A cry from Burma

Historical Perspective

_ By Gazala Paul

Specialist in Coexistence and Conflict, Alumni of Brandeis University, Massachusetts, USA

Ethnicity and struggle:      

           Burma has an ethnic and religious plurality. From a geographical perspective, about one half of the country is comprised of territory traditionally occupied by non-Burman ethnic minorities. [1] Demographically, the Burmese (BaMa) make up 65 percent of the nation’s 50 million population. Burma’s population is estimated to be 50 million, settled in seven divisions (populated largely by Burmese [BaMa or Bamar], in colonial times called ‘Ministerial’ Burma) and seven states (identified with certain ethnic groups, or ‘Frontier’ Burma). The latter terms ‘ministerial’ and ‘frontier’ have not been used since the September, 1947 Constitution, but they indicate something of the demographic arrangement nonetheless. From an ethnic perspective, about two-thirds of the population is BaMa. Theoretically, ethnic minorities comprise the rest. To simplify these categories, eight major ethnic groups and 135 so-called ‘national’ or ‘principal races’ are identified.[2] The ethnic groups are BaMa, Rakhine, Shan, Mon, Chin, Kayin, Kayah or Karenni and Kachin. A 1931 census, which some maintain was the last to comprehensively attempt any kind of ethnic enumeration, gives an indication of the percentile size of these communities. Analysts and social scientists extrapolate from these figures (e.g., BaMa 65%; Karen 9%; Shan 7%; Chin 2%; smaller groups like the Mon, Kachin and Wa at 1% each; Indian 7%, though many have subsequently left the country). [3] The two major races came into Burma, the Sino-Tibet and the Mon-Khmers, and from these dozens of what might loosely be called ethnic ‘groups’ or sub-sects emerged. [4] Added to this is the matter of religious diversity. Although the Theravada Buddhism of the BaMa majority is shared by the Rakhine and most Shans and Karens, Burma has large communities of Christians, Hindus and Muslim. Christianity is more often than not identified with tribal minorities, such as Chin, Kachin and Karen. It thus carries with it the stigma of colonialism and close identity with the ethnic minorities. [5]  Indians, whether Hindu or Muslim, are still regarded by many as kala or ‘foreign’. Much more discomfort confronts Islam. Probably comprising up to 13% of the population (the state claims only 3%), Muslims are found in at least four sects. The largest groups are the Rakhine Muslims (their name, Rohingya, is derived from the word Rakhine). There are likely over one million Rohingya in Rakhine State (the Arakan). Few have Burman citizenship. [6]  The military government insists on a ‘Myanmarfication’ program that ignores the integrity of tribal, aboriginal and other ethnic cultures. Most importantly, education programs give little place to indigenous languages other than Burmese. It is not just language and religion that’s at stake here, but a severe, patronizing attitude from the heartland of the ethnocratic state, from Rangoon. The regional army commanders are almost always BaMa, a clear indication of cultural as well as military hegemony.

Mobilization of these ethnic groups:

     After World War Two there was an immediate accelerated rise of nationalism, but without much time to work out what a nation and nationalism might best mean in Burma’s peculiar circumstance. Regrettably, the British had done nothing to foster a sense of ethnic harmony or national unity. Indeed, Furnivall avers that British rule “stimulated sectional particularism…fostered racial antagonism and subverted the internal balance of power.” [7] This unfortunate policy heightened the ‘primordial sentiments’ (to use the language of Clifford Geertz), [8] particularly among the majority Burmese. As part of this, the architect of Burma’s sovereignty, the Bogyoke or Major General Aung San, inherited a powerful tradition of Buddhist political activism. Figures like the Arakan monks U Seinda and U Ottama in the early 20th century, along with the Burmese monk U Wissera and the nationalist ex-monk Saya San in the 1920’s and 30’s, left a rich legacy as anticolonial agitators. As Emmanuel Sarkisyanz has noted, “for some time, religion was the only unifying factor available, the only way Burmese nationalism could express itself”. [9] Buddhist domination of what a sense of independent Burmese nationalism might represent did not interrupt Aung San’s agenda, however. Intent on building a framework for a new union of Burma, he sidestepped the religious and collateral BaMa ethno-national claims to superiority, and met with key Shan, Chin and Kachin leaders in Panglong, a small town in Shan State. On 12 February 1947, the Panglong Agreement was signed, described not as an “incorporating document” but as “a general agreement providing for [so-called] Frontier Area representation in the government’s Executive Council, and an agreement in principle… for the autonomy of the Frontier Areas in internal administration.” [10]  A central weakness of the Agreement, however, was the conspicuous absence of the Karen, Karenni, Rakhine (Arakanese) and Mon. The Karen were the most problematic, still perceived by many Burmese has having received “preferential treatment” from the British (the Karen remained loyal to the British in World War II and contributed several battalions of trained troops to the post-War Burma Army, soon to be disbanded by Gen. Ne Win). [11] But whatever might be said about the deficiencies of Panglong, it remains an historic triumph of sorts, not yet to be duplicated. Aung San’s assassination in July 1947, just months before Burma’s independence, immediately compromised the Agreement. His successor, Prime Minster U Nu, lacked the vision and capacity to carry the ethnic accord and infant federalism forward.

Ethnic identity in Burma

     The question of how democracy affects ethnic relations and ethnic identity presupposes that ethnic identities are fluid and that political changes can bring about changes in the relationship between ethnic groups and influence ethnic identity. This is a presupposition that is linked to an instrumental perspective of ethnicity (the Batesian Theory). [12] In this perspective, ethnic identities arise in certain circumstances. They are fluid and malleable. Conflicts that arise between ethnic groups therefore often have other, non-ethnic, causes. They are rooted in characteristics linked to a specific situation, such as the nature of a political regime or a change of regime. The counterpoint to this view is the primordial position that ethnic identities are given. Ties of religion, blood, language and custom are traits that unite members of an ethnic group across time and that have an ineffable quality (Geertz). As a result, conflicts between ethnic groups are often seen as given. Today, many scholars seek to combine the two positions, based on the realization that specific aspects of an ethnic identity are open for change, but that the relevance of ethnic identities as such tends to persist over time.

     In Burma, there were adverse circumstances surrounding the development of democracy before 1962, related to the nature of ethnic identity as well as to the diverging conceptions of democracy that dominated Burmese political thinking.  As several scholars have pointed out, the lack of a common national identity has meant that the quest for national unity has been a key to Burmese politics for the past fifty years. [13] Efforts to develop democracy after 1948 were accompanied by efforts to engage in nation building. An assimilation policy promoting Buddhism and the Burmese language was put in place in order to turn the members of Burma’s various ethnic groups into Burmese. What contributed to complicate these efforts is that for various reasons, ethnic identities in Burma are partially defined in terms of mutual oppositions. For instance, in 1946, a leading Karen nationalist leader and member of the Karen Goodwill Mission to London, San Po Chit, argued that “it is a dream that Karens and Burmans can ever evolve a common nationality”. [14] Such mutually opposing identities are not only characteristic of the relationship between Karen and Burman. They also exist between ethnic groups in the valleys and the plains of the Irrawaddy and ethnic groups in the hills, between Buddhists and non-Buddhists – in particular Muslims (as the conflicts between Arakanese and Rohingya indicate) – between those who speak Burmese and those who speak other languages. [15]

Concepts of democracy:

     Institutionalized political debate in modern Burma has a history of fifty years. Under the British in the 1930s, when Burma became separated from India, political parties mushroomed. Although these groups merely served the ends of individual leaders, they did establish the precedent of a multi-party system that survived till 1962.  Whether the term “democracy” can be appropriately applied during those periods is debatable, but political pluralism was certainly in evidence. [16]

     Democracy in Burma between 1948 and 1962 had a focus on electoral democracy. When Burma became independent in 1948, very different concepts of democracy prevailed among the main political actors. The ruling party, the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL) developed a political platform based on socialism. For the AFPFL, politics and economics were closely linked. In 1947, Aung San argued that genuine democracy could not develop in a capitalist economy. Instead, he proposed a New Democracy for Burma that entailed a democratic political system combined with a mixed economy and a strong state that would participate in the country’s economy and social affairs. The long-term aim was the development of a socialist state. After 1948, the AFPFL continued to develop an ideology along the same lines. The AFPFL thus stood for an extensive and substantial interpretation of democracy and how it related to other sectors of society. By the same token, democratization also acquired a broader significance that went beyond political reforms.

     Several of Burma’s non-Burman leaders did not share the AFPFL’s conception of democracy. When the traditional leaders of the Chin, Kachin and Shan came together with Aung San at Panglong, Shan State, in 1947, they signed an agreement on internal autonomy within a democratic framework for the peoples of the hill areas. In 1951, the leader of the Mon Freedom League (MFL), Nai Ba Lwin, compared Burma to the “truly democratic” Swiss Commonwealth (as he described it), arguing that in Switzerland, the four ethnic and linguistic communities were granted both autonomy and language rights. [17] In other words, there was a second concept of democracy in Burma that was closely linked to the idea of political autonomy and cultural rights for ethnic minorities and to a more limited state. Attempts by various political actors to act on the basis of these concepts ended in clashes. For instance, the nationalization and redistribution of land was a key policy for the AFPFL after 1948. Two land nationalization acts were passed, one in 1948 (which was never implemented due to the outbreak of the war) and one in 1954. The issue of land reforms brought conflicts between the central government and representatives from Arakan and Shan State. Opposition was partly expressed in legal terms. For instance, Shan representatives argued that land nationalization fell within the competence of the various states in Burma, and that it was not for the union to decide on land matters. However, the conflict also had other dimensions and was expressed in other terms. The struggle of those who pressed for land reforms – known as the anti-feudalists – was interpreted as part of a broader reform movement to change the traditional social structure in Shan State and the role of the traditional Shan princes – the saohpas, which was based on control over land. In Arakan, the objections were not directed so much against land redistribution as such as against state ownership over land. These objections need to be understood in relation to the context at the time marked by growing Arakanese aspirations for autonomy and the identification of the government in Arakan with the ruling AFPFL and in particular with the Burman ethnic majority. [18]

     A second example of how different interpretations of democracy led to different interpretations of certain events and resulted in conflicts between the government and an ethnic group were political reforms in the traditional powers of the Shan saohpas. Shortly after independence in 1948, the saohpas gave up their judicial authority to the new central government in Rangoon. Legislative powers were transferred to the new union parliament. However, the saohpas retained their traditional positions as heads of government in the state and they kept a privileged position in the upper Chamber of Nationalities in parliament. In 1959, the saohpas also transferred their executive power to the elected Shan State government and gave up their seats in the parliament. In Rangoon, attempts by the government to push for these reforms were seen as a movement towards more democracy in Shan State and the saohpas were regarded as a leftover of a traditional feudal political system. In Shan State, however, the push from Rangoon was regarded as undue interference of a Burman government in internal Shan affairs. Shan leaders subsequently played a central role in the federal movement that emerged in Burma at the end of the 1950s in connection with preparations for constitutional reforms in 1959. After 1959, members of saohpa families also played a key role in the rebellion that erupted in Shan State. [19] These two examples show that policies and policy processes aimed at consolidating democracy cannot be viewed separately from their effect on ethnic relations in a multiethnic state like Burma.

Elections and Party System in Burma:

     In the early years of independence, the constitutional arrangements appeared to be establishing strong democratic roots in society. National-level parliamentary elections were held in 1947, 1951, 1956, and 1960. The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League, the former wartime resistance organization that evolved into a political party, was victorious in the first three elections and accordingly formed AFPFL-dominated governments. In the 1960 election, former prime minister U Nu led his new Pyidaungsu (Union) Party to a decisive victory over the military supported Stable Faction of the collapsed AFPFL. Turnouts in these elections were often higher than 70 percent, and in accordance with Western expectations of electoral systems, losers vacated their offices and winners took over. Furthermore, by the early 1950s another crucial element of democratic rule emerged in the form of a “loyal opposition.” Growing out of a faction that broke off from the AFPFL in 1950, the National United Front (NUF) developed into a viable opposition party. In the 1956 election, it gained forty-seven seats to the Chamber of Deputies, including numerous seats previously considered “safe” by the AFPFL. In that election, the NUF polled more than 30 percent of the popular vote, as compared to 48 percent for the AFPFL. [20] Beyond its electoral strength, the NUF also commanded extensive media attention and succeeded in organizing trade unions and peasant organizations outside of the AFPFL’s reach. Later, the two successor parties to the AFPFL that competed in the 1960 elections continued in the tradition of a loyal opposition as they worked within the provisions of the 1947 constitution. In many ways, the success of the NUF in the 1956 election and the election of U Nu over the military-backed candidate in 1960 represented clear steps forward on the paths toward institutionalizing a truly competitive parliamentary system.

          The findings by Saideman and Lounge [21] suggest  that ethnic conflicts are more prone to erupt during the transition from non-democratic to democratic rule, and that they subside during the subsequent consolidation of the democratic regime. These are the conclusions of the “Minorities at Risk” project at the University of Maryland, U.S., which has mapped ethnic conflicts across the globe since the 1980s. However, the project also finds that there are noticeable differences between the impact of democratization in the post-communist states in the former USSR and Eastern Europe, where conflicts increased during the transition to democracy, and in the Third World, where they subsided with the introduction of democracy. In other words, the pattern is not entirely uniform. [22] Apparently, Burma is a country that fits with the general pattern described above. Several scholars have argued that a gradual process of democratic consolidation was taking place in the country between 1948 and 1962. They three elections that were conducted in 1951, 1956 and 1960, and argue that these elections were reasonably free and fair, and that a party system was emerging between 1948 and 1962. [23]

Institutional failure in Burma

     A number of studies argue that ethnic conflicts develop as a result of failed institutional arrangements and that they can be managed by the proper crafting of political and other institutions. Indeed, such arguments became increasingly common in the 1980s and 1990s. Examples of such arguments include Donald Horowitz’ study from 1987 of the relationship between party systems and ethnic conflicts as well as Arent Lijphart’s studies of consociational democracies as a means to avert the emergence of ethnic conflicts. [24]

     Institutional explanations can also be found in the academic literature on ethnic relations in Burma. Most frequently, explanations with regards to Burma point to ambiguities in the federal structure of the union created by the constitution in 1947 as well as inconsistencies in the manner by which demands by various ethnic groups were met and in the type of measures that were selected. For instance, scholars refer to the establishment of Kachin, Karenni and Shan State in the former Frontier Areas while demands for autonomy among Karen, Arakanese and Mon were neglected, or to the contrast between the political autonomy guaranteed by the Panglong agreement and the cultural policies of assimilation and Burmanization pursued by various governments after 1948. [25] A related set of institutional explanations does not refer to weaknesses in specific institutional arrangements, but to the nature of the Burmese state. For instance, David Brown [26] argues that ethnic separatist rebellions in Burma are a reaction to the penetration into ethnic minority areas of an ethnocratic state associated with Burman ethnic nationalism. In Burma, the state is weak and contested to the point of violence and it has been unable to control violent reactions from erupting in the periphery.

     The discussion of strategies to foster democratic modes of accommodation/dispute resolution in plural societies has been explained in the table four-fold (2×2) categorization, whose horizontal axis represents communalist vs. integrative perspectives and whose vertical axis is the degree of emphasis on institutional mechanisms that foster elite accommodations as compared to institutional arrangements that affect the society as a whole. (See Table 1) developed by Grofman Bernard and Robert Stockwell. [27]

Table 1.Categorizing Institutional Approaches to Fostering Stable Democracy in Plural Societies

	institutions that perpetuate the importance of ethnicity but seek to minimize its negative consequences (communal institutions)	institutions that seek to minimize the importance of ethnicity and/or foster a multiethnic character to the state (integrative institutions)
mass-oriented	separate legal systems specific provisions for group rights separate school systems (appropriate for rural Burma), education in local language and dialects. ethnically- based allocative rules for jobs, etc. that draw on the norm of proportional representation	a legal system with a strong emphasis on individual rather than group rights political distributions that are not tied to ethnicity requiring a single common language or requiring multilingualism of all citizens forbidding certain markers of group distinctiveness (e.g., the kala (dark complexion-terminology used for non-burmans in Burma)
elite-based	ethnically rooted  (territorial) federalism with considerable autonomy for subunits mono-ethnic electoral constituencies (or, in the extreme, communal rolls) elite power sharing mechanisms (e.g., grand coalitions; minority veto, ethnically based political parties, or, in the extreme, ethnically designated office holding) electoral rules that foster centralized elite control (e.g., list PR)– (Rotational Union Presidency-Shan to Burman to Karen) use of a parliamentary rather than presidential system	forms of federalism that either do not coincide with ethnicity or that divide up ethnic blocs into multiple units so as to diminish prospects of ethnic solidarity STV in multi-ethnic constituencies (Reynolds & Reilly, 1999) the alternative vote in multiethnic constituencies (Horowitz, 1985)

      The emphasis on institutional failure as the root cause of Burma’s ethnic conflicts is also apparent in the quote by Saw Ba Thinn from the KNU when he speaks of the need for a proper “constitutional arrangement with the non-Burman ethnic nationalities”. It is furthermore apparent in the manner in which the Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee (ENSCC) explains the need for a tripartite dialogue in relation to the New Panglong Initiative. For the Committee, the Burmese problem is a constitutional problem. It is neither a ‘minority’ problem given that the various non-Burman ethnic groups form a large part of the Burmese population, nor an ‘ethnic’ problem given that the main opponents are not the various ethnic nationalities, but Burma’s ethnic nationalities versus the military. [28]

Ethnopolitics in Burma:

     Weak state and poor institutional arrangements have indeed provided a basis for the development of conflict in Burma. However, it is also necessary to examine specific policies and policy processes. The two examples referred to above – land nationalization in Arakan and political reforms in Shan State – clearly show the need to examine the impact of concrete policies – whether they are targeted at one or more ethnic groups (such as the reforms in Shan State) or not (as in the case of the land reforms). Indeed, it can be argued that in a multiethnic country like Burma, politics, economics and culture are closely linked, and that many policies inevitably take on an ethnic dimension because they frequently impinge upon the relative power and position of ethnic groups. In addition, once ethnic demands have been raised, the need to formulate a nationality policy to respond to such demands and prevent the development of conflict quickly arises. In a newly democratic regime, a nationality policy that succeeds in creating harmonious ethnic relations can play a key role in securing legitimacy for the government and for democracy, thus turning the new regime into “the only game in town”, as Juan J.Linz and Alfred Stepan describe the process of democratic consolidation. [29] Indeed, whether ethnic demands should be addressed during the transition to democratic rule, or whether they ought to be postponed to after the introduction of democracy is in itself a policy choice.

     This is a point that has to be recognized in the debate about the tripartite dialogue: Should the military and the National League for Democracy (NLD) discuss a transition to democracy for Burma first, and should the ethnic minorities be included at a later stage in the dialogue? Or should all three parties sit down at the same time and discuss? The ethnic minorities –obviously – favour the latter option, as the quote by Saw Ba U Thinn above indicated, while the military is reluctant to allow the non-Burman groups to participate in the dialogue. In the case of Burma, the transition to independence and democracy in 1948 created a poor basis for the development of a harmonious multiethnic society. Instead, the transition took place in the midst of increasing ethnic tensions. The transition to independence furthermore created a democratic regime that institutionalized certain ethnic interests through the creation of separate states in Shan, Kachin and Karenni and special representation rights for the Karen, while other ethnic demands were ignored –most significantly demands for autonomy by Karen, Mon and Arakanese. Several key issues had not been addressed by the time of independence. For instance, the Panglong agreement guaranteed autonomy in internal administration for the hill peoples within an overall political framework based on democracy, but there were no provisions for how to solve conflicts that may occur between these two principles. Neither did the constitution outline principles for the internal administration in the states. The consolidation of democracy and the development of a common will to live together depend on activities in several arenas, including politics, economics and culture. But in Burma, politics in these arenas did not consolidate democracy or create a common sense of solidarity.

      In the cultural arena, the impact of the government’s assimilation policies has indeed, in the fields of education, religion, language or culture – in particular the growing role of Buddhism in the public – either failed to solve tensions between ethnic groups or contributed to increase them, as several scholars have pointed out. [30]

     In 1948, Burma was established as a secular state that recognized the special position of Buddhism as the religion professed by the majority of the citizens. By 1960, the question of state religion had become the main issue during the electoral campaign, and Buddhism was proclaimed the state religion. [31] The gradual prominence of Buddhism fuelled tensions among religious minorities and was one factor that contributed to the outbreak of armed rebellion in Kachin State in 1961.

     In addition, economic development was uneven with a higher level of development – agricultural as well as industrial –in Lower and Central Burma than in the largely non-Burman areas along the border. For instance, in the mid-fifties an observer noted that “nineteenth of the development of the last eight years can be seen in a forty-minute drive, going no more than ten miles from the city (Rangoon) in the triangle formed by the Hlaing River and the Pegu River”. [32] Today, this has led to a situation where the border areas continue to lag behind central areas in terms of economic and social development.[33]

The Politics of Ethnicity:

      The military claimed that it had to take over power (1962) because there was a secession plot by the leaders of the ethnic nationalities (or the “national races”, the term used by the present regime). [34] They further claimed that without a strong military presence, there would be secession and inter ethnic violence. This is the justification for military rule in perpetuity. The leadership of the ethnic nationalities and resistance movements has focused on ethnicity. They articulate the aspirations of their respective groups for rights and equality in terms of ethnicity. The aspirations of Burma’s ethnic nationalities [35] are no different to that of ethnic groups and minorities (and indigenous peoples) elsewhere, who feel endangered, marginalized and discriminated against by the state. However, in another sense, the Burma context differs from other countries. The Union of Burma was formed by an accord signed at Panglong in 1947, one year prior to the emergence of Burma as an independent, post-colonial state (in 1948). The accord was between the leaders who represented the different territorial entities of what became the Union of Burma. In this sense, both historically and conceptually, the ethnic Burma’s so-called ethnic conflict is more aptly described as a political conflict against the ruling military rather than a conflict between warring ethnic groups. The conflict is primarily a conflict between the ruling military exercising a monopolistic control of the state in Burma and the ethnic nationalities. It is a vertical conflict between the state and various ethnically defined societies. It is a conflict about how the state is to be constituted and how the relation between the constituent components of society and the state are to be ordered. It is not the case of ethnic segments feuding with and killing each other, nor is it driven by the secessionist impulses. Looking at Burma’s history since 1948, a long-standing and seriously dysfunctional relationship between the state and broader society can be observed and it has been exacerbated by four decades of monopolistic military rule.

Federalism and Ethnic Equality and Rights

     There has been an agreement among ethnic-based resistance organizations since the early 1970s to adhere to the idea of federalism, and to live together under one flag, within a genuinely federal framework. In the early 1990s, there was an agreement among all forces within the democracy movement that federalism was the common goal. [36] It can be said that apart from the military, there is a broad consensus among political actors in Burma with regard to the spirit of the Panglong Accord and a consensus to rebuild the country as a democratic, federal Union. Although there is a broad consensus regarding the future Union of Burma as a federal state, the ethnic nationalities faces the challenge, firstly, of understanding federalism – specifically, whether a federation is a union of territories or a union of ethnic segments. It remains ambiguous and there is currently widespread confusion in this regard. The answer, based on the Panglong Accord, would be that federation in Burma is about the union of territories, not of ethnic societies or segments. Furthermore, a federation or federalism is a system of sharing power and dividing jurisdiction between and among territorial components making up the union or federation. In other words, a federation is about how different territorial entities will relate to one another within a larger nation-state configuration. The essence of federation or federalism is the equality of constituent members, one where there is no Mother State dominating and controlling other member states. And also, it is one where the national or federal government and legislature is not biased or weighted in favor of one member state, but is formed to promote the welfare and security of the union or the federation as a whole and by extension, the people as a whole. The national or federal government does not “possess” a specific piece of territory – to which and for which it is mainly responsible. This leads to the challenge: How to define ethnic equality and rights in the context of federalism? Do they have a place in federalism? These questions are important for the ethnic nationalities because no constituent state in Burma is ethnically homogenous. They are all multi-ethnic. Even in the most ethnically homogeneous state – the Chin and the Karenni State – there are to be found dialect groups that are quite different from one another in varying degrees. Furthermore, the aspiration for ethnic equality has been unleashed in the course of events that transpired. The resistance to state where the military monopolized power has come from ethnic-based constituent states and the language of ethnicity has been widely employed by ethnic-based resistance movements to rally followers and legitimize the cause. The demand for ethnic equality will therefore have to be dealt with by the ethnic nationalities leaders and other political actors in Burma It may not be enough therefore to agree on principles of federalism, i.e., on how power is to be shared among and between territorial components composing the federation or the union, and between the federal center and the constituent states. The ethnic nationalities and political actors in Burma will have to look at ways to accommodate the aspirations for ethnic equality in practical terms and ensure that no ethnic groups is dominated by another ethnic group. The challenge therefore is how to ensure ethnic equality and rights both within a federation and within the multi-ethnic member states of the Union. It is clear that state constitutions hold the key to this problem. How different ethnic (or dialect) groups living within the territorial boundary of a constituent or member state should relate to each other as equals, is a question that state constitutions should deal with and provide solutions. The state constitutions are the sites where a framework to provide for ethnic equality and rights, have to be worked out.

State Constitutions and Ethnic Equality

     Thus it becomes clear that the ethnic nationalities are faced with two very important challenges. One, is to establish a genuinely federal union where all the member states are equal, and where there is no Mother State (or a Pyi-Ma) – as envisioned by the founding leaders at Panglong in 1947. It may rightly be said that an arrangement where one member state is powerful equal than others cannot be defined as a federation or a Union. Second is the challenge of ensuring ethnic equality and rights, specifically within a multi-ethnic member state, so that smaller groups are not dominated and marginalized by a major ethnic group within a given state. It is here suggested that democratic de-centralization should be advanced by ethnic nationalities’ leadership and political actors when drafting the state constitutions. The idea of empowering local communities defined in terms of ethnicity or otherwise, through the system of local governments and councils elected and run by local people, should be explored (Indian local governance system).[37] This is all the more so necessary because there has been no experience in Burma of democratic decentralization at any level. Local governments in the past have been established from the top – an arrangement where administrative officers are appointed from the center and sent down to administer localities. The system of de-centralized administration, if adopted, would provide ethnic communities with the opportunity and power to manage their own affairs through the democratic control of autonomous local governments. Thus, the aspiration of an ethnic group for equality and the right to determine its own fate would, to a very large extent be fulfilled. For example, in a locality, such as the Shan State, where many ethnic groups such as the PaO (or Lahu), Palaung, Akha reside, the local government would be one run and managed by the PaO (or Lahu). Thus, in the Shan State, there would be at least one, if not several local governments that are ethnically defined (as PaO, or Lahu, Palaung, Akha, etc, in townships and other areas). This would be the pattern in every constituent state if a system of democratic de-centralization or autonomous local government is put in place or adopted in the state constitutions.

      Another advantage of establishing a system of local governments where power is democratically de-centralized is that local governments would have to accommodate the aspirations of minority ethnic groups within their jurisdiction. Democratic local governments do not possess the power to coerce or marginalize minority groups. Elected local governments must be responsive to the aspirations of minorities as well. The State government and the State legislature would (as would the federal government and the federal parliament) operate at another level with different powers and functions. They would not be responsible for any specific local government function or a particular community issue. State-level officials and law-makers will be responsible only for, and to, the whole state and all its citizens, not to particular ethnic communities or any local governments. The relationship between the state government and local governments -should be based on accommodation, consultation, cooperation, and the division and sharing of power and responsibility as well and not be a top-down process.

Democratic Decentralization

     One alternative to a system of democratic de-centralization based on highly autonomous local governments as suggested here is an arrangement whereby a higher authority or a national convention or a constitutional assembly, creates autonomous regions or special areas for ethnic minorities. Such an arrangement is currently in place in China, and was included in the constitution of the now defunct Soviet Union. Theoretically, such an arrangement will provide ethnic minorities with self-government and autonomy, and ethnic equality as well. Another alternative is to ensure through the constitution a certain number of seats in the national parliament be reserved for ethnic minorities – i.e., a system of ethnic quotas. The British in Burma did put in place such an arrangement where the Karen and other minorities were provided with a number of seats in the legislative assembly of Burma Proper. [38] Such an arrangement would, at the very least, ensure the representation for minorities at the national level, and as well provide them with a vehicle to preserve their identity and values. Thus it is conceivable that the ethnic conflict in Burma can be managed through constitutional means, through the adoption of a federal framework at the national level and putting in place at the state level, a system of democratic de-centralized local governments that empower and are responsible to local communities.

 

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[1] Furnivall,  J.S., 1988, p.4. The Governance of Modern Burma: N.Y: Institute of Pacific Relations.

[2] Martin, Smith, 1999, p.31. Burma- Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity: London: Zed Books.

[3] The Economist Intelligence Unit, p.13. EIU Country Profile 2000 Myanmar: London.

[4] Naing,U Min.  2000, p.2 .National Ethnic Groups of Myanmar (Trans. by Hpone Thant).Yangon: Thein Myint Win Press, Burma.

[5] Smith, D.E.  1965, p.267. Religion and Politics in Burma: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

[6] Martin, Smith, 1999, p.219. Burma- Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity: London: Zed Books.

[7] Furnivall, J.S. 1988, p.21. The Governance of Modern Burma: N.Y: Institute of Pacific Relations, “The object of British policy was to develop the material resources of Burma by throwing it open for free enterprise to all the world on equal terms….Industry and commerce passed into the hands of foreigners”. (p.22).

[8] Geertz Clifford, 1963.The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States, in Geertz Clifford, ed., Old Societies and New States: New York: Fress Press,

[9] Sarkisyanz, Manuel. 1965. Buddhist backgrounds of the Burmese revolution.The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

[10]Taylor, R.H, 1987, p.90. The State in Burma. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, The new Union of Burma reflected in the 1947 Constitution, based on four federating states (Shan, Karenni (Kayeh), Kachin, Kayin and the Chin Special Division). It provided for a titular president whose office rotated among the ethnic groups. Two houses in the legislature included a Westminster-style elected Pyithu Hluttaw, and a 17 Chamber of Nationalities, the latter giving special representation to the various ethnic groups.

[11] Smith (op. cit.), p.48.

[12] Bates, Robert, Modernization, Ethnic Competition & Rationality of politics in Contemporary Africa

[13] Silverstein, Josef. 1980,  Burmese Politics – The Dilemma o f National Unity: New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

[14] Gravers, Michael. 1996. The Karen Making of a Nation: in Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antløv (eds): Asian

Forms of the Nation, Richmond: Curzon Press Ltd.

[15] Leach, Edmund. Oct. 1960.   The Frontiers of Burma: Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 49-67

[16] Steinberg, David. 1990, P. 24. The Future of Burma-Crisis and Choice in Myanmar: The Asia Society, The University Press of America.

[17] Lwin, Nai Ba. December 1951. The Mon National Question and the Creation of a Mon State: Statement.

[18] Fairbairn, George. 1957,Vol. 30, No. 4. Dec., Some Minority Problems in Burma: Pacific Affairs. 299-311.

[19] Tzang, Yawnghwe. 1987.  The Shans of Burma, Memoirs of a Shan Exile: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore.

[20] Tinker,Hugh1967, 4th ed., p. 90.  The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence, Oxford University Press, London.

[21]. Sideman,  Stephen M, Lanoue, David J. 1985-1998. Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict , Comparative Political Studies, 35(`1) : 103-129. 2002 Sage Publications.

[22] Gurr, Ted R. 2000, Peoples versus States, Minorities at Risk in the New Century, Washington D.C.: United States

Institute of Peace Press.

[23] Callahan, Mary (1998) pp. 49-68. On Time Warps and Warped Time, Lessons from Burma’s ‘Democratic Era in

Rotberg, Robert I (ed.): pp. 49-68. Burma – Prospects for a Democratic Future: Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute

Press.

[24] Horowitz, Donald 1987. Ethnic Groups in Conflict:  Berkeley: University of California Press; Lijphart,Arent 1977. Democracies: Democracy in Plural Societies: New Haven: Yale University Press.

[25] Smith, Martin 1991. Burma – Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity: London: Zed Books Ltd.; Silverstein, Josef 1980. Burmese Politics – The Dilemma of National Unity: New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

[26] Brown, David. 1994.  The state and ethnic politics in Southeast Asia:. Routledge, London/New York.

[27] Grofman, Bernard and Stockwell, Robert. 2000, August 14-17. Institutional Design in Plural Societies: Mitigating Ethnic Conflict and Fostering Stable Democracy, paper presented at the University of Messina Conference on The Political Economy of Institutional Development. School of Social Sciences: University of California, Irvine

[28] Chiang, Mai.  2002. Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Co-operation Committee: Tripartite Dialogue:  Policy Papers,: UNLD Press.

[29] Juan, J.Linz, and Stepan, Alfred. 1996 Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

[30] Silverstein, Josef. 1980.  Burmese Politics – The Dilemma of National Unity: New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers

University Press.

[31] Donald,  Eugene, Smith. 1965.  Religion and Politics in Burma:  Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press

[32] Tinker, H. 1957 The Union of Burma – A Study of the First Years of Independence:  London: Oxford.

University Press

[33] Brown, David, 1998. From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia.  Pacific Affairs 61,1. University of British Columbia.

[34] The term used here is “ethnic nationalities” rather than “national minorities” to denote the ethnic groups of the country. Burma is a multi-ethnic country. The major groups are the Burman, Shan, Karen, Kachin, Chin, Rakhine, Mon, and Karenni. There is indeed much confusion as regard the majority-minority equation. There exists a perception that the Burmans are the majority, in the absolute sense, and that the rest are ethnic minorities. While the Burmans do indeed constitute an overall majority (perhaps about 50 percent plus), they are a minority in several states, e.g. the Shan State, the Chin (etc.) states. The equation becomes more complicated when the constituent states are themselves multi-ethnic, despite the names: the Shan State, the Karen State, etc. However, in the Burmese language, a distinction is made between minorities and ethnic national groups (nationalities) – Lu-Ne-Zu, denoting minorities, and Lu-Myo-Zu for ethnic nationalities.

[35] The non-Burmans are ethnic segments that do not speak Burmese as their mother tongue like, for example, the Shan,

Mon, Karen, etc. The Burmans are ethnic Burmese, speaking the Burmese language. Apart from the eight major

segments, there are numerous other ethnic groups like the Ta-Ang or Palaung, PaO, Lahu, Wa, Akha, Kayan. As well, there are Chin, Burman, Kachin (etc.) dialect groups. nationalities are the founding nations of the Union of Burma, and the 1947 Panglong Accord – was not one between ethnic segments but between founding nations.

[36] This refers to the 1990 Bo Aung Gyaw Street Declaration between the NLD (National League for Democracy) and the UNLD (United Nationalities League for Democracy) to establish a democratic federal Union, and the 1991 Manerplaw Agreement between the NCGUB (National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma) and ethnic nationalities armed resistance organizations.

[37] The 73^rd Amendment Act 1992 came into effect from the 24 April 1993. All States enacted legislation by 23^rd April 1994. The Panchayats previously were a mere suggestion in the Directive Principles of State Policy whereas the 73^rd Amendment resulted in the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIS) being conferred Constitutional Status bestowed upon the PRIs, it is now has the potential to revolutionize the way we have been seeing local governance. It is not only a system of participative self governance but it ensures political empowerment to the poor, marginalized, and the oppressed, which traditionally in India have been Schedules Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, and the women. These features activate Panchayati Raj Institutions today, to contribute to the process of development.

Panchayati Raj Institutions today, to contribute to the process of development.

[38] Silverstein, Joseph. July 1959. The Federal Dilemma in Burma. Far Eastern Survey. Vol. 28, No 7: 97-195. pg. 98.