. There were a few persons around at the General house, and the gate was shut and locked when we arrived there. But there were no signs of security at Padoh’s house and the gate was opened when we arrived there.

I thought to myself, perhaps, since we had informed in advance to both of them of our visits, Padoh must have let the gate opened for our convenience. I wonder how much security have been placed around the SPDC leaders palaces in Naypyidaw. The entry to Naypyidaw itself needs some security clearance, as I have been told.

As a political ally and key economic partner of Burma’s military government, China should not only continue to actively engage the Burma junta, but also delicately reach out to opposition groups. In recent years, China’s use of peaceful diplomatic ‘’soft power” has won it much applause around the world. But one risk is that such applause at times comes from the elites without a grassroots echo.

In dealing with a country like Burma, China should consider how its own interests would be affected by a change in that neighbour’s political landscape.

China is cautiously taking initiatives to avoid potential setbacks. When China’s special envoy Wang Yi visited Burma last November, he urged the government to resolve the political crisis through dialogue and to attain political stability soon.

It was also reported that China maintains relations with several former rebel groups that now have made peace with the government, and that China is willing to listen to opposition groups.

These are encouraging signs that China is shifting its Burma policy to be more flexible.

China should stay in the driver’s seat amid international efforts to spur change in Burma, using the United Nations at times as a forum to gauge international concerns, to nurture positive cohesion, and to measure steps to take.

No country chooses to have its domestic issues internationalised. But Burma may accept UN intervention as a makeshift strategy to subdue international criticism. There is a risk to China that if it lets other countries take the initiative on Burma, it could end up being sandwiched between Burma and other major powers.

China would want to avoid choosing sides in Burma, so as not to compromise its holistic interests. A more effective route is to manage relations with all to maximise common interest. To achieve this, the motto of ”there are no permanent friends or enemies in international relations” is the key.

China is seen as see-sawing. On the one hand, it insists on non-interference in Burma’s internal affairs. Last January, China used its veto power _ for the fifth time in history _ to defeat a UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma’s human rights situation.

On the other hand, China helped facilitate two visits to Burma by Ibrahim Gambari, special envoy of the UN secretary-general, after the crackdown late last year on the monks’ demonstration. Ironically, the latter resulted from the former, because China’s influence stems from its credibility in making friends and refraining from pointing fingers at other countries’ domestic affairs.

A ”no-preaching” style only increased China’s influence.

A peaceful Burmese domestic situation and positive Sino-Burma relations are important for China’s strategic and economic interests. China and Burma share a 2,100km border.

As in the case of North Korea, China does not want the problems of a neighbour like Burma spilling over into its own territory. Burma is also part of China’s strategic configuration with other regional and international players.

Economically, China has become Burma’s second-largest trading partner, and the two countries are collaborating on several major projects, including a 2,300km oil and gas pipeline that connects China’s landlocked Yunnan province to Burma’s coast.

This pipeline will directly transport oil and gas from the Middle East and Africa into China, therefore circumventing the problems of passing the Malacca Strait. Such a strategic project is both a liability and an asset as China tries to leverage Burma, given China’s thirst for energy and Burma’s hunger for development.

Because of the inter-locking interests, China sees Burma as more a problematic neighbour than a threat to international peace and security _ which explains China’s aversion to UN Security Council actions.

But this also underlines the importance of a more proactive policy by Beijing itself.

China’s Burma policy is facing a bigger challenge with the approach of the Olympic Games. China cannot afford another source of instability in its foreign affairs.

Beijing should pursue an active diplomacy of ”intervening without interfering”, and try to steer Burmese authorities toward greater engagement with the opposition and the international community for the purpose of national reconciliation.

Not the least of the advantages for China of such a policy is that it will keep a door slightly open to future alternative prospects in Burma.

Jason Qian is a fellow at the Harvard Negotiation Project at Harvard Law School. Anne Wu is an associate at the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.” Unquote

According to one of the laws of power, you have found what China’s chink in the armour – disruption of the Olympic Games. That’s the ‘thumbscrew’ for you to work on. The law goes like this, “Everyone has a weakness, a gap in the castle wall. That weakness is usually an insecurity, an uncontrollable emotion or need; it can also be a small secret pleasure. Either way, once found, it is a thumbscrew you can turn to your advantage.”
China put a huge stage on the success and smooth running of the Games to launch itself of its rightful place in international affairs. It’s an ‘image’ thing as well as a gamble. China has invested a lot in the Games with the hope that with the benefit from the Games and those to be gained also from the World Expo to be held in Shanghai 2010 as such it will lift it people to the next level in their standard of living. Chinese will say, “Who needs democracy when you can live a good life?”.
Check out what Larry Jagan had to say in his article in the Bangkok Post on 12 February with the headline, “The Junta’s slow march to democracy”. Until next time.

I am not sure it will be a “political suicide” or “political survival’ for DASSK to leave the country, to challenge the military rulers in Burma from outside. And JHB has no official position or policy on this matter as well since no one has proposed this matter for discussions or debate. Some of members would probably have their views on this matter, but never proposed to JHB for formal policy.

I would be more inclined towards Karl Popper that not only he has scientific thinking/philosophy but also much in line with his theories on cosmology supportive of Einstein General Relativity theory. And the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanic based upon Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle” led to the famous Einstein’s statement that “God does not play dice’.

China is and will be the major player on Burma affairs, as more and more bilateral economic and security ties are in place. The question is how can we (Burmese oppositions) convinced China to stop supporting the Junta and help to introduce democracy and human rights in Burma, while they have not done it themselves yet. The US can put real pressure on China, as there are so much economic ties between the two countries, but we can be sure on that the US will not use effectively them for Burma. But again I might be wrong if new democrat president and more liberal Congress is elected in coming November, and adopts new China policies. We’ll have to wait and see with ‘open minds’.

So in contrast to general views, the reality is that the doctorates are just specialists in the selected subject, not expected to be know-every thing generalized experts, unlike the politicians who are normally expected to know all issues, at least in general.

As I have been trained in a physical science not in a political or social science, I dare and will not claim to know every thing in political and social field, but still on a learning curve with the help of my disciplined intellectual capacity.

I had contemplated on the likelihood scenario of DASSY leaving the country and potentially becoming another Dalai Lama of Burma. And I am not sure even if the military will let her leave the country now, may be or may be not, as situations are not the same as in 1999 when her husband Dr. Michael Aris died in England. And also depends upon what implications that might effect on them by letting her leave the country. If they can contain her under house arrest until such a time that they can establish a legal military control civilian government in Burma, perhaps by 2010 according to their time table.

Thus, there are no clear cut answers to those questions, and hence I called for the ‘debate’ to discuss on this important matter, which could have a long time effect on our strategy. All pro and cons could be addressed on this matter formally at the forum.

But, we have seen quite clearly how much affect they had on the Junta. Perhaps, some might argued that due to these pressures, the Junta have now set time table to implement their ‘road map’, that I don’t agree personally entirely. The Junta have their own reasons and agenda to kick start it.

The question that we need to ask ourselves, how do we stop it or can we stop it at all. Before we answer both questions, first we must ask another important question; what leverage do we (that mean Burmese democrats and Ethnics both inside and outside the country, and our key international supports) have to stop this process or at least make it become inclusive process as suggested by Ban Ki-Moon, UN SG.

WE all know that the Junta has never wanted to talk to DAASK and NLD, and never ever intent to let go of the power in hand. Period.

Once the UN accepts the referendum date and willing to monitor the process, then the Junta wins surely on this round. As we can expect that they would get 99% YES votes either by hook or crook using their massive mobilized USDA and other pro-junta organizations in the balloting process.

Can the NLD, 88 Students group and Buddhist Monks also counter mobilize a parallel mass opposition inside the country? It could be done, but there will be a lot of violence confrontation with the pro-junta groups and military, more beating, shooting and arrests.

In the mean time, what can the exile Burmese oppositions can do? Yes, there will lots of demonstrations, media campaign, international outcries, and any more? Will the UN send in peace keeping forces into Burma? Not likely. China and Russia will veto whatever UNSC resolutions against the Junta proposed the US and her allies. Can we see what role does the exile Burmese Government can do here? Not much in present state, except issuing condemnation statements and lobbying usual friendly nations.

Now, we can see the rational of having self reliance and strong unified exile government headed by DASSK (she needs to leave the country) to challenge the Junta in the long run. This idea might seem far fetched and even unrealistic base upon the key factor of whether DASSK will leave the country or not. And that debate should be taking seriously now if we are to prepare for the long fight against soon becoming a legal military/civilian government in Burma.

They must have also looked into this legality of the referendum as well. And if I could guess it, they would asked the UN to do the monitoring of the process to make it legal. And just like in Cambodia election, Hun Sen had won the election quite easily under the UN supervisions, although the oppositions cried foul play in many places.

I believe, SPDC now feel much confident about getting majority “YES” votes on the referendum in May, ( I could recalled the referendum on BSPP 1974 constitution that got 99% Yes votes nation wide, and I was quite surprised to hear the result of our local polling station declared 100% ‘YES’ votes while at least we (me and my father and others) had voted – NO) , giving little time for any one to take part in the verification, clarification and amendment of the draft constitution even if they are allowed to do so.

So this referendum in May will be the repetition of 1974 affair, and just a matter of whether the UN is going to be there or not to make it look legal. If there are no so much oppositions from the international communities on this legal issue, they will certainly go ahead with their plan and will get another 99% YES votes.

Country like Singapore is now saying this is the positive development, and likewise many pro-engagement proponents organization like the ICG have been talking to take this opportunity, in thier view hoping to establish political space where they can operate to get political reform in Burma eventually. No one can guarantee for sure that they would get invited to do so by the SPDC in the process.

And another fact that I think that play a significant role to set dates on both referendum and election is the health of Than Shwe, as you have stated in your second posting. The successions line up in Burmese military hierarchy has never been clear since Ne Win times, and the same goes for Than Shwe as well. I have been told that Than Shwe will take Maung Aye along with him when he becomes President after the election, assuming that they still win with majority even if NLD take part in it.

That leaves the post of C-in-C of Defense to Shwe Mann or another younger protégé of Than Shwe, most likely Myint Shwe. of MI. But rumors said that Maung Aye still wanted to be next C-in-C of Defense after Than Shwe and have been refusing to go along with Than Shwe to take one of the VP posts in new civilian-cum-military cabinet. So, my guess is that Maung Aye must have agreed now to give up his military post along with Than Shwe after 2010. Perhaps, in return, one of his men would be promoted to Deputy C-in-C Defense in his place Thus, it seems that every one must be happy with the formula and they are getting their acts together now to go for it. However, the NLD and DASSK was never considered and included in their formula right from the beginning.

There should not be a surprise of the SPDC’s referendum date in May, as their draft constitution have long been done, just waiting for the right time to declare. And their propsoed election date of 2010 can be change to any further dates if they feel that they are not sure of winning it.

Obviously by setting the dates for the referendum and election, SPDC have employed again their old trick to throw off-balance the international communities and the UN, who have been consistently asking them to set time table for the implementation of their “road map”.

And now, they have cleverly put the ball in the opposition democratic parties’ court, whether they are prepared to participate in the election under their terms, i.e. SPDC constitutions that is most likely to be approved in the coming May referendum, similar the previous BSPP 1994 constitution. And they have enough civilian cohorts to make this happen one way or another.

What would happen next, if NLD refuse to accept the May referendum and boycott the 2010 election, would depends upon the positions and responses of international communities and the UN, first on the referendum, and second, the subsequent 2010 election without NLD and democratic ethnic parties participation.

Most certainly, the US and some key EU members will not recognized the results of May referendum without NLD participation. However, lead by regional super powers like China and India with Russia support, the ASEAN group is likely to toe the line along regional consensus, likely to accpet and recognize the referendum results. Then the UN will now be facing political dilemma caught between the two opposing groups.

Once there is a split between the international communities, the SPDC shall be triumph of the major political campaign and would easily sail across the winning line in 2010 unless some drastic events are taken place inside the country.

How can we stop SPDC’s referendum? What support the exile democracy movement can give to achieve this?